Loading…
Loading…
What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: mining metals. Company profile →
Qatar's state-owned energy company. Through QatarEnergy LNG it develops the North Field and runs the Ras Laffan LNG trains, producing LNG plus associated condensate, LPG, ethane, NGLs, sulphur and helium. QatarEnergy LNG manages and operates Ras Laffan Helium Plants 1 and 2 (combined liquid-helium capacity 2.
1 bscf per year), and Ras Laffan Terminal Operations runs the Common Sulfur Plant and loads granulated-sulphur ships for all Ras Laffan producers.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
No production footprint is recorded in its dossier yet — its HQ country is 🇶🇦 Qatar, a registration fact, not a production or sales claim. We say so rather than guess.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Helium — producer, by-product of LNG processing. The company states that with both plants at full capacity it supplies approximately 25 % of world helium production. Helium has no substitute in MRI/cryogenics and semiconductor processes, and it is extracted during LNG processing, so output stops when the LNG trains stop: after the March 2026 missile attacks on Ras Laffan, AGBI reported…
Sulfur — producer, bulk by-product. Recovered from North Field sour gas and exported as granulated sulphur via the Ras Laffan common facilities. Like helium, volume follows gas throughput, not sulfur demand, so an LNG outage is also a sulfur outage.
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 2 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
CN · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches sulfur · flagged 25 Jul 2026, 74d pending
Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still exportable under special approval; reporting attributes the measure to a joint Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) + General Administration of Customs (GACC) notice, expected to run through end-2026. Sulfuric acid is the indispensable leach/process input for copper hydrometallurgy (SX-EW), phosphate-fertilizer production, and battery-metal (nickel HPAL, lithium) processing, so a China export halt tightens a systemic upstream chokepoint hitting seaborne-acid buyers (Chile/Peru copper, Morocco/India phosphate, Indonesia nickel). This is a DISTINCT instrument from the already-filed 2025-12-12-china-ndrc-phosphate-fertilizer-export-suspension (finished-fertilizer export control) and 2026-03-31-russia-decree-350-sulphur-export-ban-extension (elemental sulphur, different country/product) — it controls the acid itself.
source ↗Sulfur — producer, bulk by-product. Recovered from North Field sour gas and exported as granulated sulphur via the Ras Laffan common facilities. Like helium, volume follows gas throughput, not sulfur demand, so an LNG outage is also a sulfur outage.
sulfur — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
TZ · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · touches helium · flagged 29 Jun 2026, 100d pending
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the official LIST of critical and strategic minerals — a distinct REGULATORY instrument (not the fiscal Finance Act). The strategy explicitly prioritises IN-COUNTRY BENEFICIATION for graphite, nickel, rare earths and lithium, and amends mineral-processing-licence conditions so that every processing licence now requires a domestic value-addition plan; it targets a 40-mineral beneficiation/local-processing scope plus technology-transfer partnership requirements. Once the list is gazetted, raw/unprocessed exports of the listed minerals (Tanzania = a structural graphite chokepoint via Faru/Lindi/Mahenge graphite, plus emerging niobium at Panda Hill and nickel at Kabanga) face value-addition-plan gating and likely export conditionality — re-pricing a major non-China graphite supply node and the Kabanga nickel/Panda Hill niobium projects.
source ↗Helium — producer, by-product of LNG processing. The company states that with both plants at full capacity it supplies approximately 25 % of world helium production. Helium has no substitute in MRI/cryogenics and semiconductor processes, and it is extracted during LNG processing, so output stops when the LNG trains stop: after the March 2026 missile attacks on Ras Laffan, AGBI reported…
This changes the form of what TZ exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your TZ-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a TZ processing partner, not a supplier switch.
helium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
1 of 5 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 2 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in ev batteries, permanent magnets, ev motors, wind turbines, defence… — read via the graph's critical minerals node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of helium. Restrictions by 🇺🇸 US push buyers toward ex-US producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the helium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of sulfur. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the sulfur chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.