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2 critical materials scored · binding chokepoint: Vanadium (🇨🇳 CN 79% of refining) · 15 restrictive government measures on record
A verification pass re-checked this dossier's ownership/corporate-structure fields against their cited sources. It did not re-read the material_exposures claim the score, band and stress figures below are built on — treat those as not yet independently re-checked.
Largo Inc produces 2 of the 2 scored materials above (Vanadium, Titanium). For those, a supply restriction by the controlling country is a tailwind, not a headwind — the exposure is to disruption of a market this company supplies, not to a chokepoint it depends on. Every scored material here sits on its output side, so the Elevated · 63/100 band should be read as chokepoint salience, not as buyer vulnerability, and the Art. 24 input-side duties below are qualified accordingly.
Role from an explicit dossier role: tag or the producer-sector classifier behind the /minerals alternatives bench (one classifier on disk, generated 2026-10-07) — the same source the company page uses. A material the classifier has no entry for defaults to a buyer dependency, which can understate a producer's output side. Descriptive classification only: it enters no score.
The binding exposure is Vanadium — 🇨🇳 CN controls 79% of global refining. On this company's production footprint that scores 64/100 (neutral exposure; global 64). The register holds 15 restrictive government measures touching this company's materials — each traced to its primary source below.
Peer rank · Vanadium Largo Inc is the 205th-most-exposed of the 238 named companies we track on 🇨🇳 CN's Vanadium chokepoint; the most-exposed is Energy Fuels Inc. (75/100). Ranked on the same footprint-adjusted buyer score as above — a relative read of an existing metric, not a new one.
Largo Inc ranks 216th of 461 verified mining metals companies, tied with 12 others at 63.
Same sector_primary, ranked on the company supply-risk index. Restricted to hand-verified dossiers — 132 further mining metals companies are tracked but auto-onboarded, and excluded here because their exposure list is a sector template rather than company research. A peer scoring lower is the useful read: it usually means a different production geography or a qualified second source.
Company supply-risk index 63/100 — the binding chokepoint dominates, with a modest add for exposure breadth across 2 scored materials. Buyer-relative (first-order): weighted by where the company produces (BR 100%, estimated split — no cited source states these exact shares), applied across all materials — it does not yet trace each input to its specific sourcing step.
Disclosed production sites
Named plants and what they make, from the company's disclosures. Descriptive detail — the buyer score above is still driven by country-level footprint weights, not per-site material intensity.
Largo Inc (Toronto-domiciled; dual-listed TSX: LGO and NASDAQ: LGO) is the world's largest primary vanadium producer. Its sole operating asset is the Maracás Menchen Mine in Bahia state, Brazil, which mines and processes vanadiferous ore into vanadium pentoxide (V2O5) flake/powder, vanadium trioxide powder, and ferrovanadium, with ilmenite (a titanium ore) sold as a by-product. Largo also runs a downstream energy-storage arm (Largo Clean Energy / the Storion Energy joint venture with Stryten Energy) that makes vanadium redox flow battery (VRFB) electrolyte and systems, and in 2026 holds a five-year U.S. Department of Defense contract to supply high-purity vanadium pentoxide to the National Defense Stockpile.
consumer, of vanadium: essentially all of its revenue depends on price and offtake for V2O5/ferrovanadium out of a single mine. That makes the company a direct read on vanadium supply-security policy (e.g. the DoD stockpile contract) rather than a downstream buyer exposed to a Chinese-concentrated input — China is both the dominant vanadium producer and the dominant consumer (steel rebar alloying), so Largo's non-Chinese, single-asset supply is itself the policy-relevant scarce asset for Western steel and defense buyers.
go into high-strength low-alloy (HSLA) steel (construction, pipeline, automotive) where vanadium adds strength and corrosion resistance; VPURE™/ VPURE+™ high-purity V2O5 feeds VRFB electrolyte for long-duration (>4-hour) grid energy storage — a demand stream Largo has explicitly said now pays better than steel-grade vanadium.
mine/plant in Bahia, Brazil — there is no geographic diversification to fall back on if Maracás Menchen faces an operational, regulatory, or logistics disruption (the company's own 2026 filings note ore-access and plant-stability swings driving quarter-to-quarter output volatility).
exposure.** Ilmenite from the same ore body is sold into titanium dioxide production as a secondary revenue stream, not purchased. Previously excluded as unscored; titanium was added to SCORED_MATERIALS 2026-07-23, after this dossier's prior refresh (2026-07-08) — corrected 2026-08-20.
