Loading…
Loading…
What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: battery. Company profile →
VisBlue A/S is a Danish/Portuguese spinout from Aarhus University and the University of Porto (founded 2014 by Adelio Mendes, Anders Bentien, Morten Madsen and Søren Bødker), based in Aarhus, Denmark. It manufactures vanadium redox flow batteries (VRFBs) for long-duration, stationary renewable-energy storage — final system assembly and integration happens at the Aarhus HQ, with the electrochemical "stack" units (the core power-conversion component) supplied under a framework agreement by J. Schmalz GmbH of Glatten, Germany since 2020.
VisBlue markets a "SMARTflow" control layer that schedules charge/discharge cycles against weather forecasts and grid prices. It is a small company (~12 employees) and is, per its own marketing, the only Danish battery producer specialising in vanadium redox flow technology.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where VisBlue produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Graphite (stack bipolar plates): the stack's bipolar plates are a graphite-polymer composite; graphite is subject to Chinese export-licensing controls on graphite-related items (in force since Dec-2023), and China dominates global natural and processed-graphite supply, so this is a genuine upstream concentration risk for the Schmalz-built stacks even though VisBlue itse…
Vanadium (electrolyte, direct and central): the entire VRFB storage mechanism is a vanadium-sulphate electrolyte cycled across four oxidation states (V2+/V3+/V4+/V5+) in two tanks — vanadium is not a minor input but the active energy-storage medium itself, so exposure is total rather than incidental. VisBlue's own materials page notes vanadium is sourced either as a byproduct of i…
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches graphite · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 109d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗Graphite (stack bipolar plates): the stack's bipolar plates are a graphite-polymer composite; graphite is subject to Chinese export-licensing controls on graphite-related items (in force since Dec-2023), and China dominates global natural and processed-graphite supply, so this is a genuine upstream concentration risk for the Schmalz-built stacks even though VisBlue itse…
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Brazil supplies 3.6% of world graphite mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid Brazil entirely: graphite supply outside BR is 🇨🇳 CN 85%, 🇲🇬 MG 4.8%, 🇹🇿 TZ 4.6% (shares renormalised after removing BR).
MW · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches graphite · flagged 13 Aug 2026, 54d pending
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi — uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, coal, limestone, gemstones, heavy mineral sands, vermiculite, phosphate, rutile, gold, diamonds, copper and others — with an exemption for minerals processed/refined/value-added domestically per Malawian mining law. Announced alongside a suspension of new mining-licence issuance and a review of mining laws (2026/27 State of the Nation Address), plus a planned sovereign wealth fund. Stated rationale: local beneficiation, targeting up to USD 500m/yr once the Kasiya rutile/graphite deposit (Lilongwe) and Kangankunde rare-earth project (Balaka, Mkango Resources — Africa's prospective first new REE mine since 2017, targeting late-2026 production) are fully developed. Violators face fines/penalties under Malawian law. MW is currently the THINNEST country in the register (1 prior action) despite this breadth of minerals covered. Export-ban/beneficiation-mandate, same instrument class as Zimbabwe's SI 213/2022 raw-mineral bans and Guinea's 2026 gold-export ban already in the register.
source ↗Graphite (stack bipolar plates): the stack's bipolar plates are a graphite-polymer composite; graphite is subject to Chinese export-licensing controls on graphite-related items (in force since Dec-2023), and China dominates global natural and processed-graphite supply, so this is a genuine upstream concentration risk for the Schmalz-built stacks even though VisBlue itse…
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Malawi stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Malawi processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
graphite — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.
Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇨🇳 CN 81% · 🇲🇬 MG 4.6% · 🇹🇿 TZ 4.4% · 🇧🇷 BR 3.8% — shares renormalised after removing MW.
