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3 critical materials scored · binding chokepoint: Silicon (🇨🇳 CN 80% of refining) · 33 restrictive government measures on record
Osaka Titanium Technologies produces 1 of the 3 scored materials above (Titanium). For those, a supply restriction by the controlling country is a tailwind, not a headwind — the exposure is to disruption of a market this company supplies, not to a chokepoint it depends on. The remaining 2 (Silicon, Magnesium) are genuine buyer dependencies and drive the mitigations below. The two sides are reported separately and never netted against each other.
Role from an explicit dossier role: tag or the producer-sector classifier behind the /minerals alternatives bench (one classifier on disk, generated 2026-10-07) — the same source the company page uses. A material the classifier has no entry for defaults to a buyer dependency, which can understate a producer's output side. Descriptive classification only: it enters no score.
The binding exposure is Silicon — 🇨🇳 CN controls 80% of global refining. On this company's production footprint that scores 77/100 (adversarial chokepoint; global 64). The register holds 33 restrictive government measures touching this company's materials — each traced to its primary source below.
Peer rank · Silicon Osaka Titanium Technologies is the 280th-most-exposed of the 830 named companies we track on 🇨🇳 CN's Silicon chokepoint; the most-exposed is aerodyn Engineering GmbH (77/100). Ranked on the same footprint-adjusted buyer score as above — a relative read of an existing metric, not a new one.
Osaka Titanium Technologies ranks 18th of 98 verified metals refining companies, tied with 3 others at 76.
Same sector_primary, ranked on the company supply-risk index. Restricted to hand-verified dossiers — 39 further metals refining companies are tracked but auto-onboarded, and excluded here because their exposure list is a sector template rather than company research. A peer scoring lower is the useful read: it usually means a different production geography or a qualified second source.
Company supply-risk index 76/100 — the binding chokepoint dominates, with a modest add for exposure breadth across 3 scored materials. Buyer-relative (first-order): weighted by where the company produces (JP 100%, estimated split — no cited source states these exact shares), applied across all materials — it does not yet trace each input to its specific sourcing step.
Disclosed production sites
Named plants and what they make, from the company's disclosures. Descriptive detail — the buyer score above is still driven by country-level footprint weights, not per-site material intensity.
Osaka Titanium Technologies (OTC, TSE: 5726), headquartered in Amagasaki, Japan, is the world's second-largest producer of titanium sponge after Russia's VSMPO-Avisma. Founded in 1952 as Japan's first commercial titanium producer (originally Sumitomo Titanium), it makes titanium sponge, ingots, ferro-titanium and high-purity titanium via the Kroll process, supplying premium-grade sponge for jet-engine and airframe components as well as titanium for chemical-plant, desalination and consumer-goods use. A separate High-Performance Materials line produces silicon-based specialty products, including silicon monoxide (SiO). OTC previously ran a semiconductor-grade polycrystalline-silicon business (est. 1960) but exited it in 2018-19 after cancelling its long-term supply contract with Sumco, citing an unresolved industry supply-demand gap.
a purchased-input exposure).** OTC is the world's second-largest producer of titanium sponge (after VSMPO-Avisma) and one of the small handful of producers whose aerospace-grade sponge is actually qualified for jet-engine and airframe use — most Chinese sponge output is not. As a producer rather than a buyer, OTC's exposure runs upstream to its titanium mineral-concentrate feedstock (ilmenite/rutile), which is moderately concentrated (China ~1/3, then Mozambique/South Africa), not to the metal itself. This exposure was previously omitted from material_exposures under the (now-stale) note that titanium wasn't a scored mineral on this platform — it was added to SCORED_MATERIALS 2026-07-23, after this dossier's prior refresh (2026-07-10); corrected 2026-08-20.
chlorinating titanium ore to TiCl4, then reducing it with metallic magnesium; OTC's own process description confirms the magnesium (and the chlorine) is recovered and recycled back into the reduction loop. Recycling lowers, but does not eliminate, OTC's dependence on external magnesium supply — China accounts for roughly the large majority of global primary magnesium production, making make-up magnesium a real (if partially buffered) chokepoint for sponge output.
