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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: metals recycling. Company profile →
Altilium is a private UK clean-technology company (founded 2020, headquartered in Plymouth, Devon) that recycles end-of-life EV lithium-ion batteries. Its proprietary hydrometallurgical process, marketed as EcoCathode™, takes shredded battery scrap ("black mass"), leaches it in acid to dissolve the cathode metals, then purifies the resulting streams into battery-grade intermediates and cathode active material (CAM) for resale back into the battery supply chain. Altilium reports independent validation of over 95% recovery of key cathode metals.
Its ACT2 pilot line in Plymouth began processing battery waste in December 2024; a four-acre ACT3 scale-up plant (targeting ~24,000 EVs/year of throughput) is under construction in Plymouth with commissioning planned for late 2027, and a larger ACT4 facility is planned for Teesside. The company has raised capital across several rounds, including UK government support via Innovate UK's Battery Innovation Programme, and £18.5m in grant funding through the UK government's DRIVE35 Scale-Up Fund announced in April 2026 to build what it describes as the UK's first commercial recovery facility for critical minerals — separate from over £17m in private investment secured to date from backers including SQM Lithium Ventures, Marubeni Corporation and Mizuho Bank.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Altilium Group Ltd / Altilium Metals Ltd produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Graphite — recovered as the anode material; the company's April 2026 announcement puts ACT3's planned output at about 5,400 t/yr of graphite. Trade press (Interesting Engineering) attributes 99% graphite and 97% lithium recovery to the EcoCathode process (company-reported, not independently audited).
Manganese — explicitly named as a recovered metal (the company's patent title references purifying independent streams of manganese, nickel and cobalt), reflecting its use in NMC-type cathode chemistries.
Cobalt — explicitly named as a recovered cathode metal in Altilium's leaching/purification process and in its patent filing. Cobalt supply is concentrated in the DRC (mining) and China (refining), making recycled cobalt a meaningful hedge against both chokepoints.
Lithium — explicitly named as a target recovered metal at every stage of the EcoCathode process; ACT3's output specifically includes lithium sulphate. Global lithium refining is heavily concentrated in China, so a domestic UK recovery route is a genuine alternative-supply play, not a cosmetic one.
Nickel — explicitly recovered; ACT3's planned output includes nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP), an intermediate normally imported from Indonesian/Chinese-linked processing capacity.
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches graphitemanganesecobaltlithium · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 108d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗Graphite — recovered as the anode material; the company's April 2026 announcement puts ACT3's planned output at about 5,400 t/yr of graphite. Trade press (Interesting Engineering) attributes 99% graphite and 97% lithium recovery to the EcoCathode process (company-reported, not independently audited).
Manganese — explicitly named as a recovered metal (the company's patent title references purifying independent streams of manganese, nickel and cobalt), reflecting its use in NMC-type cathode chemistries.
Cobalt — explicitly named as a recovered cathode metal in Altilium's leaching/purification process and in its patent filing. Cobalt supply is concentrated in the DRC (mining) and China (refining), making recycled cobalt a meaningful hedge against both chokepoints.
+1 more touched material — see the composition section (3) above.
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
graphite — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
manganese — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches graphitecobaltnickel · flagged 26 Jun 2026, 101d pending
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax exemptions granted under individual mining Framework Agreements and introduces standard operating procedures — reduces discretionary government risk for large mining investors (Panda Hill niobium, graphite juniors, Buzwagi gold); parallel VAT amendments give equivalent statutory certainty for VAT exemptions; taken together, the bill moves Tanzania from discretionary tax administration toward a rule-of-law-based investor regime for all critical-mineral projects; budget targets Tanzania for top-4 niobium producer status (Panda Hill DA already signed March 24, 2026) and 50% geophysical survey coverage by 2030
source ↗Graphite — recovered as the anode material; the company's April 2026 announcement puts ACT3's planned output at about 5,400 t/yr of graphite. Trade press (Interesting Engineering) attributes 99% graphite and 97% lithium recovery to the EcoCathode process (company-reported, not independently audited).
Cobalt — explicitly named as a recovered cathode metal in Altilium's leaching/purification process and in its patent filing. Cobalt supply is concentrated in the DRC (mining) and China (refining), making recycled cobalt a meaningful hedge against both chokepoints.
