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1 critical material scored · binding chokepoint: Potash (🇨🇦 CA 31% of refining) · 8 restrictive government measures on record
Uralkali PJSC produces 1 of the 1 scored material above (Potash). For those, a supply restriction by the controlling country is a tailwind, not a headwind — the exposure is to disruption of a market this company supplies, not to a chokepoint it depends on. Every scored material here sits on its output side, so the Elevated · 58/100 band should be read as chokepoint salience, not as buyer vulnerability, and the Art. 24 input-side duties below are qualified accordingly.
Role from an explicit dossier role: tag or the producer-sector classifier behind the /minerals alternatives bench (one classifier on disk, generated 2026-10-06) — the same source the company page uses. A material the classifier has no entry for defaults to a buyer dependency, which can understate a producer's output side. Descriptive classification only: it enters no score.
The binding exposure is Potash — 🇨🇦 CA controls 31% of global refining. On this company's production footprint that scores 58/100 (adversarial chokepoint; global 50). The register holds 8 restrictive government measures touching this company's materials — each traced to its primary source below.
Peer rank · Potash Uralkali PJSC is the 2nd-most-exposed of the 41 named companies we track on 🇨🇦 CA's Potash chokepoint; the most-exposed is Belaruskali (58/100). Ranked on the same footprint-adjusted buyer score as above — a relative read of an existing metric, not a new one.
Uralkali PJSC ranks 69th of 99 verified chemicals companies, tied with 4 others at 58.
Same sector_primary, ranked on the company supply-risk index. Restricted to hand-verified dossiers — 13 further chemicals companies are tracked but auto-onboarded, and excluded here because their exposure list is a sector template rather than company research. A peer scoring lower is the useful read: it usually means a different production geography or a qualified second source.
Company supply-risk index 58/100 — the binding chokepoint dominates, with a modest add for exposure breadth across 1 scored material. Buyer-relative (first-order): weighted by where the company produces (RU 100%, estimated split — no cited source states these exact shares), applied across all materials — it does not yet trace each input to its specific sourcing step.
Disclosed production sites
Named plants and what they make, from the company's disclosures. Descriptive detail — the buyer score above is still driven by country-level footprint weights, not per-site material intensity.
> The exposure report this dossier powers is at > /intelligence/dossiers/uralkali-pjsc/report.
Uralkali PJSC is a Russian potash miner and fertilizer producer headquartered in Berezniki, Perm Krai. It develops the Verkhnekamskoye deposit — the world's second-largest potash ore reserve — through five mines and seven ore-treatment mills in the towns of Berezniki and Solikamsk. Its principal product is standard and granular potassium chloride (KCl, muriate of potash); it also produces sodium chloride (halite) and carnallite.
It is an exporter first: roughly 80% of output goes overseas, sold through its own trading arm Uralkali Trading into more than 60 countries, with Brazil, India, China, Southeast Asia, the United States and Europe as the major markets alongside Russia. Production was 11.3 Mt of potassium chloride in 2020; USGS recorded 13.3 Mt/yr of MOP capacity in 2019 against a plan to reach 15 Mt/yr via the Polovodovsky, Solikamsk and Ust-Yayvinsky mine projects. Uralchem holds 81.47% of the shares (as of December 2020).
Uralkali is a producer, not a consumer, of the one scored material it touches. Its exposure to policy is therefore the mirror image of a manufacturer's: export controls, sanctions and trade remedies aimed at Russian fertilizer act on its sales, not its inputs.
role: producer). Uralkali minessylvinite ore and refines it to potassium chloride at Berezniki and Solikamsk. This is not one input among many in a bill-of-materials; it is essentially the whole company. Potash has few substitutes as a potassium source in fertilizer, and global production is concentrated in a small number of basins — Russia, Belarus, Canada — which is precisely why a single Russian producer at 11+ Mt/yr is a material node in the global supply picture.
Not listed, and why. Carnallite is among Uralkali's stated products and is the conventional feedstock for primary magnesium production — but producing the feedstock mineral is a different fact from producing magnesium metal, and no source located this pass says Uralkali does the latter, so magnesium is deliberately omitted rather than inferred. Sodium chloride (halite), also produced, is not on the scored register.
