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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: metals refining. Company profile →
HBIS Serbia Iron & Steel (Smederevo) runs Serbia's flagship integrated steel works: two blast furnaces feeding a three-converter basic-oxygen-furnace shop, rated at roughly 2.2 million tonnes/year of finished product, plus an electrolytic tin-plate finishing line at a separate site in Šabac serving the food/chemical/pharma can-stock market. The plant (formerly Železara Smederevo, then U.
S. Steel Serbia) was privatized to HBIS Group — Hesteel, a Hebei provincial state-owned steelmaker — for €46 million in 2016, and is routinely cited by Beijing and Belgrade as a flagship Belt and Road / bilateral cooperation project.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where HBIS Group / HBIS Serbia Iron & Steel (Smederevo) produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Tin — structural coating input (not trace). The Šabac line electrolytically tin-plates steel coil into can stock; tin is a direct, non-substitutable input to that specific product line.
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
NG · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches tin · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all foreign-invested mining JVs; builds on existing eMC+ digital cadastre and mandatory value-addition plans introduced Nov 2024; could force processing-plant investment or suspension of raw mineral shipments from Africa's most populous economy; RMRDC = Raw Materials Research and Development Council (the sponsoring agency)
source ↗Tin — structural coating input (not trace). The Šabac line electrolytically tin-plates steel coil into can stock; tin is a direct, non-substitutable input to that specific product line.
This changes the form of what Nigeria exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Nigeria-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Nigeria processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid Nigeria entirely: tin supply outside NG is 🇨🇳 CN 26%, 🇮🇩 ID 23%, 🇵🇪 PE 12% (shares renormalised after removing NG).
BO · stage draft-published → moderate likelihood · touches tin · flagged 17 Jun 2026, 110d pending
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12. 5% impuesto adicional IUE-RM on extraordinary commodity-price gains; retains 25% company profits tax (IUE) and 5% royalty; streamlines licensing from current 9–15 years to international norms; enables association contracts between private companies and cooperatives; coordinated with a forthcoming general investment law incorporating fiscal and non-fiscal incentives; framed around reversing 15+ years of investment drought; backing from World Bank; bill to be presented to Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional after Mining Summit (May 18–20, 2026); target: executive submission late July 2026
source ↗Tin — structural coating input (not trace). The Šabac line electrolytically tin-plates steel coil into can stock; tin is a direct, non-substitutable input to that specific product line.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
ID · stage announced → low likelihood · touches tin · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Indonesia = ~20% of global refined tin exports (Bangka Belitung); a ban on refined-tin exports would force downstream solder/semiconductor-packaging manufacturing domestically; disrupts global electronics and EV supply chains dependent on Indonesian tin solder and specialty alloys
source ↗Tin — structural coating input (not trace). The Šabac line electrolytically tin-plates steel coil into can stock; tin is a direct, non-substitutable input to that specific product line.
Indonesia supplies 21% of world tin mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇮🇩 ID: 🇨🇳 CN 34% · 🇵🇪 PE 16% · 🇧🇷 BR 13% · 🇨🇩 CD 13% — shares renormalised after removing ID.
UG · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · touches tin · flagged 13 Jun 2026, 114d pending
Mandates 15% free-carried interest for Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC) in all new mining licences; introduces mandatory mineral buying centres; tightens local-content and value-addition obligations — changes joint-venture economics for all new Ugandan mining operations, raising effective cost-of-entry for foreign miners
source ↗Tin — structural coating input (not trace). The Šabac line electrolytically tin-plates steel coil into can stock; tin is a direct, non-substitutable input to that specific product line.
This changes the form of what UG exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your UG-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a UG processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid UG entirely: tin supply outside UG is 🇨🇳 CN 26%, 🇮🇩 ID 23%, 🇵🇪 PE 12% (shares renormalised after removing UG).
ID · stage announced → low likelihood · touches tin · flagged 16 Jun 2026, 111d pending
The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — covering copper, tin, nickel, gold, and silver — is postponed indefinitely pending development of a "mutually beneficial formulation"; the already-filed PP 19/2025 (2025-04-11) established a tiered royalty regime that would have raised effective royalty burdens for large-volume miners; the postponement relieves immediate cost pressure on Freeport McMoRan (copper/gold — Grasberg), Vale Indonesia (nickel), PT Timah (tin), and other major operators; the delay also signals continued investor-consultation sensitivity in Indonesian mining fiscal policy following industry pushback
source ↗Tin — structural coating input (not trace). The Šabac line electrolytically tin-plates steel coil into can stock; tin is a direct, non-substitutable input to that specific product line.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
1 of 15 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in critical minerals — read via the graph's critical minerals processing node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-05), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
+10 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.