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One screen answering: “if the dominant supplier halts, who can fill the gap, how fast, at what regulatory risk?” Replaces manual cross-referencing of the production table with the IPTM register.
If China refining (55% of global) halts: 7 substitutes cover 100% of non-CN capacity · fastest ramp 0-6mo (ID) · highest policy-risk: ID (score 6.1, 8 filings).
Stage: Refined tin smelting (Sn metal output) · Year: 2025 · Source: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (Feb 2026 release; 2025 data).
Post-removal HHI = 2,355 (moderate). Lead-time is a heuristic from share-of-stage (≥10% → 0-6mo brownfield · ≥2% → 6-12mo ramp · >0 → 12-24mo new line · 0 + supplier-directory present → 24-36mo greenfield). Policy-risk = Σ over last-24m tin filings issued by that country (severity × polarity-sign × 5y-linear recency). This measures a country's own export-restriction behaviour only — it is a separate axis from Western sanctions exposure (flagged below in red where it applies). A country with zero restrictive filings can still be sanctioned by the US/EU/UK and therefore not a real sourcing option.
Tin is the canonical "electronics solder" metal — ~50% of demand is solder, with the lead-free RoHS shift since 2006 making tin the irreplaceable joining material in every PCB on Earth. Concentration is severe but more diversified than tungsten/graphite: CN+ID together hold ~67% of mining and ~70% of refining. Two recent supply shocks have shaped the market: (a) Myanmar Wa State mining ban (Aug 2023) removed ~20kt/yr of feedstock — Wa State produced ~17% of global mine supply pre-ban via cross-border trucking to Yunnan smelters; the ban is partial-enforcement and supply has slowly recovered; (b) Indonesia 2023 export-permit freeze paused PT Timah shipments for ~Q1-Q2 2023, sending LME tin from $20k → $30k/t. China refining share has been remarkably stable at ~46-49% across 2014-2024 — tin is one of the few critical-material refining surfaces where Chinese share has NOT crept upward over the decade. Indonesia is the only major non-Chinese smelter cluster with policy interest in moving up the value chain (rejecting raw-ore exports in favour of smelted-Sn exports). The German Mittelstand exposure is downstream — every Bavarian electronics-assembly line consumes tin solder; substitution to other joining alloys (epoxy, conductive adhesives) covers <2% of the market.