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The strategy is not a single decree but a presidential policy framework with several distinct legal vehicles, some implemented administratively, others requiring Congressional action:
1. State-majority requirement on "strategic" salars. For salars classified as strategic — explicitly the Salar de Atacama and Salar de Maricunga in the initial announcement — the State must hold a controlling stake in any extraction venture. This is implemented via public-private partnership contracts assigned to Codelco (Atacama) and ENAMI (Maricunga) acting as the State's vehicles until Empresa Nacional del Litio is constituted.
2. Codelco-SQM negotiation as the proof of concept. SQM's existing CORFO lease over part of the Atacama salar runs to 2030. Rather than wait for expiry, the government directed Codelco to negotiate a new joint venture with SQM that extends operations beyond 2030 but transfers control to the State (Codelco-majority). The framework agreement was reached in December 2023; the joint venture went binding through 2024-2025.
3. National Lithium Company. A new state-owned firm with a mandate covering the entire lithium value chain (exploration, extraction, refining, cathode/cell, recycling). Establishment is subject to a separate bill in Congress; as of mid-2025 the bill had not advanced and the de-facto role is filled by Codelco and ENAMI.
4. Protected salt-flat network. Commitment to designate 30% of Chile's salt flats as protected areas by 2030, restricting future extraction.
5. Technology mandate. New projects required to evaluate direct lithium extraction (DLE) and other lower-impact methods rather than the traditional evaporation ponds that dominate Atacama operations.
Mineral Commodity Summaries 2024) and holds the largest reserves. Together with Australia and Argentina it forms the global supply core; a regulatory shift in any one of the three reshapes the market.
Albemarle (NYSE: ALB) — the two operators on Atacama — both face renegotiated terms that reduce their share of project economics post-2030. SQM's Codelco JV terms were the most visible consequence.
Triangle" countries watch each other; Argentina's regulatory posture has been more open, but a Chilean state-majority precedent is exactly the kind of policy that travels in EM resource-nationalism cycles. Bolivia (YLB) is already in this posture but has failed to commercialise.
works through renegotiation rather than expropriation, (b) existing leases are honoured to expiry, and (c) Empresa Nacional del Litio remains unbuilt as of writing. Compared to Indonesia's nickel ore ban (severity 5), Chile's approach is more contractual and less abrupt.
capped by State majority; reserves-based valuation models need a sovereignty discount.
governance in state-aligned hands across producing countries is a structural margin-leak from Western-listed extractors to EM state vehicles.
lithium — significant balance-sheet and execution risk for what was already a stretched state enterprise.
first major Latin American jurisdiction to follow Indonesia's template (state-led upstream control), although via partnership rather than outright export ban.
has stalled in Congress. If it does not pass, "the strategy" in practice is just Codelco + ENAMI acting as ad-hoc state vehicles, which is materially weaker.
invites capital that might otherwise have gone to Chilean brownfield expansion. Track Argentine lithium FDI as the relevant flow indicator.
through 2024-2025; without execution, Maricunga remains on paper.
reflect the post-2030 governance shift on Atacama production share and the timeline risk on Maricunga ramp.