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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: mining metals. Company profile →
AngloGold Ashanti plc is a multinational gold miner operating 10 mines/projects across Africa, the Americas and Australia, producing 3.09 million ounces of gold group-wide in FY2025. Its group parent redomiciled from South Africa to England & Wales in September 2023 (primary listing moved from JSE to NYSE: AU, with JSE: ANG and Ghana Stock Exchange: AGA as secondary listings), while corporate operational functions sit in Greenwood Village, Colorado (US).
Cerro Vanguardia is its sole Argentine asset — a combined open-pit/underground gold-silver mine near Puerto San Julián, Santa Cruz Province, 92.5% AngloGold Ashanti / 7.5% provincial state company Fomicruz, producing 179,000 oz gold in FY2025.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
No production footprint is recorded in its dossier yet — its HQ country is 🇬🇧 United Kingdom, a registration fact, not a production or sales claim. We say so rather than guess.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Silver — structural byproduct, not trace. Cerro Vanguardia is a genuine gold-*silver* mine, and its silver byproduct is material to group economics: AngloGold Ashanti produced 3.70 million ounces of silver group-wide in FY2025, and Cerro Vanguardia alone accounted for 3.
Sulfur — byproduct, minor. AGA's Brazilian operations (Cuiabá Complex / Córrego do Sítio) produce 0.26-0.
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 4 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
CN · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches sulfur · flagged 25 Jul 2026, 72d pending
Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still exportable under special approval; reporting attributes the measure to a joint Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) + General Administration of Customs (GACC) notice, expected to run through end-2026. Sulfuric acid is the indispensable leach/process input for copper hydrometallurgy (SX-EW), phosphate-fertilizer production, and battery-metal (nickel HPAL, lithium) processing, so a China export halt tightens a systemic upstream chokepoint hitting seaborne-acid buyers (Chile/Peru copper, Morocco/India phosphate, Indonesia nickel). This is a DISTINCT instrument from the already-filed 2025-12-12-china-ndrc-phosphate-fertilizer-export-suspension (finished-fertilizer export control) and 2026-03-31-russia-decree-350-sulphur-export-ban-extension (elemental sulphur, different country/product) — it controls the acid itself.
source ↗Sulfur — byproduct, minor. AGA's Brazilian operations (Cuiabá Complex / Córrego do Sítio) produce 0.26-0.
sulfur — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
PE · stage passed-committee → elevated likelihood · touches silver · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Reduces maximum idle-concession period from 30 to 15 years (initial production deadline unchanged at 10 yr; penalty extension cut from 20 yr to just 5 yr); eliminates irrevocable legal status of mining concessions for first time in Peruvian law history, making concessions revocable by administrative authority; introduces higher annual fees and stronger production/investment requirements; threatens legal certainty for Peru's undeveloped copper and silver project pipeline — Peru = #2 copper, #4 silver, #1 lead, #2 zinc globally
source ↗Silver — structural byproduct, not trace. Cerro Vanguardia is a genuine gold-*silver* mine, and its silver byproduct is material to group economics: AngloGold Ashanti produced 3.70 million ounces of silver group-wide in FY2025, and Cerro Vanguardia alone accounted for 3.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
silver — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
BO · stage draft-published → moderate likelihood · touches silver · flagged 17 Jun 2026, 110d pending
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12. 5% impuesto adicional IUE-RM on extraordinary commodity-price gains; retains 25% company profits tax (IUE) and 5% royalty; streamlines licensing from current 9–15 years to international norms; enables association contracts between private companies and cooperatives; coordinated with a forthcoming general investment law incorporating fiscal and non-fiscal incentives; framed around reversing 15+ years of investment drought; backing from World Bank; bill to be presented to Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional after Mining Summit (May 18–20, 2026); target: executive submission late July 2026
source ↗Silver — structural byproduct, not trace. Cerro Vanguardia is a genuine gold-*silver* mine, and its silver byproduct is material to group economics: AngloGold Ashanti produced 3.70 million ounces of silver group-wide in FY2025, and Cerro Vanguardia alone accounted for 3.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
silver — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
ID · stage announced → low likelihood · touches silver · flagged 16 Jun 2026, 111d pending
The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — covering copper, tin, nickel, gold, and silver — is postponed indefinitely pending development of a "mutually beneficial formulation"; the already-filed PP 19/2025 (2025-04-11) established a tiered royalty regime that would have raised effective royalty burdens for large-volume miners; the postponement relieves immediate cost pressure on Freeport McMoRan (copper/gold — Grasberg), Vale Indonesia (nickel), PT Timah (tin), and other major operators; the delay also signals continued investor-consultation sensitivity in Indonesian mining fiscal policy following industry pushback
source ↗Silver — structural byproduct, not trace. Cerro Vanguardia is a genuine gold-*silver* mine, and its silver byproduct is material to group economics: AngloGold Ashanti produced 3.70 million ounces of silver group-wide in FY2025, and Cerro Vanguardia alone accounted for 3.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
silver — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
None of these filed an explicit stage — in-force status defaults from an absent stage: field (flagged below), not a claim any filer made. Each still links to the register entry with its primary source; verify stage before treating as a confirmed baseline.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 2 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in ev batteries, permanent magnets, ev motors, wind turbines, defence… — read via the graph's critical minerals node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of silver. Restrictions by 🇲🇽 MX push buyers toward ex-MX producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the silver chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of sulfur. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the sulfur chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.