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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: semiconductor equipment. Company profile →
JX Advanced Metals Corporation (TSE: 5016) is a Tokyo-headquartered semiconductor- and electronics-materials producer spun off from ENEOS Holdings and listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Prime Market on 19 March 2025 (Japan's largest IPO since 2018). It traces to the Hitachi copper mine founded in 1905 and today runs three segments: Semiconductor Materials (sputtering targets; high-purity tantalum/niobium powders), ICT Materials (rolled copper foil and precision copper alloys for circuit boards), and Metals & Recycling (mining, smelting/refining, end-of-life electronics recycling) — a vertically integrated chain from ore to finished electronic material. Customers include leading-edge chipmakers such as TSMC and Intel.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where JX Advanced Metals Corporation produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Tungsten — structural component. 5N-purity sputtering targets for gate electrodes, plus W-Si and W-Ti alloy targets; a thin-film layer rather than a mass input, but tungsten sourcing (concentrated in China) is a standing supply-chain risk across the whole semiconductor-equipment sector.
Indium — structural component. Indium phosphide (InP) compound-semiconductor wafers (~40% claimed global share) for photonics/RF applications — indium is a primary constituent of the wafer itself, not a trace dopant, but this is one specific product line rather than the whole company's output. Dropped from the sector-default stub (no company-specific evidence found):…
Cobalt / Nickel — trace additive. 5N-purity cobalt and nickel (including NiPt alloy) sputtering targets for gate electrodes: nanometre-scale thin films, not a mass consumer of either metal, but drawing on the same cobalt/nickel supply chains (DRC cobalt; Indonesia/Philippines nickel) as battery-grade demand.
Titanium — structural component. Sputtering-target material for barrier layers under aluminium interconnects and hard masks in semiconductor fabrication, and the titanium leg of the ~60%-share titanium-copper alloy line — a functional thin-film/alloy layer, not a bulk structural metal here.
Copper — bulk input. Core business across two of three segments: rolled copper foil for flexible circuit boards (~80% claimed global share), titanium-copper alloy (~60% share), and 6N-purity copper/CuAl/CuMn sputtering-target seed layers for semiconductor interconnects, on top of upstream mining and smelting/refining of copper ore.
Cobalt / Nickel — trace additive. 5N-purity cobalt and nickel (including NiPt alloy) sputtering targets for gate electrodes: nanometre-scale thin films, not a mass consumer of either metal, but drawing on the same cobalt/nickel supply chains (DRC cobalt; Indonesia/Philippines nickel) as battery-grade demand.
Niobium — trace additive. Produced alongside tantalum from the same columbite-tantalite ore stream in the Semiconductor Materials segment's high-purity metal-powder line; a co-product exposure rather than a standalone product line.
Tantalum — bulk input. High-purity tantalum powder (~50% claimed global share) for capacitors, plus tantalum sputtering targets used as diffusion barriers in copper-interconnect and TSV (through-silicon-via) processes. Tantalum supply is concentrated (DRC, Rwanda, Brazil ore sources) and carries conflict-mineral traceability requirements.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches cobalttitaniumcoppernickelniobium · flagged 26 Jun 2026, 101d pending
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax exemptions granted under individual mining Framework Agreements and introduces standard operating procedures — reduces discretionary government risk for large mining investors (Panda Hill niobium, graphite juniors, Buzwagi gold); parallel VAT amendments give equivalent statutory certainty for VAT exemptions; taken together, the bill moves Tanzania from discretionary tax administration toward a rule-of-law-based investor regime for all critical-mineral projects; budget targets Tanzania for top-4 niobium producer status (Panda Hill DA already signed March 24, 2026) and 50% geophysical survey coverage by 2030
source ↗Cobalt / Nickel — trace additive. 5N-purity cobalt and nickel (including NiPt alloy) sputtering targets for gate electrodes: nanometre-scale thin films, not a mass consumer of either metal, but drawing on the same cobalt/nickel supply chains (DRC cobalt; Indonesia/Philippines nickel) as battery-grade demand.
Titanium — structural component. Sputtering-target material for barrier layers under aluminium interconnects and hard masks in semiconductor fabrication, and the titanium leg of the ~60%-share titanium-copper alloy line — a functional thin-film/alloy layer, not a bulk structural metal here.
Copper — bulk input. Core business across two of three segments: rolled copper foil for flexible circuit boards (~80% claimed global share), titanium-copper alloy (~60% share), and 6N-purity copper/CuAl/CuMn sputtering-target seed layers for semiconductor interconnects, on top of upstream mining and smelting/refining of copper ore.