Dropped from the sector default: phosphate, vanadium, nickel, cobalt, silicon, antimony, manganese and lithium. These came from a generic "chemicals" sector bill-of-materials and none is supported by any source for a single-commodity potash miner. Phosphate is worth naming specifically: it is a fertilizer nutrient and so looks plausible next to potash, but Uralkali does not mine or process phosphate rock — phosphate and potash are different deposits, different mines and different producers.
No magnitude band is set. Uralkali's own website is CAPTCHA-walled from this host and no company disclosure quantifying a material's revenue or cost share could be read, so the (band: ...) annotation is omitted rather than guessed.
Ranked by buyer-relative risk, highest first.
| Material | Controlled by | You | Global | Band | Art. 5 | Input share | Substitute | Laws | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Potash | 🇨🇦 CA 31% refining | 58 | 50 | Elevated | — | — | none | 8 | ▲ rising |
You = buyer-relative score (this company's disclosed footprint vs. the controller). Global = buyer-agnostic supply risk. Substitute = ease of swapping the material out (none = locked in). Input share = the material's disclosed magnitude in the company's input basket (HIGH/MED/LOW only where a public filing quantifies it; — = unrated). Descriptive effect-size, never scored.
Art. 5 = does the global top single-country share breach the EU's own CRMA Art. 5 diversification ceiling (no more than 65% of a strategic raw material from a single third country)? A conservative global-production PROXY for the EU-import denominator — descriptive only, sits beside the score, never merged into it (— = non-strategic material). Reg. (EU) 2024/1252 Art. 5 ↗
Per-material factor scoring on a 1–5 likelihood×impact scale, mapped to the Art. 24(2)(b) risk-factor framework. The headline score above is a portfolio RAG; this matrix is the assessment — it is where two companies with the same binding chokepoint diverge.
| Material | Geopolitical | Concentration | Price / market | Substitutability | Import reliance | Logistics · ESG · Supplier |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Potash | 4 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 3 | company input |
1 = very low … 5 = very high — a standard supply-risk likelihood×impact scale (the form a competent authority expects for the Art. 24(2)(b) factor analysis, not a CRMA-numbered scale). Public-source factors are pre-filled from the engine's primary sources (USGS concentration, IPTM government actions, EU import data); the three rightmost factor categories need company / Tier-1 supplier data and are flagged as input under Art. 24(3). Hover any cell for its evidence.
Every new filing and every amendment (rate change, scope change, repeal) touching this company's materials in the window above. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date.
No filings or amendments in this window — the register has been quiet on this company's materials.
Restrictive government measures on this company's materials, newest first — each links to its primary government source.
The Art. 24(2)(c) vulnerability assessment, made explicit. For each leading exposure we model the move in this company's buyer-relative score under two distinct supply-disruption scenarios — the production footprint held fixed, only one lever moved at a time so each delta isolates one shock:
Under the 🇨🇦 CA shock, these disclosed plants carry the binding Potash exposure:
| Type | Scenario | Today | Stressed | Δ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy | Potash — 🇨🇦 CA escalates potash controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime | 58 | 66 | +8 |
| Concentration | Potash — 🇨🇦 CA becomes the single source for potash — the second source is lost (full 31%+ monopoly) | 58 | 90 | +32 |
A zero delta means that lever is already modelled at maximum on that material — today's score already prices it in. This is why the two scenarios are shown together: where a material's policy lever is already maxed (zero policy delta), the concentration shock still carries a real delta, and vice-versa. Each stressed score isolates its one lever; all other factors are held at current values.
No material crosses the significant-vulnerability threshold on the input side — every scored material here is one Uralkali PJSC produces, and Art. 24 addresses the use of a strategic raw material as an input. The Art. 24(4) mitigation duty is not triggered on the public-source evidence; the mitigations below are precautionary.
Stated threshold (so the conclusion is reproducible and auditable): buyer-relative band ≥ High AND substitutability hard/none AND ≥ 1 in-force restrictive measure on the material, assessed over the 0 materials this company buys (the 1 it produces are excluded from the test and listed above). The CRMA does not fix a numeric definition of “significant”; the company may adopt a stricter or looser threshold and should record it here.
