Loading…
Loading…
What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: mining metals. Company profile →
Tungsten West Plc (AIM: TUN) is restarting the Hemerdon mine in Devon, England — one of the largest tungsten-tin skarn deposits in the world outside China, originally worked from the 1930s-1940s (wartime tungsten) and again in 2015-2018 before its previous operator (Wolf Minerals) went into administration. Tungsten West acquired the site in 2019 and is rebuilding the mineral processing plant to restart production, targeting first fines-gravity output in H2 2026/Q3 2026 and full plant commissioning in early 2027. The operation produces tungsten concentrate (as tungsten trioxide, WO3) and tin concentrate as a co-product from the same ore.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Tungsten West (Hemerdon) produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Tungsten (single-asset concentration risk). Hemerdon's whole investment case rests on primary tungsten supply: the company markets the deposit as capable of supplying roughly a fifth of global tungsten demand outside China once fully ramped, in a market where China has historically supplied over 80% of world tungsten and became a net importer in 2025. Tungsten is on both the EU cr…
Tin (co-product, same ore body). Tin concentrate is recovered alongside tungsten from the same skarn ore — Hemerdon is one of very few Western assets producing both metals as primary co-products. Tin is also on the USGS critical minerals list and carries its own separate supply concentration (smelting and mining dominated by China, Indonesia and the DRC-linked supply ch…
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches tungsten · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
source ↗Tungsten (single-asset concentration risk). Hemerdon's whole investment case rests on primary tungsten supply: the company markets the deposit as capable of supplying roughly a fifth of global tungsten demand outside China once fully ramped, in a market where China has historically supplied over 80% of world tungsten and became a net importer in 2025. Tungsten is on both the EU cr…
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
tungsten — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
NG · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches tin · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all foreign-invested mining JVs; builds on existing eMC+ digital cadastre and mandatory value-addition plans introduced Nov 2024; could force processing-plant investment or suspension of raw mineral shipments from Africa's most populous economy; RMRDC = Raw Materials Research and Development Council (the sponsoring agency)
source ↗Tin (co-product, same ore body). Tin concentrate is recovered alongside tungsten from the same skarn ore — Hemerdon is one of very few Western assets producing both metals as primary co-products. Tin is also on the USGS critical minerals list and carries its own separate supply concentration (smelting and mining dominated by China, Indonesia and the DRC-linked supply ch…
This changes the form of what Nigeria exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Nigeria-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Nigeria processing partner, not a supplier switch.
tin — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
UG · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · touches tungstentin · flagged 13 Jun 2026, 114d pending
Mandates 15% free-carried interest for Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC) in all new mining licences; introduces mandatory mineral buying centres; tightens local-content and value-addition obligations — changes joint-venture economics for all new Ugandan mining operations, raising effective cost-of-entry for foreign miners
source ↗Tungsten (single-asset concentration risk). Hemerdon's whole investment case rests on primary tungsten supply: the company markets the deposit as capable of supplying roughly a fifth of global tungsten demand outside China once fully ramped, in a market where China has historically supplied over 80% of world tungsten and became a net importer in 2025. Tungsten is on both the EU cr…
Tin (co-product, same ore body). Tin concentrate is recovered alongside tungsten from the same skarn ore — Hemerdon is one of very few Western assets producing both metals as primary co-products. Tin is also on the USGS critical minerals list and carries its own separate supply concentration (smelting and mining dominated by China, Indonesia and the DRC-linked supply ch…
This changes the form of what UG exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your UG-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a UG processing partner, not a supplier switch.
tungsten — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
tin — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches tungsten · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 112d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗Tungsten (single-asset concentration risk). Hemerdon's whole investment case rests on primary tungsten supply: the company markets the deposit as capable of supplying roughly a fifth of global tungsten demand outside China once fully ramped, in a market where China has historically supplied over 80% of world tungsten and became a net importer in 2025. Tungsten is on both the EU cr…
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
MN · stage draft-published → moderate likelihood · touches tungsten · flagged 27 Jun 2026, 100d pending
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising holding fees (to curb speculative licence-trading/flipping); (ii) introduces a STATUTORY definition of "critical minerals" (aligned to Mongolia's 11-mineral list: molybdenum, manganese, nickel, copper, fluorspar, graphite, REEs, cobalt, lithium, PGMs, tungsten) and a SEPARATE licensing regime for downstream beneficiation plants; (iii) mandates mine-closure plans + financial bonding once a mine reaches 75% of its life; aims to accelerate licence issuance and expand the resource base. Mongolia is a structural China/Russia-flanked chokepoint pursuing Western REE/copper partnerships (US FORGE, JP, KR), so a domestic critical-minerals statutory regime + downstream-processing licensing reprices the entry terms for any foreign developer of Mongolian copper/REE/fluorspar (Oyu Tolgoi-adjacent, Erdenes critical-minerals SOE pipeline).
source ↗Tungsten (single-asset concentration risk). Hemerdon's whole investment case rests on primary tungsten supply: the company markets the deposit as capable of supplying roughly a fifth of global tungsten demand outside China once fully ramped, in a market where China has historically supplied over 80% of world tungsten and became a net importer in 2025. Tungsten is on both the EU cr…
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
tungsten — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
Indonesia = ~20% of global refined tin exports (Bangka Belitung); a ban on refined-tin exports would force downstream solder/semiconductor-packaging manufacturing domestically; disrupts global electr…
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…
1 of 24 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 2 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in ev batteries, permanent magnets, ev motors, wind turbines, defence… — read via the graph's critical minerals node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of tungsten. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the tungsten chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of tin. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the tin chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.