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2 critical materials scored · binding chokepoint: Copper (🇨🇳 CN 48% of refining) · 55 restrictive government measures on record
A verification pass re-checked this dossier's ownership/corporate-structure fields against their cited sources. It did not re-read the material_exposures claim the score, band and stress figures below are built on — treat those as not yet independently re-checked.
Lundin Mining Corporation produces 2 of the 2 scored materials above (Copper, Silver). For those, a supply restriction by the controlling country is a tailwind, not a headwind — the exposure is to disruption of a market this company supplies, not to a chokepoint it depends on. Every scored material here sits on its output side, so the Elevated · 55/100 band should be read as chokepoint salience, not as buyer vulnerability, and the Art. 24 input-side duties below are qualified accordingly.
Role from an explicit dossier role: tag or the producer-sector classifier behind the /minerals alternatives bench (one classifier on disk, generated 2026-10-06) — the same source the company page uses. A material the classifier has no entry for defaults to a buyer dependency, which can understate a producer's output side. Descriptive classification only: it enters no score.
The binding exposure is Copper — 🇨🇳 CN controls 48% of global refining. On this company's production footprint that scores 59/100 (neutral exposure; global 59). The register holds 55 restrictive government measures touching this company's materials — each traced to its primary source below.
Peer rank · Copper Lundin Mining Corporation is the 1219th-most-exposed of the 1443 named companies we track on 🇨🇳 CN's Copper chokepoint; the most-exposed is aerodyn Engineering GmbH (68/100). Ranked on the same footprint-adjusted buyer score as above — a relative read of an existing metric, not a new one.
Lundin Mining Corporation ranks 313th of 449 verified mining metals companies, tied with 33 others at 55.
Company supply-risk index 55/100 — the binding chokepoint dominates, with a modest add for exposure breadth across 2 scored materials. Buyer-relative (first-order): weighted by where the company produces (CL 86% · BR 14%, estimated split — no cited source states these exact shares), applied across all materials — it does not yet trace each input to its specific sourcing step.
Disclosed production sites
Named plants and what they make, from the company's disclosures. Descriptive detail — the buyer score above is still driven by country-level footprint weights, not per-site material intensity.
> The exposure report this dossier powers is at > /intelligence/dossiers/lundin-mining/report.
Lundin Mining is a Toronto-headquartered diversified base-metals miner with producing operations in Chile (Candelaria, Caserones) and Brazil (Chapada), plus the Josemaría copper-gold project under development in Argentina. It divested its US nickel-copper operation, Eagle Mine (Michigan), to Talon Metals Corp. on 2026-01-09 in exchange for a ~19.86% equity stake in Talon. It is primarily a copper producer — 2025 consolidated copper output was ~331,000 tonnes — with silver as a secondary product.
all three producing complexes (Candelaria, Caserones, Chapada); it is the company's dominant revenue driver, not a trace byproduct.
complex in Chile; a minor revenue credit rather than a targeted output, sold to Franco-Nevada under the Candelaria streaming agreement.
Nickel, cobalt and platinum-palladium exposure previously listed here came solely from Eagle Mine (Michigan), which Lundin Mining divested to Talon Metals Corp. on 2026-01-09; Lundin now holds a ~19.86% equity stake in Talon rather than an operating position in those materials, so they are removed from this dossier's scored exposures. Molybdenum is also produced as a byproduct at Caserones but is not one of MacroLens's scored critical-mineral slugs, so it is not listed above.
From the company’s own filings and dated disclosures — top-5 concentration and related-party tables where the filer’s regime compels them, named supply and offtake agreements where it does not. This is a disclosure, not a netting: a named supplier concentration is shown beside the exposure score and never adjusts it. Figures are the fiscal years labelled, not a current snapshot.
