Small input, large economy — who sits at each stage
| Stage | Companies | US output 2023 | Most exposed |
|---|
| Mining, refining, trading | 33 | 0.16% | TdVib, Northern Minerals Limited, Mkango Resources Limited |
| Functional goods (magnets, chemicals, cells, components) | 33 | 0.4–0.7% | Hitachi Astemo, Ltd., Lafert Group S.p.A., Magnomatics Ltd |
| Industries that depend on them | 130 | 4.9–5.4% | aerodyn Engineering GmbH, Enercon GmbH, Vensys Energy AG |
Counted from our company dossiers and recomputed on every load. Stage is inferred from each company’s role and sector, and this counts companies, not output. US output share: the ECB’s mapping of industries to stages (Occasional Paper No. 384, Table A1) applied to BEA supply tables, 2017 detail carried forward to 2023 by each industry’s summary-level growth; the range drops low-intensity industries. Stage 3 over time: 2017 5.9% · 2018 6.1% · 2019 5.7% · 2020 4.9% · 2021 5.1% · 2022 5.6% · 2023 5.4%. The ECB publishes 0.1% / 0.4–0.7% / 3.7–6.3%, and estimates an 18-month partial Chinese restriction at 0.3–0.6% of US output (18 months of partial Chinese export restrictions, severity scaled by the authors' geopolitical-distance assumption; model output, not observation); source.
If CN stops supplying — where it lands
$7.5bn of output at risk worldwide, 2.08× the $3.6bn first-round loss. US $967M, EU $2.1bn. Other suppliers: MM $2.6bn · JP $1.5bn.
| Where it bites hardest | At risk | of its output | Named here |
|---|
| VN · Electrical equipment | $91M | 0.34% | none in our corpus yet |
| SI · Electrical equipment | $15M | 0.33% | Domel d.o.o. |
| HU · Electrical equipment | $32M | 0.23% | none in our corpus yet |
| PL · Electrical equipment | $43M | 0.14% | none in our corpus yet |
| VN · Motor vehicles | $11M | 0.13% | none in our corpus yet |
| DE · Electrical equipment | $166M | 0.12% | aerodyn Engineering GmbH, Enercon GmbH, AMK Arnold Müller GmbH & Co. KG |
| MX · Electrical equipment | $51M | 0.12% | none in our corpus yet |
| MY · Electrical equipment | $12M | 0.12% | none in our corpus yet |
Output at risk if CN’s $3.6bn of exports stop, propagated through every country and industry: OECD ICIO 2025 edition (released Aug 2025, revised Jan 2026), 2022 structure, BACI 2024 flows, supply-side (Ghosh) input-output model. No substitution and no inventories, so this is an upper-bound exposure, not a forecast loss; USGS’s price-based estimate above answers a different question. Amplification by year: 2016 2.06× · 2017 2.03× · 2018 2.04× · 2019 2.04× · 2020 2.03× · 2021 2.05× · 2022 2.08×. Rare earths as one chain: compounds and metals (HS 2846, 280530) plus permanent magnets (HS 850511, which also includes SmCo and AlNiCo). Named companies: dossiers headquartered there, in a matching sector, already exposed to this material.
Reality check — what live disruptions actually did to the EU
China export licensing — heavy rare earths and magnets (since 2025-04)
EU imports from CN: +7% over the last 3 months (worst month -15%, 2025-06) · all extra-EU: +7% · EU output index: +5%
no clear supply cut; gap largely filled by other suppliers; no visible EU output fall. Data to 2026-07. Magnets containing Dy/Tb are licensed; HS 850511 also holds SmCo and AlNiCo.
Filing.
China export licensing — permanent magnets alone (since 2025-04)
EU imports from CN: +6% over the last 3 months (worst month -22%, 2025-07) · all extra-EU: +7% · EU output index: +5%
no clear supply cut; gap largely filled by other suppliers; no visible EU output fall. Data to 2026-07. Magnets alone: in tonnage the rare-earth series is dominated by bulk cerium and lanthanum compounds, which hides a magnet-specific cut. HS 850511 also holds SmCo and AlNiCo.
Filing.
Eurostat Comext imports (tonnes) and EU27 industrial production, 12 months before the disruption against the months since, refreshed monthly. Descriptive, not causal: prices, seasons and other shocks move the same series, and only a control supplier the cause does not touch isolates it.