Kazakhstan Presidential Decree U2600001233 — Strategy for the Development of the Nuclear Industry until 2050

Mechanism

Presidential Decree U2600001233 is the capstone policy instrument for Kazakhstan's atomic industry, providing the 30-year strategic framework within which all sector-level regulations, investment agreements, and intergovernmental contracts sit. It was published in the official Adilet legal database (adilet.zan.kz) on or around 17 April 2026.

NPP programme — three-plant minimum:

• Plant 1 (Ulken/Balkhash): Two VVER-1200 Generation 3+ units totalling ~2.4 GW,

built by Rosatom. Intergovernmental agreements formalised 28 May 2026 (→ 2026-05-28-kazakhstan-russia-balkhash-npp-iga). Construction to begin 2027; first unit targeted operational by 2034, second by 2036. Estimated cost: USD 14.4 billion (~85% Russian state export credit).

• Plant 2: Second site approved January 2026; vendor and technology selection ongoing.
• Plant 3 (SMR): Small modular reactor technologies explicitly evaluated "for appropriate

regions, contingent on technical and financial viability." Potential deployment for coal-replacement in northern industrial zones.

• Plant 4: Being assessed contingent on demand growth; not yet committed.

Fuel-cycle sovereignty mandate:

The strategy calls for Kazakhstan to develop a domestic "nuclear cluster" — moving from raw uranium concentrate (yellowcake) exports toward fuel-cycle services including conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. Kazakhstan currently processes uranium at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant (UMP, Öskemen), which already produces pellets and fuel assemblies under Kazatomprom JVs, but the bulk of mined uranium is sold as U₃O₈ to foreign converters (primarily ConverDyn/US, Orano/France, Rosatom). The 2050 strategy sets a policy direction to capture more of that conversion/enrichment margin domestically over the next three decades.

R&D levy:

Kazakhstan's Scientific and Technical Council formalised a requirement in April 2026 — concurrent with this strategy — that uranium miners allocate 1% of annual uranium production costs to R&D, covering the period to 2030. This creates a structured fund for nuclear technology and materials research without direct state appropriation.

Production context:

Kazakhstan produced 23.3 kt of uranium in 2024 and an estimated 25.8 kt in 2025, accounting for roughly 40-45% of global mined output. Kazatomprom, the national uranium company, operates all uranium mines, either wholly or through JVs with Cameco (Canada), Orano (France), CGNPC (China), and others. Kazatomprom is listed on the London Stock Exchange (KAP) and Astana International Exchange (AIX).

Downstream implications

• The strategy is the overarching policy roof for all sector-specific KZ uranium instruments:

subsoil code priority-rights amendments, the MET tiered-tax, mine-level subsoil agreements, and the Balkhash NPP IGA all now explicitly nest under it.

• The NPP programme creates a captive domestic demand anchor for Kazakh uranium — at full build-out,

3-4 units at ~2.4 GW each would require ~2,000-2,400 tU/year of enriched fuel, absorbing a meaningful share of Kazatomprom production that currently flows to export markets.

• The SMR evaluation is notable: Kazakhstan has expressed interest in both Rosatom BREST-OD-300

and western SMR vendors (NuScale, Rolls-Royce). Western SMR penetration would reduce Russian dominance over Kazakhstan's nuclear energy infrastructure — the geopolitical dimension of the vendor choice is significant.

• The fuel-cycle sovereignty push directly threatens the existing business model of Western

converters and enrichers (Orano, Urenco, Centrus) who buy Kazakh concentrate and sell back enriched fuel. If Kazakhstan internalises even partial enrichment, it reduces feed demand from those operators over the 2035-2050 horizon.

• The 1% R&D levy creates institutional pressure to develop domestic nuclear engineering capacity,

reducing reliance on imported reactor technology and services over the strategy's 30-year arc.

Open questions

• Which vendor(s) will be selected for Plant 2, and whether it will be Russian, Chinese (CGN

HPR-1000), or a western technology — the answer will signal geopolitical alignment.

• Whether the enrichment/conversion provisions of the fuel-cycle cluster will be implemented

via Kazatomprom directly, via expanded Ulba Metallurgical Plant capacity, or through new JVs with state enrichers (Rosatom, Urenco, CHNFC).

• Pace of the SMR programme given Kazakhstan's lack of domestic SMR supply chain and the

current immaturity of most commercial SMR designs.

• Financing mechanism for Plants 2-4 beyond the Rosatom state export credit model used for

Plant 1 (which may not be politically acceptable for all sites).