Sandstorm Gold Ltd.'s FY2024 AIF (EX-99.1): in October 2015 Sandstorm entered a copper stream with Yamana Gold Inc. on the Chapada Mine (Brazil) -- 'the Company agreed to purchase an amount of copper from the Chapada Mine equal to: 4.2% of the copper produced (up to an annual maximum of 3.9 million pounds), until the Chapada Mine has delivered 39.0 million pounds of copper to the Company' (stepping down to 3.0% then 1.5% at higher cumulative-delivery thresholds per the same stream), paying 'ongoing payments for each pound of copper received under the Copper Stream equal to 30% of the spot price per pound of copper'. Yamana sold the Chapada Mine to Lundin Mining Corporation on 2019-07-05; the AIF confirms 'The Company's rights under the Copper Stream remain intact' and separately notes Chapada produced 43,261t copper and ~65,000oz gold in calendar 2024 (citing Lundin's own 2025-02-19 production announcement). Copper is this dossier's dominant scored material.
Ranked by buyer-relative risk, highest first.
0 of 1 of your scored CRMA-strategic material breach the EU’s own Art. 5 65% single-third-country ceiling (global-production proxy).
| Material | Controlled by | You | Global | Band | Art. 5 | Input share | Substitute | Laws | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Copper | 🇨🇳 CN 48% refining | 59 | 59 | Elevated | within 48% |
Per-material factor scoring on a 1–5 likelihood×impact scale, mapped to the Art. 24(2)(b) risk-factor framework. The headline score above is a portfolio RAG; this matrix is the assessment — it is where two companies with the same binding chokepoint diverge.
| Material | Geopolitical | Concentration | Price / market | Substitutability | Import reliance | Logistics · ESG · Supplier |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Copper | 4 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
Every new filing and every amendment (rate change, scope change, repeal) touching this company's materials in the window above. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date.
Restrictive government measures on this company's materials, newest first — each links to its primary government source.
The Art. 24(2)(c) vulnerability assessment, made explicit. For each leading exposure we model the move in this company's buyer-relative score under two distinct supply-disruption scenarios — the production footprint held fixed, only one lever moved at a time so each delta isolates one shock:
Under the 🇨🇳 CN shock, these disclosed plants carry the binding Copper exposure:
No material crosses the significant-vulnerability threshold on the input side — every scored material here is one Lundin Mining Corporation produces, and Art. 24 addresses the use of a strategic raw material as an input. The Art. 24(4) mitigation duty is not triggered on the public-source evidence; the mitigations below are precautionary.
Stated threshold (so the conclusion is reproducible and auditable): buyer-relative band ≥ High AND substitutability hard/none AND ≥ 1 in-force restrictive measure on the material, assessed over the 0 materials this company buys (the 2 it produces are excluded from the test and listed above). The CRMA does not fix a numeric definition of “significant”; the company may adopt a stricter or looser threshold and should record it here.
Proposed, announced or draft regulation that is not yet in force but would touch this company's at-risk materials if it passes. Forward-looking early-warning — the likelihood shown is an honest band derived from the legislative stage, not a forecast or a fabricated probability. Kept separate from the enacted register above: nothing here is law yet.
Forward-looking read on the binding chokepoint, from the recent trajectory of policy on these materials. Directional, not a forecast.
Every scored material here is one Lundin Mining Corporation produces, so the Art. 24(4) buyer levers — qualify an alternative supplier, re-source, substitute the input — do not apply to this company. The output-side items below are what a concentrated producer's risk office actually acts on. We render them rather than a generic diversification list because a prescription addressed to the wrong side of the market is worse than none.