Nickel — explicitly recovered; ACT3's planned output includes nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP), an intermediate normally imported from Indonesian/Chinese-linked processing capacity.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
graphite — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
cobalt — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches cobalt · flagged 11 Aug 2026, 55d pending
On 29 June 2026 DRC's Vice-Prime Minister for the National Economy (Daniel Mukoko Samba), Minister of Mines (Louis Watum Kabamba) and Minister of Foreign Trade (Julien Paluku Kahongya) jointly signed an arrêté interministériel regulating the commercialisation, export and nomenclature of marketable mining products, which for the first time BANS the export of unprocessed copper and cobalt concentrates outright — replacing the entire framework adopted 4 August 2023. Mining-rights holders, processing entities and buying counters (comptoirs) may seek a ministerial derogation to export less-elaborated products for up to one year, assessed against national mining policy and the technical/economic constraints of each mineral. A new tax regime for economically significant mining byproducts is introduced with a 3-month transition period. This is broader and more foundational than the existing filed/queued DRC cobalt-specific instruments — it is a national concentrate EXPORT BAN (not a quota or hydroxide-specific measure) covering BOTH copper and cobalt, issued under joint Economy/Mines/Trade authority rather than ARECOMS sectoral rulemaking. DRC = priority-tier chokepoint (cobalt, copper, tantalum). Severity 4 expected (national ban, dual-metal, replaces a 3-year-old framework).
source ↗Cobalt — explicitly named as a recovered cathode metal in Altilium's leaching/purification process and in its patent filing. Cobalt supply is concentrated in the DRC (mining) and China (refining), making recycled cobalt a meaningful hedge against both chokepoints.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in DR Congo stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a DR Congo processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
cobalt — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches cobalt · flagged 20 Jul 2026, 77d pending
On ~29 June 2026 the Autorité de Régulation et de Contrôle des Marchés des Substances Minérales Stratégiques (ARECOMS) ordered that all first-half-2026 cobalt export quotas left unused by 30 June 2026 be forfeited and recovered, with a 5 July 2026 cutoff, and reallocated into ARECOMS's discretionary "strategic quota" pool (already ~10% of the 96,600 t/yr authorised volume) earmarked for national-interest local-processing projects. This is an escalation/operationalisation of the filed 2025-02-22 ARECOMS cobalt quota system: it concentrates additional volume under state discretionary control, tightens the effective free-market allocation for producers (Glencore/KCC, CMOC, ERG) on the world's dominant cobalt chokepoint (~76% of mine supply), and — via the linked customs-notification malfunction that blocked quota-linked export declarations after 1 July 2026 — created a real short-run supply interruption. IPTM action would be an AMENDMENT to 2025-02-22-drc-arecoms-cobalt-export-ban-quota-system.
source ↗Cobalt — explicitly named as a recovered cathode metal in Altilium's leaching/purification process and in its patent filing. Cobalt supply is concentrated in the DRC (mining) and China (refining), making recycled cobalt a meaningful hedge against both chokepoints.
cobalt — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
TZ · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · touches graphitecobaltlithiumnickel · flagged 29 Jun 2026, 98d pending
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the official LIST of critical and strategic minerals — a distinct REGULATORY instrument (not the fiscal Finance Act). The strategy explicitly prioritises IN-COUNTRY BENEFICIATION for graphite, nickel, rare earths and lithium, and amends mineral-processing-licence conditions so that every processing licence now requires a domestic value-addition plan; it targets a 40-mineral beneficiation/local-processing scope plus technology-transfer partnership requirements. Once the list is gazetted, raw/unprocessed exports of the listed minerals (Tanzania = a structural graphite chokepoint via Faru/Lindi/Mahenge graphite, plus emerging niobium at Panda Hill and nickel at Kabanga) face value-addition-plan gating and likely export conditionality — re-pricing a major non-China graphite supply node and the Kabanga nickel/Panda Hill niobium projects.
source ↗Graphite — recovered as the anode material; the company's April 2026 announcement puts ACT3's planned output at about 5,400 t/yr of graphite. Trade press (Interesting Engineering) attributes 99% graphite and 97% lithium recovery to the EcoCathode process (company-reported, not independently audited).