High-Performance Materials segment currently lists silicon monoxide (SiO) among its live products, which is produced from silicon feedstock and used as an anode-material precursor in high-energy-density batteries. This is distinct from, and smaller than, the semiconductor polysilicon business OTC exited in 2018-19 — that historical exposure is not carried forward here.
1. OSAKA Titanium Technologies — official product/process pages (titanium sponge, Kroll process, SiO): https://www.osaka-ti.co.jp/e/e_product/ 2. OSAKA Titanium Technologies — company/business outline: https://www.osaka-ti.co.jp/e/e_company/outline.html 3. Bernreuter Research — "Osaka Titanium exits polysilicon business for semiconductors": https://www.bernreuter.com/newsroom/polysilicon-news/article/osaka-titanium-exits-polysilicon-business-for-semiconductors/
A separate read from its own public reporting — not part of the exposure score above. We check whether the company's latest annual / CSRD-ESRS filing names, quantifies, and gives a mitigation plan for the critical-minerals dependency our register ranks it on. The mismatch — ranked exposed here, silent in its own filing — is the engagement / short-thesis signal. Every answer is traced to a primary filing or left “not found”; nothing is inferred.
Disclosure mismatch. Our register ranks this company as exposed (high), but its own public reporting does not name this critical-minerals dependency — the exact high-exposure / non-disclosing profile that flags an engagement or short-thesis candidate.
Basis: Official company product/process pages (osaka-ti.co.jp) describe magnesium recycling in the Kroll process but do not frame external magnesium or silicon supply as a named risk
Source: primary filing ↗ · checked 2026-07-11 · Alternative track — a disclosure read, never merged into the exposure score.
Ranked by buyer-relative risk, highest first.
3 of 3 of your scored CRMA-strategic materials breach the EU’s own Art. 5 65% single-third-country ceiling (global-production proxy).
| Material | Controlled by | You | Global | Band | Art. 5 | Input share | Substitute | Laws | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Silicon | 🇨🇳 CN 80% refining | 77 | 64 | High | EXCEEDS 80% | Low | limited | 19 | ▲ rising |
| Magnesium | 🇨🇳 CN 86% refining | 75 | 63 | High | EXCEEDS 86% | Med | none | 2 | ▲ rising |
| Titanium | 🇨🇳 CN 70% refining | 71 | 59 | High | EXCEEDS 70% | High | limited | 14 | ▲ rising |
You = buyer-relative score (this company's disclosed footprint vs. the controller). Global = buyer-agnostic supply risk. Substitute = ease of swapping the material out (none = locked in). Input share = the material's disclosed magnitude in the company's input basket (HIGH/MED/LOW only where a public filing quantifies it; — = unrated). Descriptive effect-size, never scored.
Art. 5 = does the global top single-country share breach the EU's own CRMA Art. 5 diversification ceiling (no more than 65% of a strategic raw material from a single third country)? A conservative global-production PROXY for the EU-import denominator — descriptive only, sits beside the score, never merged into it (— = non-strategic material). Reg. (EU) 2024/1252 Art. 5 ↗
Per-material factor scoring on a 1–5 likelihood×impact scale, mapped to the Art. 24(2)(b) risk-factor framework. The headline score above is a portfolio RAG; this matrix is the assessment — it is where two companies with the same binding chokepoint diverge.
| Material | Geopolitical | Concentration | Price / market | Substitutability | Import reliance | Logistics · ESG · Supplier |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Silicon | 4 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 4 | company input |
| Magnesium | 3 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 3 | company input |
| Titanium | 4 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 4 | company input |
1 = very low … 5 = very high — a standard supply-risk likelihood×impact scale (the form a competent authority expects for the Art. 24(2)(b) factor analysis, not a CRMA-numbered scale). Public-source factors are pre-filled from the engine's primary sources (USGS concentration, IPTM government actions, EU import data); the three rightmost factor categories need company / Tier-1 supplier data and are flagged as input under Art. 24(3). Hover any cell for its evidence.