Under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (Reg. (EU) 2024/1252), a Member State identifies the large companies (Art. 2(29): >500 employees and >€150M net worldwide turnover) using strategic raw materials to manufacture a listed strategic technology (batteries, renewables, hydrogen, traction motors, heat pumps, aircraft, data-storage equipment, robotics, drones, satellites, advanced chips). Those companies must, at least every three years and to the extent the information is available to them (Art. 24(2)), assess their strategic-raw-material supply chain. Where suppliers do not provide the data on request, the assessment may rely on the Commission's monitoring dashboard (Art. 20(4)) or other publicly available information (Art. 24(3)) — which is the evidence base this report assembles. Board reporting (Art. 24(5)) is voluntary unless the Member State mandates it (Art. 24(6)).
| CRMA provision | Obligation | Where addressed |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 24(1) | Member State identifies the company as in-scope (uses an SRM to make a listed strategic technology). | Scope & applicability |
| Art. 24(2)(a) | Map where the strategic raw materials are extracted, processed and recycled. | Exposure register + Supply-risk factor analysis |
| Art. 24(2)(b) |
Article 24 applies only when both size thresholds are met and a Member State has identified the company as making a listed strategic technology with strategic raw materials.
| Threshold test | This assessment |
|---|---|
| Average employees (last FY) > 500 | company input |
| Net worldwide turnover (last FY) > €150M | company input |
| Uses a strategic raw material as an input | company input — all 2 scored SRMs here are ones this company produces, not buys; input use is not evidenced by this assessment |
| Manufactures a listed strategic technology | mining-metals (confirm against Annex) |
| Formally identified by a Member State authority | company input |
Production-concentration figures: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 + the production dataset behind each material page. Policy measures trace to the primary government sources below.
Each material's global supply-risk index blends five weighted factors: concentration of refining/processing (35%), active trade-control & policy pressure (25%), import reliance (15%), substitutability (15%), and price stress (10%). The buyer-relative score then scales the relational factors (concentration / policy / import) by this company's production-footprint alignment against each material's controlling country — bloc-neutral factors (substitutability, price) are left intact.
Caveats. The footprint is the company's assembly / manufacturing geography applied uniformly across all materials — a first-order proxy, not per-material input tracing. Scores are an analytical judgement on public data with a transparent weighting, not a market forecast or investment advice. Production shares reflect 2024-2025 figures and the policy position as of 2026-09-30; the register is continuously maintained and should be re-pulled against each new policy action.
MACROLENS · CICONIALABS · GEOPOLITICAL SUPPLY-RISK REPORT (EU CRMA ART. 20–25) · report generated 2026-10-06
Tip: the change log above defaults to the last 30 days. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date (e.g. ?since=2026-04-01).
This is a description of the actual automated pipeline (verifiable against this repo's own cron schedule), not a contractual commitment.
Same sector_primary, ranked on the company supply-risk index. Restricted to hand-verified dossiers — 127 further mining metals companies are tracked but auto-onboarded, and excluded here because their exposure list is a sector template rather than company research. A peer scoring lower is the useful read: it usually means a different production geography or a qualified second source.
Franco-Nevada's FY2025 AIF/40-F (year ended 2025-12-31; this is the company's year-end disclosure notice of that filing — the original SEC exhibit URL, sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1456346/000110465926032133/fnv-20251231xex99d1.htm, now returns 403 to automated fetches): on 2014-10-06, LMC Bermuda Ltd. (a Lundin Mining subsidiary), Franco-Nevada and Franco-Nevada Barbados Corporation entered the Candelaria stream agreement for an upfront deposit of $648.0 million. The stream covers 68% of payable gold and silver from the Candelaria Copper Mining Complex (Lundin Mining 80% / Sumitomo Corporation 20%), stepping down to 40% in H2 2027. Franco-Nevada buys Lundin's Candelaria silver (and gold) at a fixed per-ounce price — the streaming-company equivalent of a customer. Step-down terms re-confirmed 2026-09-19 against independent reporting. Silver is one of this dossier's scored materials; gold is not.
Compañía Contractual Minera Candelaria (Candelaria complex, Copiapó, Atacama, Chile; Lundin 80%) audited FY2025 IFRS statements filed with Chile's CMF (SARYT royalty registry), Note 12 related-party transactions: 'Sumitomo Metal Mining | Shareholder | Sales of copper concentrates | 635,014 | 473,783' (ThUS$, 2025 | 2024), i.e. US$635.0m in 2025 and US$473.8m in 2024. Note 29 long-term offtake: SMM takes 24% of Candelaria's estimated annual concentrate production. SMM's only copper smelter is Toyo Smelter & Refinery (Ehime, Japan).
