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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: metals recycling. Ownership re-checked 2026-10-02 — exposure claims not re-checked since fill. Company profile →
Neometals Ltd (ASX: NMT) is a West Perth-headquartered critical-minerals project developer and process-technology licensor, not a manufacturer or end-user of finished products. It has no operating mines or plants today — its business is advancing early/mid-stage extraction and recovery projects and patented processing technology toward production or licensing revenue. In August 2025 it fully exited lithium-ion battery recycling, divesting its 50% stakes in the Primobius/SMS Group joint venture (plant-building) and its recycling-technology holding company to partner SMS Group for €5M upfront plus a capped royalty.
As of its 22-July-2026 investor update the company described a "gold reset" — sharpening focus on the Barrambie gold opportunity while retaining exposure to lithium, potash and vanadium.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Neometals Ltd produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Vanadium — Novana Oy / Avanti Materials (86.1% owned), Pori, Finland. A patent-pending hydrometallurgical process recovers high-purity vanadium pentoxide (V2O5) from vanadium-bearing steel slag — a secondary/recycled source rather than primary ore. This is the company's most financing-advanced project: Definitive Feasibility Study complete, European Investment Bank conditional cornerstone debt approval, an…
Lithium and potash — Utah Brine Corporation JV (51% owned), Paradox Basin, Utah. Neometals re-entered upstream lithium in March 2026 via this brine joint venture, with exclusive access to 23 inactive oil-and-gas wells for sampling and ~80,000 acres of lodged potash and lithium claims. The planned process uses mechanical evaporation to recover potash first, then direct lithium extraction (DLE) for lithium, refined via…
Titanium (and vanadium) — Barrambie VTM Project (100% owned), Western Australia. One of the world's highest-grade hard-rock titanium deposits, also vanadium-bearing. The board approved divestment of this asset in 2025 and advanced discussions with third-party acquirers were ongoing as of the company's most recent public update (2026-07-22); no completed sale has been announced.
Lithium and potash — Utah Brine Corporation JV (51% owned), Paradox Basin, Utah. Neometals re-entered upstream lithium in March 2026 via this brine joint venture, with exclusive access to 23 inactive oil-and-gas wells for sampling and ~80,000 acres of lodged potash and lithium claims. The planned process uses mechanical evaporation to recover potash first, then direct lithium extraction (DLE) for lithium, refined via…
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches lithium · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 108d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗Lithium and potash — Utah Brine Corporation JV (51% owned), Paradox Basin, Utah. Neometals re-entered upstream lithium in March 2026 via this brine joint venture, with exclusive access to 23 inactive oil-and-gas wells for sampling and ~80,000 acres of lodged potash and lithium claims. The planned process uses mechanical evaporation to recover potash first, then direct lithium extraction (DLE) for lithium, refined via…
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
lithium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches titanium · flagged 26 Jun 2026, 101d pending
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax exemptions granted under individual mining Framework Agreements and introduces standard operating procedures — reduces discretionary government risk for large mining investors (Panda Hill niobium, graphite juniors, Buzwagi gold); parallel VAT amendments give equivalent statutory certainty for VAT exemptions; taken together, the bill moves Tanzania from discretionary tax administration toward a rule-of-law-based investor regime for all critical-mineral projects; budget targets Tanzania for top-4 niobium producer status (Panda Hill DA already signed March 24, 2026) and 50% geophysical survey coverage by 2030
source ↗Titanium (and vanadium) — Barrambie VTM Project (100% owned), Western Australia. One of the world's highest-grade hard-rock titanium deposits, also vanadium-bearing. The board approved divestment of this asset in 2025 and advanced discussions with third-party acquirers were ongoing as of the company's most recent public update (2026-07-22); no completed sale has been announced.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
titanium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches lithium · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
source ↗Lithium and potash — Utah Brine Corporation JV (51% owned), Paradox Basin, Utah. Neometals re-entered upstream lithium in March 2026 via this brine joint venture, with exclusive access to 23 inactive oil-and-gas wells for sampling and ~80,000 acres of lodged potash and lithium claims. The planned process uses mechanical evaporation to recover potash first, then direct lithium extraction (DLE) for lithium, refined via…
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
lithium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches lithiumtitanium · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 112d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗Lithium and potash — Utah Brine Corporation JV (51% owned), Paradox Basin, Utah. Neometals re-entered upstream lithium in March 2026 via this brine joint venture, with exclusive access to 23 inactive oil-and-gas wells for sampling and ~80,000 acres of lodged potash and lithium claims. The planned process uses mechanical evaporation to recover potash first, then direct lithium extraction (DLE) for lithium, refined via…
Titanium (and vanadium) — Barrambie VTM Project (100% owned), Western Australia. One of the world's highest-grade hard-rock titanium deposits, also vanadium-bearing. The board approved divestment of this asset in 2025 and advanced discussions with third-party acquirers were ongoing as of the company's most recent public update (2026-07-22); no completed sale has been announced.
