Loading…
Loading…
Base rate computed from analyst-asserted responds_to: edges in the reverse direction (target-country → issuer-country) for prior issuer-actions on the same target. Modal type + lag percentiles only — not a model output. Treat as a historical anchor for sizing counter-response scenarios, not a forecast in itself.
OFAC designated a network spanning oil purchasers, a port terminal, and shadow-fleet shipping intermediaries under E.O. 13902 (Iran's petroleum and petrochemical sectors) and E.O. 13846 (support to the National Iranian Oil Company, NIOC). China-based teapot refinery Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd. has received multiple shipments of Iranian crude worth "hundreds of millions of dollars"; its sole-owned Singapore broker subsidiary Xing AO Energy PTE. LTD. was added to the SDN List as a 50%+-owned affiliate. Three firms tied to a Dongying Port (Shandong) terminal — Baogang (Dongying Donggang) Logistics and Warehousing Co., Ltd., Shandong Jingang Port Co., Ltd., and (for prior-period control) Shandong Baogang International Port Co., Ltd. — were designated for the terminal having received more than one million barrels of Iranian crude from sanctioned shadow-fleet vessels since 2024. Six vessels (Panama-flagged STAR TWINKLE 6, LAMD, SKADI, BIG MAG; Sao Tome and Principe-flagged IMPALAS; San Marino-flagged THANE) and their Hong Kong, UK, and Marshall Islands owning companies (Star Twinkle Shipping Limited, Hong Kong Prime Trading Co., Ltd., Skadi Limited, Propitious Forever Trading Co Ltd, Embrace Que Limited, Nissho Lines Incorporated) were designated for ship-to-ship transfers and direct carriage of Iranian petroleum to China and the Persian Gulf. Two Indian-national vessel captains, Ketan Agarwal and Lincoln Francisco Viegas, were also designated for mastering sanctioned shadow-fleet vessels over multiple years.
Anchored on disclosed volumes rather than a single rate: the LAMD alone moved "upwards of eight million barrels" of Iranian crude to China since mid-2024, BIG MAG helped deliver "up to six million barrels" since early 2025, and the Dongying Port terminal received "more than one million barrels" via two now-sanctioned vessels. This is OFAC's third teapot-refinery action and first targeting Shandong terminal operators specifically — material widening of the designated network's node types (refiner + broker + terminal + shipowners + captains in one action), consistent with severity 4 on the sanctions scale used elsewhere in the register (see 2025-05-13-us-ofac-iran-oil-shipping-network-sepehr-energy for a comparable multi-node designation).
broker → terminal → shipowner → captain) in a single action rather than isolated SDN additions, raising compliance-diligence burden across China-bound crude logistics.
recurring node in Iran shadow-fleet sanctions actions (see also the 13 May 2025 Sepehr Energy network designation), reinforcing STS-transfer hub risk in those jurisdictions.
potential template for future actions against other China teapot-refinery receiving terminals.
exposure) not independently re-verified beyond the Treasury press release text at filing time.
per-vessel barrel volumes and refinery-level "hundreds of millions of dollars" language were given.