Compañía Contractual Minera Candelaria (Candelaria complex, Copiapó, Atacama, Chile; Lundin 80%) audited FY2025 IFRS statements filed with Chile's CMF (SARYT royalty registry), Note 12 related-party transactions: 'Pan Pacific Copper Co | Common Shareholder | Sales of copper concentrates | 112,389 | 117,780' (ThUS$ 2025 | 2024). Also Caserones (SCM Minera Lumina Copper Chile, Atacama, Chile; Lundin 70%) FY2025 CMF statements Note 7 (image scan), https://www.cmfchile.cl/institucional/mercados/ver_archivo.php?archivo=/web/seil/saryt/sinvalidar/royalty_202512_99531960_bal_i_20260325_153030.pdf (image scan, not text-searchable, so paraphrased not quoted) lists Pan Pacific Copper Co., Ltd. as common parent with sales of copper cathodes and concentrate of ThUS$372,595 (2025) and ThUS$432,308 (2024), where JX Advanced Metals Corporation is listed as Parent (2023: 1,081,117 per FY2024 statements). PPC is JX's copper-smelting subsidiary; its smelters (Saganoseki, Oita; Hibi, Tamano) are in Japan.
Compañía Contractual Minera Candelaria (Candelaria complex, Copiapó, Atacama, Chile; Lundin 80%) audited FY2025 IFRS statements filed with Chile's CMF (SARYT royalty registry), Note 12 related-party transactions: 'Mitsubishi Materials Corporation | Common Shareholder | Sales of copper concentrates | 75,744 | 57,479' (ThUS$ 2025 | 2024), i.e. US$75.7m in 2025. MMC's copper smelters (Naoshima; Onahama) are in Japan.
Compañía Contractual Minera Candelaria (Candelaria complex, Copiapó, Atacama, Chile; Lundin 80%) audited FY2025 IFRS statements filed with Chile's CMF (SARYT royalty registry), Note 12 related-party transactions: 'Jinlong Copper Co., Ltd | Common Shareholder | Sales of copper concentrates | 88,630 | 86,270' (ThUS$ 2025 | 2024), i.e. US$88.6m in 2025. Jinlong Copper is a single-site copper smelter in Tongling, Anhui, China (a Tongling Nonferrous group smelter with Sumitomo participation; parent share not asserted here).
Compañía Contractual Minera Candelaria (Candelaria complex, Copiapó, Atacama, Chile; Lundin 80%) audited FY2025 IFRS statements filed with Chile's CMF (SARYT royalty registry), Note 12 related-party transactions: 'Sumitomo Corporation | Shareholder | Sales of copper concentrates | 32,465' (ThUS$ 2025; nil 2024); Note 29 offtake of 6% of estimated annual production. Trading house: destination not stated.
Lundin AIF (19 Feb 2025): 'All of the copper concentrates from the Eagle Mine are transported by rail and sold to a smelter in Canada.' Eagle Mine / Humboldt Mill are in Michigan (US), hence US>CA. The AIF does not name the smelter; Glencore's Horne Smelter (Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec) is identified by elimination as Canada's only copper smelter (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horne_Smelter), and an older rail-traffic account names Eagle copper concentrate going to Glencore Rouyn-Noranda (http://vanderheide.ca/blog/2015/08/14/freight-car-friday-47/) -- hence confidence secondary. Eagle was sold to Talon Metals in Jan 2026; Talon says only that concentrates go to North American smelters.
Alternative track — a counterparty read from primary filings, never merged into the exposure score. Absence of a name is not absence of a relationship: Filers name only the counterparties their regime compels them to name, and several of this company’s largest are disclosed by size with no name at all.
| High |
| limited |
| 52 |
| ▲ rising |
| Silver | 🇲🇽 MX 24% mining | 39 | 43 | Low | — | Low | some | 5 | ▲ rising |
You = buyer-relative score (this company's disclosed footprint vs. the controller). Global = buyer-agnostic supply risk. Substitute = ease of swapping the material out (none = locked in). Input share = the material's disclosed magnitude in the company's input basket (HIGH/MED/LOW only where a public filing quantifies it; — = unrated). Descriptive effect-size, never scored.
