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One screen answering: “if the dominant supplier halts, who can fill the gap, how fast, at what regulatory risk?” Replaces manual cross-referencing of the production table with the IPTM register.
If Russia refining (45% of global) halts: 5 substitutes cover 100% of non-RU capacity · fastest ramp 0-6mo (CN) · highest policy-risk: GB (score 3.7, 2 filings).
Stage: Conversion + enrichment (SWU) · Year: 2025 · Source: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (Feb 2026 release; 2025 data).
Post-removal HHI = 2,382 (moderate). Lead-time is a heuristic from share-of-stage (≥10% → 0-6mo brownfield · ≥2% → 6-12mo ramp · >0 → 12-24mo new line · 0 + supplier-directory present → 24-36mo greenfield). Policy-risk = Σ over last-24m uranium filings issued by that country (severity × polarity-sign × 5y-linear recency). This measures a country's own export-restriction behaviour only — it is a separate axis from Western sanctions exposure (flagged below in red where it applies). A country with zero restrictive filings can still be sanctioned by the US/EU/UK and therefore not a real sourcing option.
Mining is geographically diverse; enrichment is Russia-dominant (Rosatom ~45% of global SWU capacity). 2024 US Russia-uranium-import ban + 2026 EU diversification programmes target this exact stage. Russia enrichment share has been remarkably stable ~45% since 2014; China has grown ~2% → ~15% over the decade.