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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: mining metals. Company profile →
Tharisa plc is a dual-listed (LSE, JSE) South African miner that operates the Tharisa Mine, an open-pit (transitioning to underground via the Apollo/Orion projects) operation on the western limb of the Bushveld Complex. Its defining feature is co-production: platinum-group-metal (PGM) concentrate and metallurgical/chemical-grade chrome concentrate are extracted from the same ore body, a dual-commodity model distinct from single-product PGM or chrome miners. FY2025 output was ~138,300 oz PGMs and 1.
56Mt chrome concentrate; FY2026 guidance is 145,000-165,000 oz PGM and 1.5-1.65Mt chrome. Tharisa also holds 66.3% of the Karo Platinum project on Zimbabwe's Great Dyke (~2.6Moz PGM probable reserves), under development as of mid-2026.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Tharisa plc produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Chromium — *bulk input*, Tharisa's second core product (chrome concentrate, metallurgical and chemical grade). South Africa mines ~46% of world chromite and produces over half of global ferrochrome output; together with Kazakhstan and Turkey it accounts for >75% of primary chromite supply.
Rhodium-iridium — *bulk input*, co-extracted in the same 6E PGM concentrate. Rhodium is one of the most supply-concentrated traded metals; South Africa is the leading source of mined rhodium, and there is no industrial substitute for its role in autocatalysts.
Platinum-palladium — *bulk input*, one of Tharisa's two core products. PGM concentrate (part of a 6E basket: Pt, Pd, Rh, Ru, Ir, Au) is sold directly into the platinum/palladium market.
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
ZA · stage passed-committee → elevated likelihood · touches chromium · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 114d pending
If enacted, chrome ore export tax and/or quota would disrupt South Africa's ~2. 4 Mt/yr chrome ore export stream (≈45% of global seaborne supply); beneficiation licensing conditions attached to mineral rights allocations would require FTSE/JSE-listed chrome miners (Samancor/Merafe, Assore, Glencore) to build local ferrochrome and stainless-steel capacity before new rights are allocated; PGMs and other minerals may follow chrome as the test-case model, expanding scope to the full South African mining portfolio
source ↗Chromium — *bulk input*, Tharisa's second core product (chrome concentrate, metallurgical and chemical grade). South Africa mines ~46% of world chromite and produces over half of global ferrochrome output; together with Kazakhstan and Turkey it accounts for >75% of primary chromite supply.
This changes the form of what South Africa exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your South Africa-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a South Africa processing partner, not a supplier switch.
chromium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
KZ · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches chromium · flagged 29 Jun 2026, 100d pending
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No. 125-VI ZRK): (1) raises the mandatory local (domestic) content share in works and services from 50% to 70% during exploration and extraction of solid minerals INCLUDING URANIUM — a material new in-country-value obligation on the world's #1 uranium producer (Kazatomprom) and its JV partners (Cameco, Orano, CGN/CNNC, Uranium One); (2) digitises geological data and expands electronic auctions for granting subsoil-use rights; (3) grants strategic investors implementing large industrial/innovation projects (>14. 5M MCI) a priority right to explore and extract solid minerals. Re-prices the cost base and access regime for Kazakh uranium, copper, chromium and the country's emerging rare-earth deposits.
source ↗Chromium — *bulk input*, Tharisa's second core product (chrome concentrate, metallurgical and chemical grade). South Africa mines ~46% of world chromite and produces over half of global ferrochrome output; together with Kazakhstan and Turkey it accounts for >75% of primary chromite supply.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
chromium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
JP · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches chromium · flagged 29 Jun 2026, 100d pending
Japan's METI + MOF made an affirmative PRELIMINARY determination in an anti-dumping investigation (initiated 22 Jul 2025 on an application from Nippon Steel, Nippon Yakin Kogyo, NAS Stainless Steel Strip and Nippon Kinzoku) into nickel-added cold-rolled stainless steel coil, sheet and strip originating in the People's Republic of China and the separate customs territory of Taiwan (Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu); Trade Minister Ryosei Akazawa indicated provisional duties of ~45% on Chinese product and ~21% on Taiwanese product, expected to take effect as soon as July 2026. On 19 Jun 2026 METI/MOF EXTENDED the investigation period by four months to 21 Nov 2026 (final determination pending). IPTM relevance: (1) a RARE Japan-issuer trade remedy — JP has ZERO trade-remedy actions on the register and seldom uses AD, so a Japanese AD wall is a notable issuer + instrument-bloc gap; (2) China/Taiwan-target on nickel-added stainless steel, a nickel+chromium chokepoint-adjacent material; re-prices a China/TW->Japan stainless flow into a major downstream manufacturing base; (3) parallels the active 2025-26 Asian steel-AD wave the register is now capturing (Thailand DFT aluminium-extrusions, Indonesia KADI HRC, Malaysia MITI galvanised steel).