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
CN · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches lithium · flagged 28 Jun 2026, 99d pending
Chinese battery-materials major Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (603799. SH) signed a BINDING Scheme Implementation Deed (7 May 2026) to acquire 100% of Atlantic Lithium Ltd (AIM/ASX: ALL) for ~US$210M all-cash (US$0. 25486/share; 26. 6% premium), gaining control of the Ewoyaa lithium project — Ghana's first parliament-ratified lithium mine (Central Region, 15-yr lease ratified Mar 2026). The Atlantic Lithium board unanimously recommends; largest holder Assore (~26. 4%) supports; deed has no financing/DD conditions. This is a Chinese-SOE-adjacent capture of a West-African hard-rock lithium chokepoint that had been positioned as a NON-China / Western-aligned supply source (Atlantic Lithium previously had US DFC / Piedmont offtake-JV ties), so the transaction re-prices Ewoyaa from a diversification asset into Chinese-controlled lithium supply — directly relevant to the cn-outbound-mining-fdi exposure series and to Ghana's local-ownership/beneficiation policy.
source ↗Lithium and potash — Utah Brine Corporation JV (51% owned), Paradox Basin, Utah. Neometals re-entered upstream lithium in March 2026 via this brine joint venture, with exclusive access to 23 inactive oil-and-gas wells for sampling and ~80,000 acres of lodged potash and lithium claims. The planned process uses mechanical evaporation to recover potash first, then direct lithium extraction (DLE) for lithium, refined via…
This governs deal-making — stakes, acquisitions, joint ventures — not the flow of material. Your purchasing is untouched; it matters to you only if you plan an investment or partnership inside its scope. No supplier alternatives apply.
Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all fo…
Cabinet-cleared bill to replace the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act, Act 703: raises mining royalties from current 3–5% range to 9–12% (price-linked sliding scale), introduces a new medium-scale mining…
Replaces 2016 Code Minier; embeds 'sovereignty doctrine' with stronger state participation, local-transformation mandate, and WAEMU-conformity requirements; President Faye targeted adoption before en…
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
On 28-Nov-2025 European Metals Holdings announced the Czech government approved a grant of up to EUR 360M under the Ministry of Industry and Trade's "Strategic Investments for a Climate-Neutral Econo…
In March 2026 the outgoing Boric administration reportedly fast-tracked and submitted to the Contraloría General de la República (Chile's comptroller) a batch of ~5 further Contratos Especiales de Op…
Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…
Draft law amending Morocco's 2015 Mining Code (led by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Minister Leila Benali), with public consultations reported open since ~Feb 2025.
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
10% free-carried state equity in ALL new mining and energy projects (no-cost government stake via Epangelo Mining); consultations on 51% Namibian ownership in new mining ventures; maximum royalty rat…
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
VP declared no new large-scale mining agreement will be concluded without a binding value-addition commitment; Mines Minister referenced Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ghana, and Malawi precedents for raw-miner…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
On 11 May 2026 Huayou Cobalt announced an all-cash agreement to acquire ASX/AIM-listed Atlantic Lithium for USD 210m, taking control of the Ewoyaa project (~1.
On 11 Feb 2025 the Attorney General of Canada filed a Notice of Application (Federal Court file T-472-25) seeking a court order under ICA s.
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
4 of 45 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 4 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its sector (metals recycling) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of vanadium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the vanadium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of lithium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the lithium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of titanium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the titanium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of potash. Restrictions by 🇨🇦 CA push buyers toward ex-CA producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the potash chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.