Kioxia

GLEIF (checked 2026-08-27) has an ISSUED LEI for Kioxia Holdings but reports no parent on file (parent_reported: false). No single shareholder controls Kioxia: as of 2026-08-03, BCPE Pangea Cayman2 (14.19%) narrowly overtook Toshiba (14.12%, down from 15.10% after a stake sale) as largest holder. SK hynix holds convertible bonds tied to almost all of BCPE Pangea Cayman2's voting rights — giving SK hynix effective influence over the largest holder's votes despite not owning the shares directly — but is contractually capped at <=15% voting rights until 2028 under the original 2018 acquisition agreement. Kioxia's own annual report flags this SK hynix arrangement as a conflict-of-interest risk given SK hynix and Kioxia are direct NAND competitors. Toshiba's dossier does not exist in this corpus as a controlling parent (Toshiba is a large minority holder, not a controlling one), so no parent_slug applies.

Named counterparties identified by open-source research and written only where a primary source states the relationship — never inferred from sector or co-mention. 1 customer-side. This is a partial view: it covers the relationships we could evidence, not the company's full supply base.

Every exposure is read as a buyer dependency; the top 3 are its binding chokepoints.

As a buyer, policy pressure across its consumed materials is rising.

Descriptive trend in official policy actions on this company’s materials — a policy-pressure trend, not a price or trading signal. No forward probability is implied. Direction is measured on actions we have discovered, and discovery lags events: where the recent window is too thin to support a calm reading, the row says coverage-limited instead of easing.

🇯🇵 JP accounts for 100% of severity-weighted pressure.