Every new filing and every amendment (rate change, scope change, repeal) touching this company's materials in the window above. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date.
Restrictive government measures on this company's materials, newest first — each links to its primary government source.
+ 18 more in the register.
The Art. 24(2)(c) vulnerability assessment, made explicit. For each leading exposure we model the move in this company's buyer-relative score under two distinct supply-disruption scenarios — the production footprint held fixed, only one lever moved at a time so each delta isolates one shock:
Under the 🇨🇳 CN shock, your disclosed plant carries the binding Silicon exposure:
| Type | Scenario | Today | Stressed | Δ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy | Silicon — 🇨🇳 CN escalates silicon controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime | 77 | 82 | +5 |
| Concentration | Silicon — 🇨🇳 CN becomes the single source for silicon — the second source is lost (full 80%+ monopoly) | 77 | 89 | +12 |
| Policy | Magnesium — 🇨🇳 CN escalates magnesium controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime | 75 | 90 | +15 |
| Concentration | Magnesium — 🇨🇳 CN becomes the single source for magnesium — the second source is lost (full 86%+ monopoly) | 75 | 85 | +10 |
| Policy | Titanium — 🇨🇳 CN escalates titanium controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime | 71 | 77 | +6 |
| Concentration | Titanium — 🇨🇳 CN becomes the single source for titanium — the second source is lost (full 70%+ monopoly) | 71 | 89 | +18 |
A zero delta means that lever is already modelled at maximum on that material — today's score already prices it in. This is why the two scenarios are shown together: where a material's policy lever is already maxed (zero policy delta), the concentration shock still carries a real delta, and vice-versa. Each stressed score isolates its one lever; all other factors are held at current values.
This assessment identifies 1 significant vulnerability — Magnesium — each a High/Critical exposure that is hard to substitute and already under at least one in-force restrictive measure. This engages the duty under Art. 24(4) to take mitigating efforts, including assessing diversification of the supply chain or substitution of the material (see Priority mitigations below).
Stated threshold (so the conclusion is reproducible and auditable): buyer-relative band ≥ High AND substitutability hard/none AND ≥ 1 in-force restrictive measure on the material, assessed over the 2 materials this company buys (the 1 it produces are excluded from the test and listed above). The CRMA does not fix a numeric definition of “significant”; the company may adopt a stricter or looser threshold and should record it here.
Proposed, announced or draft regulation that is not yet in force but would touch this company's at-risk materials if it passes. Forward-looking early-warning — the likelihood shown is an honest band derived from the legislative stage, not a forecast or a fabricated probability. Kept separate from the enacted register above: nothing here is law yet.
Likelihood band is derived deterministically from the legislative stage (announced → low; draft-published / in-consultation → moderate; passed-committee → elevated; passed-vote / awaiting-signature → high) — a reproducible, source-traceable proxy, not a probability estimate. Where shown, the modelled impact-if-passed re-uses the same buyer-relative stress engine as the enacted scenarios above: it holds this company's production footprint fixed and escalates the proposed measure to a full export-licensing / control regime — the conservative upper bound for a measure that may pass only as a partial cap. The delta is the move from today's score to that stressed score; companies with no modelled production footprint show no delta.
Forward-looking read on the binding chokepoint, from the recent trajectory of policy on these materials. Directional, not a forecast.
The mitigating efforts Art. 24(4) names — diversifying the supply chain and substituting the material — plus the standard levers against a concentrated, policy-exposed input. Prioritise around the binding input chokepoint (Silicon). The 1 material Osaka Titanium Technologies produces (Titanium) is excluded from these buyer levers — see the role check in the verdict and the significant-vulnerability conclusion above.