No alternative in our corpus is currently producing — every name below is pre-production, possibly captured, or unverified. Treat this list as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches graphite · flagged 26 Jun 2026, 102d pending
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax exemptions granted under individual mining Framework Agreements and introduces standard operating procedures — reduces discretionary government risk for large mining investors (Panda Hill niobium, graphite juniors, Buzwagi gold); parallel VAT amendments give equivalent statutory certainty for VAT exemptions; taken together, the bill moves Tanzania from discretionary tax administration toward a rule-of-law-based investor regime for all critical-mineral projects; budget targets Tanzania for top-4 niobium producer status (Panda Hill DA already signed March 24, 2026) and 50% geophysical survey coverage by 2030
source ↗Graphite (stack bipolar plates): the stack's bipolar plates are a graphite-polymer composite; graphite is subject to Chinese export-licensing controls on graphite-related items (in force since Dec-2023), and China dominates global natural and processed-graphite supply, so this is a genuine upstream concentration risk for the Schmalz-built stacks even though VisBlue itse…
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
TZ · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · touches graphite · flagged 29 Jun 2026, 99d pending
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the official LIST of critical and strategic minerals — a distinct REGULATORY instrument (not the fiscal Finance Act). The strategy explicitly prioritises IN-COUNTRY BENEFICIATION for graphite, nickel, rare earths and lithium, and amends mineral-processing-licence conditions so that every processing licence now requires a domestic value-addition plan; it targets a 40-mineral beneficiation/local-processing scope plus technology-transfer partnership requirements. Once the list is gazetted, raw/unprocessed exports of the listed minerals (Tanzania = a structural graphite chokepoint via Faru/Lindi/Mahenge graphite, plus emerging niobium at Panda Hill and nickel at Kabanga) face value-addition-plan gating and likely export conditionality — re-pricing a major non-China graphite supply node and the Kabanga nickel/Panda Hill niobium projects.
source ↗Graphite (stack bipolar plates): the stack's bipolar plates are a graphite-polymer composite; graphite is subject to Chinese export-licensing controls on graphite-related items (in force since Dec-2023), and China dominates global natural and processed-graphite supply, so this is a genuine upstream concentration risk for the Schmalz-built stacks even though VisBlue itse…
This changes the form of what TZ exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your TZ-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a TZ processing partner, not a supplier switch.
TZ supplies 4.2% of world graphite mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid TZ entirely: graphite supply outside TZ is 🇨🇳 CN 85%, 🇲🇬 MG 4.8%, 🇧🇷 BR 3.9% (shares renormalised after removing TZ).
MG · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches graphite · flagged 13 Aug 2026, 54d pending
Madagascar's Council of Ministers approved resumption of mining-permit issuance on ~28-29 Jan 2026, ending a moratorium in place since 2010 (imposed during a political transition amid mining-title speculation). Roughly 1,650-3,000 pending permit applications accumulated during the freeze can now be processed — Mining Cadastre Bureau (BCMM) confirmed first-come-first-served processing with a maximum 3-month target for first issuances. Covers nickel, cobalt, graphite, rare earths, mineral sands/ilmenite, bauxite, sapphire, quartz and mica; GOLD remains explicitly excluded pending further review. Legal basis: implementation of the 2023 mining code (Loi n°2023-007, promulgated 27 Jul 2024) following mining-cadastre cleanup. SUPPLY-RELIEF — opens Madagascar's graphite (6 large projects, ~3% of global production / 8% of global reserves), nickel-cobalt (Ambatovy) and rare-earth potential to new entrants after a 16-year freeze; MG is currently one of the thinnest countries in the register (2 prior actions) despite this graphite/nickel relevance.
source ↗Graphite (stack bipolar plates): the stack's bipolar plates are a graphite-polymer composite; graphite is subject to Chinese export-licensing controls on graphite-related items (in force since Dec-2023), and China dominates global natural and processed-graphite supply, so this is a genuine upstream concentration risk for the Schmalz-built stacks even though VisBlue itse…
This is support, not a threat — it funds, fast-tracks or relaxes rather than restricts. If you have operations, projects or purchases inside its scope, check your eligibility against the measure's own text above.
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
2 of 20 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in ev vehicles — read via the graph's ev batteries node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-06), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
No alternative in our corpus is currently producing — every name below is pre-production, possibly captured, or unverified. Treat this list as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
No deployment evidence in our corpus for the names below. Treat them as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.