1. Largo Inc — corporate overview, products (V2O5, ferrovanadium, VRFB electrolyte) and Maracás Menchen Mine: https://www.largoinc.com 2. Largo Reports Q1 2026 Financial Results (Maracás Menchen Mine operating performance) — The Globe and Mail / Newsfile, 2026: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/investing/markets/markets-news/Newsfile/1934229/largo-reports-q1-2026-financial-results-reflecting-strong-operating-performance-at-maracas-menchen-mine-and-the-impact-of-high-u-s-import-tariffs-on-brazilian-products-in-early-2026/ 3. Largo Awarded a Five-Year U.S. Department of Defense Contract to Supply High-Purity Vanadium Pentoxide to the National Defense Stockpile — Newsfile Corp: https://www.newsfilecorp.com/release/303582/Largo-Awarded-a-FiveYear-U.S.-Department-of-Defense-Contract-to-Supply-HighPurity-Vanadium-Pentoxide-with-FixedPrice-Delivery-Orders-to-Support-the-U.S.-National-Defense-Stockpile 4. Largo Starts Production of Copper and Platinum Group Metals as By-Products of Vanadium Operations Following Mining Agency Approval (ilmenite/titanium concentrate production temporarily suspended) — The Globe and Mail / Newsfile, 2026: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/investing/markets/markets-news/Newsfile/3753544/largo-starts-production-of-copper-and-platinum-group-metals-as-by-products-of-vanadium-operations-following-mining-agency-approval/ 5. Largo Inc.'s (TSE:LGO) largest shareholders are private equity firms with 44% ownership — Yahoo Finance / Simply Wall St, 2026: https://finance.yahoo.com/news/largo-inc-tse-lgo-largest-123535406.html
From the company’s own filings and dated disclosures — top-5 concentration and related-party tables where the filer’s regime compels them, named supply and offtake agreements where it does not. This is a disclosure, not a netting: a named supplier concentration is shown beside the exposure score and never adjusts it. Figures are the fiscal years labelled, not a current snapshot.
US customs bills of lading, shipper Largo Vanadio de Maracas S.A. (Maracas Menchen mine and plant, Bahia, Brazil): BoL MEDUSA688325 arrived 2026-08-15, 'vanadium pentoxide fused flakes' 41,450 kg, Salvador (BR) to Jacksonville FL, consignee ARG International AG; also HLCUSS3260500441 (2026-06-25, V2O5 flakes 65,765 kg, Brazil origin) and ferrovanadium BoLs HLCUSS5260579119 (2026-07-24, 102,901 kg) and MEDUR3341381 (2026-07-27, 82,237 kg). ARG International AG is a third-party metals merchant; the BoL pins the Brazil-to-US sea route. Same page shows intra-group consignees Largo International Inc. and Largo Resources USA Inc. (not counted). No ARG dossier yet.
Five-year, fixed-price-delivery-order contract awarded June 2026 to supply up to 2,876 metric tonnes of high-purity V2O5 to the U.S. National Defense Stockpile, maximum contract value US$125 million; release states no share of Largo's revenue or production.
Alternative track — a counterparty read from primary filings, never merged into the exposure score. Absence of a name is not absence of a relationship: Filers name only the counterparties their regime compels them to name, and several of this company’s largest are disclosed by size with no name at all.
Ranked by buyer-relative risk, highest first.
1 of 1 of your scored CRMA-strategic material breach the EU’s own Art. 5 65% single-third-country ceiling (global-production proxy).
| Material | Controlled by | You | Global | Band | Art. 5 | Input share | Substitute | Laws | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vanadium | 🇨🇳 CN 79% refining | 64 | 64 | Elevated | — | High | limited | 3 | ▲ rising |
| Titanium | 🇨🇳 CN 70% refining | 59 | 59 | Elevated | EXCEEDS 70% | Low | limited | 14 | ▲ rising |
You = buyer-relative score (this company's disclosed footprint vs. the controller). Global = buyer-agnostic supply risk. Substitute = ease of swapping the material out (none = locked in). Input share = the material's disclosed magnitude in the company's input basket (HIGH/MED/LOW only where a public filing quantifies it; — = unrated). Descriptive effect-size, never scored.