Art. 5 = does the global top single-country share breach the EU's own CRMA Art. 5 diversification ceiling (no more than 65% of a strategic raw material from a single third country)? A conservative global-production PROXY for the EU-import denominator — descriptive only, sits beside the score, never merged into it (— = non-strategic material). Reg. (EU) 2024/1252 Art. 5 ↗
| 3 |
| company input |
| Silver | 3 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 3 | company input |
1 = very low … 5 = very high — a standard supply-risk likelihood×impact scale (the form a competent authority expects for the Art. 24(2)(b) factor analysis, not a CRMA-numbered scale). Public-source factors are pre-filled from the engine's primary sources (USGS concentration, IPTM government actions, EU import data); the three rightmost factor categories need company / Tier-1 supplier data and are flagged as input under Art. 24(3). Hover any cell for its evidence.
+ 40 more in the register.
| Type | Scenario | Today | Stressed | Δ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy | Copper — 🇨🇳 CN escalates copper controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime | 59 | 63 | +4 |
| Concentration | Copper — 🇨🇳 CN becomes the single source for copper — the second source is lost (full 48%+ monopoly) | 59 | 84 | +25 |
| Policy | Silver — 🇲🇽 MX escalates silver controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime | 39 | 47 | +8 |
| Concentration | Silver — 🇲🇽 MX becomes the single source for silver — the second source is lost (full 24%+ monopoly) | 39 | 65 | +26 |
A zero delta means that lever is already modelled at maximum on that material — today's score already prices it in. This is why the two scenarios are shown together: where a material's policy lever is already maxed (zero policy delta), the concentration shock still carries a real delta, and vice-versa. Each stressed score isolates its one lever; all other factors are held at current values.
Bills at introduction (pre-committee) in US historically become law ~5% of the time (n=37,132, GovTrack — 117th–118th Congresses) — a base rate for comparable bills, not a forecast for this one. source ↗
Bills at out of committee in US historically become law ~21% of the time (n=1,687, GovTrack — 117th Congress (2021–2023)) — a base rate for comparable bills, not a forecast for this one. source ↗
Likelihood band is derived deterministically from the legislative stage (announced → low; draft-published / in-consultation → moderate; passed-committee → elevated; passed-vote / awaiting-signature → high) — a reproducible, source-traceable proxy, not a probability estimate. Where shown, the modelled impact-if-passed re-uses the same buyer-relative stress engine as the enacted scenarios above: it holds this company's production footprint fixed and escalates the proposed measure to a full export-licensing / control regime — the conservative upper bound for a measure that may pass only as a partial cap. The delta is the move from today's score to that stressed score; companies with no modelled production footprint show no delta.
| Analyse the factors that might affect supply. |
| Supply-risk factor analysis (factor matrix) + The laws that threaten it |
| Art. 24(2)(c) | Assess vulnerabilities to supply disruptions. | Stress test + significant-vulnerability conclusion |
| Art. 24(3) | Where supplier data is unavailable, rely on Commission (Art. 20(4)) / public sources. | This report's basis — see Methodology & sources |
| Art. 24(4) | Where significant vulnerabilities are found, assess diversifying or substituting. | Significant-vulnerability conclusion + Priority mitigations |
| Art. 24(5)–(6) | Report results, sources, significant risks and mitigations to the board. | This document — board-ready, PDF-exportable |
This report pre-fills the Art. 24(3) public-source half of the assessment. The company-specific inputs — employee/turnover thresholds, bill-of-materials volumes, the tiered supplier map, and formal board adoption — remain the company's to complete; they are flagged as “company input” where they appear.