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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: mining metals. Company profile →
China Rare Earth Group Co., Ltd. ("CREG") is a Chinese central state-owned enterprise formally established 2021-12-23 in Ganzhou, Jiangxi Province, through Beijing's consolidation of the rare-earth units of three "Big Six" SOEs — Aluminum Corporation of China (Chalco), China Minmetals Corporation, and Ganzhou Rare Earth Group — plus two research institutes, China Iron & Steel Research Institute Group and Grinm Group.
It mines, smelts, and separates rare-earth ore into oxides through subsidiaries including China Southern Rare Earth Group (Ganzhou, Jiangxi) and Guangdong Rare Earth Industry Group (assets folded in January 2024), and supplies refined feedstock to downstream NdFeB magnet makers such as JL MAG rather than manufacturing finished magnets itself.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where China Rare Earth Group Co., Ltd. produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Dysprosium and terbium — the group's core, bulk-scale business, not a downstream user's trace input. CREG is the operator of the majority of China's ion-adsorption clay deposits in Jiangxi and Guangdong, the dominant global source of heavy/medium rare earths. Based on 2021 quota figures at formation, CREG accounted for roughly 62% of China's national heavy-rare-earth supply, with dysprosium and terbium — the non-substitutable additives…
Dysprosium and terbium — the group's core, bulk-scale business, not a downstream user's trace input. CREG is the operator of the majority of China's ion-adsorption clay deposits in Jiangxi and Guangdong, the dominant global source of heavy/medium rare earths. Based on 2021 quota figures at formation, CREG accounted for roughly 62% of China's national heavy-rare-earth supply, with dysprosium and terbium — the non-substitutable additives…
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 1 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
EU · stage announced → low likelihood · touches dysprosiumterbium · flagged 27 Jun 2026, 102d pending
Under the RESourceEU action plan (COM(2025) 945, adopted 3 Dec 2025 and already filed as 2025-12-03-eu-resourceeu-action-plan-com-2025-945), the European Commission committed to PROPOSE, by Q2 2026, restrictions on the export of scraps and waste of permanent magnets — an essential feedstock for European NdFeB recyclers that is increasingly shipped abroad (notably to China). Recycling could meet ~20% of the EU's ~20,000 t/yr permanent-magnet demand, so retaining end-of-life and pre-consumer magnet scrap in the EU is framed as a supply-security measure to reduce China dependence. Accompanying measures: a new EU-level Combined Nomenclature sub-code + European Waste Catalogue entry to identify/track permanent magnets and EoL products containing them, plus a targeted CRMA amendment on product-labelling and pre-consumer-waste recycling. If enacted as a binding export restriction this would be the EU's first outbound control on a critical-mineral waste stream — directly relevant to anyone in the EU/China REE-magnet recycling loop, and a mirror-image to China's REE/magnet export controls (re-prices intra-bloc vs ex-bloc scrap flows). The European recycling industry (BIR) has publicly warned the measure risks market distortion, so adoption/scope is contested.
source ↗Dysprosium and terbium — the group's core, bulk-scale business, not a downstream user's trace input. CREG is the operator of the majority of China's ion-adsorption clay deposits in Jiangxi and Guangdong, the dominant global source of heavy/medium rare earths. Based on 2021 quota figures at formation, CREG accounted for roughly 62% of China's national heavy-rare-earth supply, with dysprosium and terbium — the non-substitutable additives…
Dysprosium and terbium — the group's core, bulk-scale business, not a downstream user's trace input. CREG is the operator of the majority of China's ion-adsorption clay deposits in Jiangxi and Guangdong, the dominant global source of heavy/medium rare earths. Based on 2021 quota figures at formation, CREG accounted for roughly 62% of China's national heavy-rare-earth supply, with dysprosium and terbium — the non-substitutable additives…
dysprosium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
terbium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
2 of 44 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 2 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in ev batteries, permanent magnets, ev motors, wind turbines, defence… — read via the graph's critical minerals node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of dysprosium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the dysprosium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of terbium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the terbium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.