Art. 5 = does the global top single-country share breach the EU's own CRMA Art. 5 diversification ceiling (no more than 65% of a strategic raw material from a single third country)? A conservative global-production PROXY for the EU-import denominator — descriptive only, sits beside the score, never merged into it (— = non-strategic material). Reg. (EU) 2024/1252 Art. 5 ↗
Per-material factor scoring on a 1–5 likelihood×impact scale, mapped to the Art. 24(2)(b) risk-factor framework. The headline score above is a portfolio RAG; this matrix is the assessment — it is where two companies with the same binding chokepoint diverge.
| Material | Geopolitical | Concentration | Price / market | Substitutability | Import reliance | Logistics · ESG · Supplier |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vanadium | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 2 | company input |
| Titanium | 4 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 4 | company input |
1 = very low … 5 = very high — a standard supply-risk likelihood×impact scale (the form a competent authority expects for the Art. 24(2)(b) factor analysis, not a CRMA-numbered scale). Public-source factors are pre-filled from the engine's primary sources (USGS concentration, IPTM government actions, EU import data); the three rightmost factor categories need company / Tier-1 supplier data and are flagged as input under Art. 24(3). Hover any cell for its evidence.
Every new filing and every amendment (rate change, scope change, repeal) touching this company's materials in the window above. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date.
Restrictive government measures on this company's materials, newest first — each links to its primary government source.
The Art. 24(2)(c) vulnerability assessment, made explicit. For each leading exposure we model the move in this company's buyer-relative score under two distinct supply-disruption scenarios — the production footprint held fixed, only one lever moved at a time so each delta isolates one shock:
Under the 🇨🇳 CN shock, your disclosed plant carries the binding Vanadium exposure:
| Type | Scenario | Today | Stressed | Δ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy | Vanadium — 🇨🇳 CN escalates vanadium controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime | 64 | 72 | +8 |
| Concentration | Vanadium — 🇨🇳 CN becomes the single source for vanadium — the second source is lost (full 79%+ monopoly) | 64 | 76 | +12 |
| Policy | Titanium — 🇨🇳 CN escalates titanium controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime | 59 | 63 | +4 |
| Concentration | Titanium — 🇨🇳 CN becomes the single source for titanium — the second source is lost (full 70%+ monopoly) | 59 | 75 | +16 |
A zero delta means that lever is already modelled at maximum on that material — today's score already prices it in. This is why the two scenarios are shown together: where a material's policy lever is already maxed (zero policy delta), the concentration shock still carries a real delta, and vice-versa. Each stressed score isolates its one lever; all other factors are held at current values.
No material crosses the significant-vulnerability threshold on the input side — every scored material here is one Largo Inc produces, and Art. 24 addresses the use of a strategic raw material as an input. The Art. 24(4) mitigation duty is not triggered on the public-source evidence; the mitigations below are precautionary.
Stated threshold (so the conclusion is reproducible and auditable): buyer-relative band ≥ High AND substitutability hard/none AND ≥ 1 in-force restrictive measure on the material, assessed over the 0 materials this company buys (the 2 it produces are excluded from the test and listed above). The CRMA does not fix a numeric definition of “significant”; the company may adopt a stricter or looser threshold and should record it here.
Proposed, announced or draft regulation that is not yet in force but would touch this company's at-risk materials if it passes. Forward-looking early-warning — the likelihood shown is an honest band derived from the legislative stage, not a forecast or a fabricated probability. Kept separate from the enacted register above: nothing here is law yet.
Likelihood band is derived deterministically from the legislative stage (announced → low; draft-published / in-consultation → moderate; passed-committee → elevated; passed-vote / awaiting-signature → high) — a reproducible, source-traceable proxy, not a probability estimate. Where shown, the modelled impact-if-passed re-uses the same buyer-relative stress engine as the enacted scenarios above: it holds this company's production footprint fixed and escalates the proposed measure to a full export-licensing / control regime — the conservative upper bound for a measure that may pass only as a partial cap. The delta is the move from today's score to that stressed score; companies with no modelled production footprint show no delta.