+2 more touched materials — see the composition section (3) above.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
cobalt — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
titanium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches cobaltcopperniobium · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 108d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗Cobalt / Nickel — trace additive. 5N-purity cobalt and nickel (including NiPt alloy) sputtering targets for gate electrodes: nanometre-scale thin films, not a mass consumer of either metal, but drawing on the same cobalt/nickel supply chains (DRC cobalt; Indonesia/Philippines nickel) as battery-grade demand.
Copper — bulk input. Core business across two of three segments: rolled copper foil for flexible circuit boards (~80% claimed global share), titanium-copper alloy (~60% share), and 6N-purity copper/CuAl/CuMn sputtering-target seed layers for semiconductor interconnects, on top of upstream mining and smelting/refining of copper ore.
Niobium — trace additive. Produced alongside tantalum from the same columbite-tantalite ore stream in the Semiconductor Materials segment's high-purity metal-powder line; a co-product exposure rather than a standalone product line.
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
cobalt — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
copper — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches cobaltcopper · flagged 11 Aug 2026, 55d pending
On 29 June 2026 DRC's Vice-Prime Minister for the National Economy (Daniel Mukoko Samba), Minister of Mines (Louis Watum Kabamba) and Minister of Foreign Trade (Julien Paluku Kahongya) jointly signed an arrêté interministériel regulating the commercialisation, export and nomenclature of marketable mining products, which for the first time BANS the export of unprocessed copper and cobalt concentrates outright — replacing the entire framework adopted 4 August 2023. Mining-rights holders, processing entities and buying counters (comptoirs) may seek a ministerial derogation to export less-elaborated products for up to one year, assessed against national mining policy and the technical/economic constraints of each mineral. A new tax regime for economically significant mining byproducts is introduced with a 3-month transition period. This is broader and more foundational than the existing filed/queued DRC cobalt-specific instruments — it is a national concentrate EXPORT BAN (not a quota or hydroxide-specific measure) covering BOTH copper and cobalt, issued under joint Economy/Mines/Trade authority rather than ARECOMS sectoral rulemaking. DRC = priority-tier chokepoint (cobalt, copper, tantalum). Severity 4 expected (national ban, dual-metal, replaces a 3-year-old framework).
source ↗Cobalt / Nickel — trace additive. 5N-purity cobalt and nickel (including NiPt alloy) sputtering targets for gate electrodes: nanometre-scale thin films, not a mass consumer of either metal, but drawing on the same cobalt/nickel supply chains (DRC cobalt; Indonesia/Philippines nickel) as battery-grade demand.
Copper — bulk input. Core business across two of three segments: rolled copper foil for flexible circuit boards (~80% claimed global share), titanium-copper alloy (~60% share), and 6N-purity copper/CuAl/CuMn sputtering-target seed layers for semiconductor interconnects, on top of upstream mining and smelting/refining of copper ore.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in DR Congo stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a DR Congo processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
cobalt — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
copper — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
MW · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copperniobiumtantalum · flagged 13 Aug 2026, 53d pending
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi — uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, coal, limestone, gemstones, heavy mineral sands, vermiculite, phosphate, rutile, gold, diamonds, copper and others — with an exemption for minerals processed/refined/value-added domestically per Malawian mining law. Announced alongside a suspension of new mining-licence issuance and a review of mining laws (2026/27 State of the Nation Address), plus a planned sovereign wealth fund. Stated rationale: local beneficiation, targeting up to USD 500m/yr once the Kasiya rutile/graphite deposit (Lilongwe) and Kangankunde rare-earth project (Balaka, Mkango Resources — Africa's prospective first new REE mine since 2017, targeting late-2026 production) are fully developed. Violators face fines/penalties under Malawian law. MW is currently the THINNEST country in the register (1 prior action) despite this breadth of minerals covered. Export-ban/beneficiation-mandate, same instrument class as Zimbabwe's SI 213/2022 raw-mineral bans and Guinea's 2026 gold-export ban already in the register.
source ↗Copper — bulk input. Core business across two of three segments: rolled copper foil for flexible circuit boards (~80% claimed global share), titanium-copper alloy (~60% share), and 6N-purity copper/CuAl/CuMn sputtering-target seed layers for semiconductor interconnects, on top of upstream mining and smelting/refining of copper ore.
Niobium — trace additive. Produced alongside tantalum from the same columbite-tantalite ore stream in the Semiconductor Materials segment's high-purity metal-powder line; a co-product exposure rather than a standalone product line.
Tantalum — bulk input. High-purity tantalum powder (~50% claimed global share) for capacitors, plus tantalum sputtering targets used as diffusion barriers in copper-interconnect and TSV (through-silicon-via) processes. Tantalum supply is concentrated (DRC, Rwanda, Brazil ore sources) and carries conflict-mineral traceability requirements.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Malawi stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Malawi processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
copper — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
niobium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches tungstenniobiumtantalum · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
source ↗Tungsten — structural component. 5N-purity sputtering targets for gate electrodes, plus W-Si and W-Ti alloy targets; a thin-film layer rather than a mass input, but tungsten sourcing (concentrated in China) is a standing supply-chain risk across the whole semiconductor-equipment sector.
