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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: specialty chemicals and materials. Company profile →
5N Plus is a Montréal-headquartered specialty-metals refiner and compound-semiconductor manufacturer. The group operates one of the very small set of Western integrated supply chains for the minor metals that sit at the heart of Case #1 (the Ga/Ge/Sb/Te/In retaliation architecture): germanium (4N–6N metal, GeO₂, GeCl₄, single-crystal Ge substrates for satellite solar cells and IR optics — the FY2024 AIF lists St. George UT for germanium, and does not list Trail BC or Saint-Genest-Lerpt FR), tellurium and cadmium-telluride (high-purity Te + CdTe sublimation feedstock for thin-film solar, with First Solar as the anchor customer under a multi-year supply agreement), antimony (purified Sb metal, antimony trioxide, antimony triselenide — used in IR detectors, defence munitions, and pharmaceutical flame retardants), bismuth (Bi metal, BiOCl, pharma-grade), indium (In metal, ITO precursor), selenium, and a smaller gallium line.
5N Plus is structurally the only North-American-domiciled pure-play public company simultaneously listed across all five MOFCOM-controlled minor-metals lines (Ge, Ga, Sb, Te, In). Heraeus (private, DE), Indium Corporation (private, US), and Vital Materials (private, CN) are the only peer-set comparators on commercial scale; the integrated Western multi-metal smelters (Aurubis, Glencore Nikkelverk, Boliden, Rio Tinto Kennecott) recover these minor metals as byproduct lines but do not segment them. The Electronic Materials segment (semiconductor wafers and high-purity compounds, including the AZUR SPACE solar-cell subsidiary — sold to Trinasolar/Canadian Solar/First Solar wafer programmes plus defence integrators in US, FR, IL) is the principal revenue concentrator; the Eco-Friendly Materials segment (pharma + animal-health bismuth + recycled tellurium) is the smaller but more margin-stable line. The group's strategic positioning sits on the producer side of every Case #1 export-control vehicle since 2023-07 AND on the beneficiary side of every Western critical-minerals-stockpile vehicle since 2025-Q4. This is a structurally rare dual exposure.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where 5N Plus Inc. produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
Also listed in its dossier but not platform-scored: selenium, cadmium telluride — no supply-risk series is tracked for these here.
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 2 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches galliumindiumgermanium · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗gallium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
indium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
germanium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
EU · stage consultation-closed (pre-proposal; CFE + OPC both closed 2026-07-29) → elevated likelihood · touches galliumgermanium · flagged 30 Jul 2026, 68d pending
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence on CRM value chains**; (b) steer and de-risk finance into strategic projects with public and private partners; (c) support **strategic stockpiling**; and (d) run **joint purchasing** by pooling company orders and matchmaking demand with supply (a "raw materials platform" pooling orders and creating joint stocks, with an EU-coordinated stockpiling pilot to become operational in the following year). A **call for evidence + public consultation opened 19 May 2026**, and the Commission announced a **legislative proposal for Q2 2026**. Supply-relief on the material axis (EU-side aggregation, stockpiles and de-risking finance directly loosen chokepoint exposure for EU industrial buyers), but it also creates a new EU purchasing/allocation gatekeeper whose membership and priority rules will be contested. If it carries reporting or data-submission duties on participating companies, it becomes a second corporate-facing CRM information obligation alongside CRMA Art. 24.
source ↗gallium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
germanium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
This is support, not a threat — it funds, fast-tracks or relaxes rather than restricts. If you have operations, projects or purchases inside its scope, check your eligibility against the measure's own text above.
germanium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
1 of 15 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 4 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its sector (specialty chemicals and materials) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-06), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
This company sits on the supply side of indium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the indium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of tellurium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the tellurium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of germanium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the germanium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of bismuth. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the bismuth chokepoint page and the watchlist.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+5 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+3 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.