source ↗Chromium — *bulk input*, Tharisa's second core product (chrome concentrate, metallurgical and chemical grade). South Africa mines ~46% of world chromite and produces over half of global ferrochrome output; together with Kazakhstan and Turkey it accounts for >75% of primary chromite supply.
A duty raises the cost of the origins the measure names into Japan's market — a cost line on affected flows, not lost availability. Origins outside the measure's named targets are the route around it; the text above names the targets where its source does.
chromium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
ZW · stage announced → low likelihood · touches chromiumplatinum palladium · flagged 4 Oct 2026, 3d pending
VP Constantino Chiwenga announced at the Zimbabwe-China Business Forum (Hangzhou) that Zimbabwe will no longer issue new mining licences for operations that extract only one mineral from a deposit — future licensees must demonstrate capacity to identify, separate and process the full mineral suite present, or be barred from operating. Framed as beneficiation policy, layered on Zimbabwe's Feb-2026 raw-mineral/lithium-concentrate export ban (filed). Raises the entry bar specifically for Great Dyke chrome/PGM claims, which are frequently single-mineral operations — a licensing-stage chokepoint action, distinct instrument type from the export-ban actions already in the register.
source ↗Chromium — *bulk input*, Tharisa's second core product (chrome concentrate, metallurgical and chemical grade). South Africa mines ~46% of world chromite and produces over half of global ferrochrome output; together with Kazakhstan and Turkey it accounts for >75% of primary chromite supply.
Platinum-palladium — *bulk input*, one of Tharisa's two core products. PGM concentrate (part of a 6E basket: Pt, Pd, Rh, Ru, Ir, Au) is sold directly into the platinum/palladium market.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Zimbabwe stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Zimbabwe processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
chromium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
platinum palladium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
ZW · stage announced → low likelihood · touches chromium · flagged 4 Oct 2026, 3d pending
Zimbabwean officials have signalled intent ("raw chrome exports obsolete") to expand the 25-Feb-2026 raw-mineral/lithium-concentrate export ban (filed) to cover chrome CONCENTRATE specifically — concentrate was exempt under the original order, which targeted raw ore only. This is the same ore/concentrate carve-out pattern that made Zimbabwe's 2022 SI 213 lithium ban a non-event (everyone exported the exempt concentrate instead). If the concentrate carve-out is closed, it would hit Zimbabwe's ~$1. 5-2bn/yr chrome sector feeding South African and Chinese ferrochrome smelters. No SI number, no date, no gazette found.
source ↗Chromium — *bulk input*, Tharisa's second core product (chrome concentrate, metallurgical and chemical grade). South Africa mines ~46% of world chromite and produces over half of global ferrochrome output; together with Kazakhstan and Turkey it accounts for >75% of primary chromite supply.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Zimbabwe stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Zimbabwe processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
chromium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Second wave of CRMA Art.
None of these filed an explicit stage — in-force status defaults from an absent stage: field (flagged below), not a claim any filer made. Each still links to the register entry with its primary source; verify stage before treating as a confirmed baseline.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 3 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in ev batteries, permanent magnets, ev motors, wind turbines, defence… — read via the graph's critical minerals node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of chromium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the chromium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of rhodium iridium. Restrictions by 🇿🇦 ZA push buyers toward ex-ZA producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the rhodium iridium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of platinum palladium. Restrictions by 🇿🇦 ZA push buyers toward ex-ZA producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the platinum palladium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.