Cobalt — explicitly named as a recovered cathode metal in Altilium's leaching/purification process and in its patent filing. Cobalt supply is concentrated in the DRC (mining) and China (refining), making recycled cobalt a meaningful hedge against both chokepoints.
Lithium — explicitly named as a target recovered metal at every stage of the EcoCathode process; ACT3's output specifically includes lithium sulphate. Global lithium refining is heavily concentrated in China, so a domestic UK recovery route is a genuine alternative-supply play, not a cosmetic one.
+1 more touched material — see the composition section (3) above.
This changes the form of what TZ exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your TZ-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a TZ processing partner, not a supplier switch.
graphite — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
cobalt — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
Revises 30 CFR Part 580 to streamline 10 provisions governing prospecting, leasing, and operations for hard minerals (manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, seafloor massive sulfides) on the US Outer…
Gabon (CTRI transitional government, President Oligui Nguema) announced at Africa Forward Summit in Nairobi (May 2026) its intention to subscribe to Eramet SA's €500M capital increase, giving the Gab…
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Cabinet-cleared bill to replace the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act, Act 703: raises mining royalties from current 3–5% range to 9–12% (price-linked sliding scale), introduces a new medium-scale mining…
Madagascar's Council of Ministers approved resumption of mining-permit issuance on ~28-29 Jan 2026, ending a moratorium in place since 2010 (imposed during a political transition amid mining-title sp…
Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed mine…
Japan's METI + MOF made an affirmative PRELIMINARY determination in an anti-dumping investigation (initiated 22 Jul 2025 on an application from Nippon Steel, Nippon Yakin Kogyo, NAS Stainless Steel S…
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
10% free-carried state equity in ALL new mining and energy projects (no-cost government stake via Epangelo Mining); consultations on 51% Namibian ownership in new mining ventures; maximum royalty rat…
Minister of Finance, acting under s.
Chinese battery-materials major Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (603799.
Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all fo…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
On 28-Nov-2025 European Metals Holdings announced the Czech government approved a grant of up to EUR 360M under the Ministry of Industry and Trade's "Strategic Investments for a Climate-Neutral Econo…
In March 2026 the outgoing Boric administration reportedly fast-tracked and submitted to the Contraloría General de la República (Chile's comptroller) a batch of ~5 further Contratos Especiales de Op…
Draft law amending Morocco's 2015 Mining Code (led by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Minister Leila Benali), with public consultations reported open since ~Feb 2025.
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
Gabon = ~25% world manganese reserves, world's 2nd largest manganese ore exporter (~8 Mt/year via COMILOG/Eramet); ban on raw ore exports forces domestic processing investment (silicomanganese, EMD,…
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
If adopted, creates a unified mining regulatory framework across Cameroon, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad — harmonising licensing regimes, fiscal terms, transparency oblig…
The 12 July 2025 Bougival Accord (13-page political agreement creating a "State of New Caledonia" within France, pending a 2026 referendum + French organic law) contains an economic-rebuilding pact t…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in advanced negotiations to acquire a 15-20% equity stake (deal value ~USD 1.
Full replacement of the Mining Act 1992 with sweeping new statute: state acquires up to 30% equity in any new mining project (Kumul Minerals free-carry); special mining leases (SML) issued for initia…
Indonesia = ~50% global nickel mine supply and dominant producer of NPI/ferronickel/MHP; export duty on downstream nickel products (NPI, ferronickel, nickel matte, MHP) would add a material cost laye…
All DRC mining operators (Glencore, CMOC, Ivanhoe Mines, Eurasian Resources Group, and 50+ others) must transfer 5% of share capital to Congolese employees by July 31, 2026 or face permit suspension;…
The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…
On 11 May 2026 Huayou Cobalt announced an all-cash agreement to acquire ASX/AIM-listed Atlantic Lithium for USD 210m, taking control of the Ewoyaa project (~1.
On 11 Feb 2025 the Attorney General of Canada filed a Notice of Application (Federal Court file T-472-25) seeking a court order under ICA s.
5 of 69 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 5 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its sector (metals recycling) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of graphite. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the graphite chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of manganese. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the manganese chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of cobalt. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the cobalt chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of lithium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the lithium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of nickel. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the nickel chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.