Niobium — trace additive. Produced alongside tantalum from the same columbite-tantalite ore stream in the Semiconductor Materials segment's high-purity metal-powder line; a co-product exposure rather than a standalone product line.
Tantalum — bulk input. High-purity tantalum powder (~50% claimed global share) for capacitors, plus tantalum sputtering targets used as diffusion barriers in copper-interconnect and TSV (through-silicon-via) processes. Tantalum supply is concentrated (DRC, Rwanda, Brazil ore sources) and carries conflict-mineral traceability requirements.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
tungsten — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
niobium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…
Minister of Finance, acting under s.
Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still ex…
On ~29 June 2026 the Autorité de Régulation et de Contrôle des Marchés des Substances Minérales Stratégiques (ARECOMS) ordered that all first-half-2026 cobalt export quotas left unused by 30 June 202…
Revises 30 CFR Part 580 to streamline 10 provisions governing prospecting, leasing, and operations for hard minerals (manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, seafloor massive sulfides) on the US Outer…
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No.
Japan's METI + MOF made an affirmative PRELIMINARY determination in an anti-dumping investigation (initiated 22 Jul 2025 on an application from Nippon Steel, Nippon Yakin Kogyo, NAS Stainless Steel S…
Reduces maximum idle-concession period from 30 to 15 years (initial production deadline unchanged at 10 yr; penalty extension cut from 20 yr to just 5 yr); eliminates irrevocable legal status of mini…
Madagascar's Council of Ministers approved resumption of mining-permit issuance on ~28-29 Jan 2026, ending a moratorium in place since 2010 (imposed during a political transition amid mining-title sp…
Replaces 2016 Code Minier; embeds 'sovereignty doctrine' with stronger state participation, local-transformation mandate, and WAEMU-conformity requirements; President Faye targeted adoption before en…
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
Mandates 15% free-carried interest for Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC) in all new mining licences; introduces mandatory mineral buying centres; tightens local-content and value-addition obligat…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…
The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in advanced negotiations to acquire a 15-20% equity stake (deal value ~USD 1.
Full replacement of the Mining Act 1992 with sweeping new statute: state acquires up to 30% equity in any new mining project (Kumul Minerals free-carry); special mining leases (SML) issued for initia…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
All DRC mining operators (Glencore, CMOC, Ivanhoe Mines, Eurasian Resources Group, and 50+ others) must transfer 5% of share capital to Congolese employees by July 31, 2026 or face permit suspension;…
The 12 July 2025 Bougival Accord (13-page political agreement creating a "State of New Caledonia" within France, pending a 2026 referendum + French organic law) contains an economic-rebuilding pact t…
VP declared no new large-scale mining agreement will be concluded without a binding value-addition commitment; Mines Minister referenced Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ghana, and Malawi precedents for raw-miner…
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
Requires US allies — primarily the Netherlands (ASML) and Japan (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu) — to align their national export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment with US BIS res…
If adopted, creates a unified mining regulatory framework across Cameroon, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad — harmonising licensing regimes, fiscal terms, transparency oblig…
Indonesia = ~50% global nickel mine supply and dominant producer of NPI/ferronickel/MHP; export duty on downstream nickel products (NPI, ferronickel, nickel matte, MHP) would add a material cost laye…
State-owned QMSD (Qatar Mining Company subsidiary), paused since Sudan's 2023 civil war, confirmed at a 13 May 2026 Port Sudan meeting between Sudan's Minister of Minerals Nour al-Daim Taha and Qatar…
Saudi state mining-investment vehicle Manara Minerals (the PIF/Ma'aden JV) is negotiating to buy a 10–20% stake in the Reko Diq copper-gold project (Balochistan, Pakistan) for ~$500M–$1bn, acquiring…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in negotiation to buy a 10-20% stake (deal value ~USD 500m-1bn) in the Reko Diq copper-gold project in Balochistan, Pakistan — one…
4 of 80 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 8 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in semiconductors — read via the graph's chipmaking equipment node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-05), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
This company sits on the supply side of tungsten. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the tungsten chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of indium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the indium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of cobalt. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the cobalt chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of titanium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the titanium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of copper. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the copper chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of nickel. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the nickel chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of niobium. Restrictions by 🇧🇷 BR push buyers toward ex-BR producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the niobium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of tantalum. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the tantalum chokepoint page and the watchlist.
+35 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.