Germanium + Gallium — combined material dossier

Covered together because they're almost always discussed together in trade-policy contexts: both were targeted by China's August 2023 export controls (the first major metals export-restriction move since rare earths in 2010). Pricing, drivers, and risk profile are parallel enough to justify a single dossier.

What they are

• Germanium (Ge): metalloid, atomic number 32. Used in

fiber optics (~35% of demand), infrared optics (~30% — night vision, satellite systems), PET catalysis (~15%), electronics (SiGe transistors, solar cells, ~20%).

• Gallium (Ga): soft metal, atomic number 31. Used in

compound semiconductors (GaAs — radar, RF, some LEDs; GaN — power electronics, 5G RF, EV inverters, LED lighting). Small tonnage but high strategic value per gram — critical to advanced power electronics and defence radar.

Both are byproducts of other processes:

• Germanium: mostly from zinc refining (sphalerite ores);

some from coal fly ash (historically in China)

• Gallium: byproduct of bauxite refining (aluminum production)

and zinc refining (Bayer process liquor)

This byproduct structure means supply elasticity is low — producers don't add germanium or gallium capacity in response to price; they add zinc or aluminum capacity and germanium/ gallium fall out as a side effect.

Price state (verified 2026-04-24)

Germanium

Gallium

Both peaked at EXACTLY 45,309 CNY/kg in January 2024 — that was the export-control-announcement shock high. Since then both have reverted a long way but now YTD is trending up again modestly. Implied: market priced in initial shock, relaxed as export licenses flowed, now creeping back up as tightness shows up in downstream supply chains.

Where they come from (verified via Trading Economics)

Germanium production

• China: ~60% of global output
• Canada, Finland, Russia, United States: secondary

producers

Gallium production

• China: >80% of global low-grade primary gallium capacity
• Germany, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Ukraine: secondary

Neither is "rare" in the earth's crust — both are trace elements in aluminum and zinc ores, so production follows the primary metal's refining footprint (China has the biggest aluminum + zinc refining industries, hence the biggest Ge + Ga capacity).

Refining specifics

• Gallium: extracted from Bayer process liquor in

alumina refineries; China's aluminum dominance = Ga dominance

• Germanium: China mostly extracts from coal fly ash

(byproduct of coal-fired power generation — peculiar to Chinese resource endowment); non-Chinese producers extract from zinc smelter dusts

• US germanium: some from Tek Resources' Trail BC smelter

(zinc byproduct) + recycled from fiber optic scrap

• Gallium: Germany's Ingal Stade (~150-200t/yr),

Japan Dowa Metals, South Korea samples

The 2023-2024 export control episode (context for current prices)

Timeline:

• August 2023: China announces export controls on

germanium and gallium, requiring export licenses from Ministry of Commerce. Prices immediately spike.

• Late 2023: License approvals slow; prices keep rising.

Global Ge price 3x; Ga price 5x+.

• January 2024: Peak prices (45,309 CNY/kg for both).
• 2024 H2: Licenses flow more smoothly (to approved

counterparties); prices decline from peak.

• December 2024: China expands controls to include

specialty graphite + additional semiconductor-related items.

• 2025: Further tightening rumors; non-Chinese

production ramps slowly.

The market lesson: export controls don't create permanent supply shocks if licenses are granted at some level — they create pricing power (China decides who gets material, at what price). Current price environment (YTD +14-17%) is consistent with "chronic tightness, managed supply, ongoing pricing power" rather than "full-blown crisis."

Demand structure

Germanium demand

• Fiber optics ~35%: used as GeO2 dopant in fiber cladding

for telecom. Growing moderately with data infrastructure.

• Infrared optics ~30%: thermal imaging (military +

industrial), satellite sensors. Growing fast with defence spending.