Under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (Reg. (EU) 2024/1252), a Member State identifies the large companies (Art. 2(29): >500 employees and >€150M net worldwide turnover) using strategic raw materials to manufacture a listed strategic technology (batteries, renewables, hydrogen, traction motors, heat pumps, aircraft, data-storage equipment, robotics, drones, satellites, advanced chips). Those companies must, at least every three years and to the extent the information is available to them (Art. 24(2)), assess their strategic-raw-material supply chain. Where suppliers do not provide the data on request, the assessment may rely on the Commission's monitoring dashboard (Art. 20(4)) or other publicly available information (Art. 24(3)) — which is the evidence base this report assembles. Board reporting (Art. 24(5)) is voluntary unless the Member State mandates it (Art. 24(6)).
| CRMA provision | Obligation | Where addressed |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 24(1) | Member State identifies the company as in-scope (uses an SRM to make a listed strategic technology). | Scope & applicability |
| Art. 24(2)(a) | Map where the strategic raw materials are extracted, processed and recycled. | Exposure register + Supply-risk factor analysis |
| Art. 24(2)(b) | Analyse the factors that might affect supply. | Supply-risk factor analysis (factor matrix) + The laws that threaten it |
| Art. 24(2)(c) | Assess vulnerabilities to supply disruptions. | Stress test + significant-vulnerability conclusion |
| Art. 24(3) | Where supplier data is unavailable, rely on Commission (Art. 20(4)) / public sources. | This report's basis — see Methodology & sources |
| Art. 24(4) | Where significant vulnerabilities are found, assess diversifying or substituting. | Significant-vulnerability conclusion + Priority mitigations |
| Art. 24(5)–(6) | Report results, sources, significant risks and mitigations to the board. | This document — board-ready, PDF-exportable |
This report pre-fills the Art. 24(3) public-source half of the assessment. The company-specific inputs — employee/turnover thresholds, bill-of-materials volumes, the tiered supplier map, and formal board adoption — remain the company's to complete; they are flagged as “company input” where they appear.
Article 24 applies only when both size thresholds are met and a Member State has identified the company as making a listed strategic technology with strategic raw materials.
| Threshold test | This assessment |
|---|---|
| Average employees (last FY) > 500 | company input |
| Net worldwide turnover (last FY) > €150M | company input |
| Uses a strategic raw material as an input | Yes — 2 scored SRMs on the input side (binding: Silicon); 1 further scored SRM produced, not consumed |
| Manufactures a listed strategic technology | metals-refining (confirm against Annex) |
| Formally identified by a Member State authority | company input |
Production-concentration figures: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 + the production dataset behind each material page. Policy measures trace to the primary government sources below.
Each material's global supply-risk index blends five weighted factors: concentration of refining/processing (35%), active trade-control & policy pressure (25%), import reliance (15%), substitutability (15%), and price stress (10%). The buyer-relative score then scales the relational factors (concentration / policy / import) by this company's production-footprint alignment against each material's controlling country — bloc-neutral factors (substitutability, price) are left intact.
Caveats. The footprint is the company's assembly / manufacturing geography applied uniformly across all materials — a first-order proxy, not per-material input tracing. Scores are an analytical judgement on public data with a transparent weighting, not a market forecast or investment advice. Production shares reflect 2024-2025 figures and the policy position as of 2026-09-22; the register is continuously maintained and should be re-pulled against each new policy action.
MACROLENS · CICONIALABS · GEOPOLITICAL SUPPLY-RISK REPORT (EU CRMA ART. 20–25) · report generated 2026-10-07
Tip: the change log above defaults to the last 30 days. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date (e.g. ?since=2026-04-01).
This is a description of the actual automated pipeline (verifiable against this repo's own cron schedule), not a contractual commitment.