Forward-looking read on the binding chokepoint, from the recent trajectory of policy on these materials. Directional, not a forecast.
Every scored material here is one Uralkali PJSC produces, so the Art. 24(4) buyer levers — qualify an alternative supplier, re-source, substitute the input — do not apply to this company. The output-side items below are what a concentrated producer's risk office actually acts on. We render them rather than a generic diversification list because a prescription addressed to the wrong side of the market is worse than none.
Under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (Reg. (EU) 2024/1252), a Member State identifies the large companies (Art. 2(29): >500 employees and >€150M net worldwide turnover) using strategic raw materials to manufacture a listed strategic technology (batteries, renewables, hydrogen, traction motors, heat pumps, aircraft, data-storage equipment, robotics, drones, satellites, advanced chips). Those companies must, at least every three years and to the extent the information is available to them (Art. 24(2)), assess their strategic-raw-material supply chain. Where suppliers do not provide the data on request, the assessment may rely on the Commission's monitoring dashboard (Art. 20(4)) or other publicly available information (Art. 24(3)) — which is the evidence base this report assembles. Board reporting (Art. 24(5)) is voluntary unless the Member State mandates it (Art. 24(6)).
| CRMA provision | Obligation | Where addressed |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 24(1) | Member State identifies the company as in-scope (uses an SRM to make a listed strategic technology). | Scope & applicability |
| Art. 24(2)(a) | Map where the strategic raw materials are extracted, processed and recycled. | Exposure register + Supply-risk factor analysis |
| Art. 24(2)(b) | Analyse the factors that might affect supply. | Supply-risk factor analysis (factor matrix) + The laws that threaten it |
| Art. 24(2)(c) | Assess vulnerabilities to supply disruptions. | Stress test + significant-vulnerability conclusion |
| Art. 24(3) | Where supplier data is unavailable, rely on Commission (Art. 20(4)) / public sources. | This report's basis — see Methodology & sources |
| Art. 24(4) | Where significant vulnerabilities are found, assess diversifying or substituting. | Significant-vulnerability conclusion + Priority mitigations |
| Art. 24(5)–(6) | Report results, sources, significant risks and mitigations to the board. | This document — board-ready, PDF-exportable |
This report pre-fills the Art. 24(3) public-source half of the assessment. The company-specific inputs — employee/turnover thresholds, bill-of-materials volumes, the tiered supplier map, and formal board adoption — remain the company's to complete; they are flagged as “company input” where they appear.
Article 24 applies only when both size thresholds are met and a Member State has identified the company as making a listed strategic technology with strategic raw materials.
| Threshold test | This assessment |
|---|---|
| Average employees (last FY) > 500 | company input |
| Net worldwide turnover (last FY) > €150M | company input |
| Uses a strategic raw material as an input | company input — all 1 scored SRM here is one this company produces, not buys; input use is not evidenced by this assessment |
| Manufactures a listed strategic technology | chemicals (confirm against Annex) |
| Formally identified by a Member State authority | company input |
Production-concentration figures: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 + the production dataset behind each material page. Policy measures trace to the primary government sources below.
Each material's global supply-risk index blends five weighted factors: concentration of refining/processing (35%), active trade-control & policy pressure (25%), import reliance (15%), substitutability (15%), and price stress (10%). The buyer-relative score then scales the relational factors (concentration / policy / import) by this company's production-footprint alignment against each material's controlling country — bloc-neutral factors (substitutability, price) are left intact.
Caveats. The footprint is the company's assembly / manufacturing geography applied uniformly across all materials — a first-order proxy, not per-material input tracing. Scores are an analytical judgement on public data with a transparent weighting, not a market forecast or investment advice. Production shares reflect 2024-2025 figures and the policy position as of 2025-11-06; the register is continuously maintained and should be re-pulled against each new policy action.
MACROLENS · CICONIALABS · GEOPOLITICAL SUPPLY-RISK REPORT (EU CRMA ART. 20–25) · report generated 2026-10-06
Tip: the change log above defaults to the last 30 days. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date (e.g. ?since=2026-04-01).
This is a description of the actual automated pipeline (verifiable against this repo's own cron schedule), not a contractual commitment.