Forward-looking read on the binding chokepoint, from the recent trajectory of policy on these materials. Directional, not a forecast.
Every scored material here is one Largo Inc produces, so the Art. 24(4) buyer levers — qualify an alternative supplier, re-source, substitute the input — do not apply to this company. The output-side items below are what a concentrated producer's risk office actually acts on. We render them rather than a generic diversification list because a prescription addressed to the wrong side of the market is worse than none.
Under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (Reg. (EU) 2024/1252), a Member State identifies the large companies (Art. 2(29): >500 employees and >€150M net worldwide turnover) using strategic raw materials to manufacture a listed strategic technology (batteries, renewables, hydrogen, traction motors, heat pumps, aircraft, data-storage equipment, robotics, drones, satellites, advanced chips). Those companies must, at least every three years and to the extent the information is available to them (Art. 24(2)), assess their strategic-raw-material supply chain. Where suppliers do not provide the data on request, the assessment may rely on the Commission's monitoring dashboard (Art. 20(4)) or other publicly available information (Art. 24(3)) — which is the evidence base this report assembles. Board reporting (Art. 24(5)) is voluntary unless the Member State mandates it (Art. 24(6)).
| CRMA provision | Obligation | Where addressed |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 24(1) | Member State identifies the company as in-scope (uses an SRM to make a listed strategic technology). | Scope & applicability |
| Art. 24(2)(a) | Map where the strategic raw materials are extracted, processed and recycled. | Exposure register + Supply-risk factor analysis |
| Art. 24(2)(b) | Analyse the factors that might affect supply. | Supply-risk factor analysis (factor matrix) + The laws that threaten it |
| Art. 24(2)(c) | Assess vulnerabilities to supply disruptions. | Stress test + significant-vulnerability conclusion |
| Art. 24(3) | Where supplier data is unavailable, rely on Commission (Art. 20(4)) / public sources. | This report's basis — see Methodology & sources |
| Art. 24(4) | Where significant vulnerabilities are found, assess diversifying or substituting. | Significant-vulnerability conclusion + Priority mitigations |
| Art. 24(5)–(6) | Report results, sources, significant risks and mitigations to the board. | This document — board-ready, PDF-exportable |
This report pre-fills the Art. 24(3) public-source half of the assessment. The company-specific inputs — employee/turnover thresholds, bill-of-materials volumes, the tiered supplier map, and formal board adoption — remain the company's to complete; they are flagged as “company input” where they appear.
Article 24 applies only when both size thresholds are met and a Member State has identified the company as making a listed strategic technology with strategic raw materials.
| Threshold test | This assessment |
|---|---|
| Average employees (last FY) > 500 | company input |
| Net worldwide turnover (last FY) > €150M | company input |
| Uses a strategic raw material as an input | company input — all 2 scored SRMs here are ones this company produces, not buys; input use is not evidenced by this assessment |
| Manufactures a listed strategic technology | mining-metals (confirm against Annex) |
| Formally identified by a Member State authority | company input |
Production-concentration figures: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 + the production dataset behind each material page. Policy measures trace to the primary government sources below.
Each material's global supply-risk index blends five weighted factors: concentration of refining/processing (35%), active trade-control & policy pressure (25%), import reliance (15%), substitutability (15%), and price stress (10%). The buyer-relative score then scales the relational factors (concentration / policy / import) by this company's production-footprint alignment against each material's controlling country — bloc-neutral factors (substitutability, price) are left intact.
Caveats. The footprint is the company's assembly / manufacturing geography applied uniformly across all materials — a first-order proxy, not per-material input tracing. Scores are an analytical judgement on public data with a transparent weighting, not a market forecast or investment advice. Production shares reflect 2024-2025 figures and the policy position as of 2026-04-27; the register is continuously maintained and should be re-pulled against each new policy action.
MACROLENS · CICONIALABS · GEOPOLITICAL SUPPLY-RISK REPORT (EU CRMA ART. 20–25) · report generated 2026-10-07
Tip: the change log above defaults to the last 30 days. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date (e.g. ?since=2026-04-01).
This is a description of the actual automated pipeline (verifiable against this repo's own cron schedule), not a contractual commitment.