• PET catalysis ~15%: bottle/packaging resin production
• Electronics / solar ~20%: SiGe transistors, triple-

junction space solar cells

Gallium demand

• GaAs (gallium arsenide) semiconductors ~60%: RF power

amplifiers (cellular, radar, satellite), LEDs, high- efficiency solar cells

• GaN (gallium nitride) semiconductors ~30%: fast-

growing segment. EV inverters, data centre power supplies (fast-charger), LED lighting, 5G/6G radio

• Magnetic materials + specialty alloys ~10%

GaN is the fastest-growing gallium demand driver — EV powertrain efficiency pushes for GaN over Si; data- centre power density demands GaN.

Policy / geopolitical context

• China export controls (Aug 2023, expanded Dec 2024):

the central fact of this market

• US CHIPS Act + DoD Defense Production Act: funding

for domestic gallium refining; RAIN (Recycled Atomic Indium/N) and Nyrstar announced projects

• EU CRMA: both Ge + Ga on strategic list
• US export controls on Chinese semi equipment (2022+):

this is the root cause of Chinese counter-measures

• Japan + Korea: existing Ga capacity is strategic

ballast; JOGMEC provides security-of-supply financing

• Germany: Stade Ga plant has expanded capacity,

subsidized

Concentration risks (stack-ranked)

1. Further Chinese tightening of export licensing — the January 2024 peak showed what full restriction looks like; repeatable overnight 2. Expansion of controlled list to additional critical materials (indium, tungsten, tellurium are rumored candidates) 3. Secondary supply interruption at small non-Chinese producers (Teck Trail fire, Japanese disruption, etc.) 4. Inverse risk: if US-China trade tensions ease significantly, prices could soften materially as license flow accelerates

Unlike rare earths, Ge + Ga have meaningful non-Chinese capacity — ~20% of Ge and ~20% of Ga is non-Chinese. Enough to matter if the West rations it among allies.

Players to know

Germanium

• Teck Resources (Canada) — Trail BC zinc smelter

byproduct

• Umicore (Belgium) — recycling + specialty
• Indium Corporation (US) — specialty products
• Yunnan Lincang Xinyuan Germanium (China) — major
• Zhongcheng Goldstone Germanium (China)

Gallium

• Ingal Stade (Germany) — largest non-Chinese primary
• Dowa Holdings (Japan)
• Sumitomo Chemical (Japan)
• Aluminum Corporation of China (CHALCO) — major

Chinese producer (Bayer-process byproduct)

• Nyrstar (Trafigura-backed) — NOT yet an active Ge/Ga

producer (corrected 2026-07-02, was previously listed as a current producer). Operates EU zinc smelters at Balen + Pelt (Belgium) and Budel (Netherlands) where Ge/Ga are chemically recoverable as byproducts, but is still evaluating where to build dedicated recovery capacity — candidate sites named publicly include Australia, Europe, and Clarksville, Tennessee (US) under DPA-linked funding. Watch for a final investment decision, not current output.

Downstream semi users (exposed if supply tightens)

• Wolfspeed (US) — GaN power semis, Mohawk Valley fab
• Infineon (Germany) — broad GaN exposure
• II-VI / Coherent (US) — compound semi materials
• Navitas Semiconductor (US) — GaN fast-charging
• STMicroelectronics (FR/IT) — automotive power

What to watch monthly

• China Ministry of Commerce export-license approval rate

(opacity is the problem — watch aggregate export data)

• Teck Resources, Umicore production updates; Nyrstar

Ge/Ga project final-investment-decision news (not yet producing)

• Wolfspeed + Infineon earnings (GaN demand signal)
• Any expansion of Chinese export controls (new materials

added to list)

• US DoD / DoE funding announcements for domestic Ge/Ga

refining

• EU CRMA strategic project list updates

Cross-references

• Reports: docs/minerals/reports/YYYY-MM-germanium-gallium.md
• Relates to: silicon (semi-industry context),

docs/thinking/2026-04-22-tech-ai-value-chain.md (Ga → GaN → data centre + EV power semis)

• Part of the broader "China critical-mineral export

control" theme (also: heavy rare earths Dy/Tb, specialty graphite, tungsten watched)