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The Strategy is a five-year operational plan issued by Naalakkersuisut's Mineral Resources Authority (MRA) under the Mining Act framework (Inatsisartut Act No. 27 of 13 June 2023, in force since 1 January 2024). Where the 2020-2024 strategy was largely directional, the 2025-2029 plan moves to a measurable-initiatives format. Headline operational tracks:
sustainability are made the explicit gating frame for licensing decisions and stakeholder engagement (fisheries, hunting, cultural heritage).
international mining conventions, expanded engagement with export-import banks (US EXIM, EIB, Nordic ECAs) for project finance, and a structured matchmaking mechanism between investment funds and Greenlandic upstream projects.
US (critical-minerals projects and finance) and the EU (sustainable value-chain integration plus carbon capture and storage), and Nordic regional cooperation on critical-minerals mapping. This positions Greenland inside the EU CRMA strategic-projects perimeter and inside the post-2024 US critical-minerals MOU/framework architecture.
small-scale licensees, building on the 2024 local-minerals legislation that ring-fenced gemstone/collector activity from the industrial track.
partnerships and expanded open-data access to lower upstream exploration-risk premia.
the 2021 Inatsisartut Act prohibiting uranium-bearing exploration and exploitation above 100 ppm — i.e. it does not reopen Kvanefjeld/Kuannersuit on its rare-earth-with-uranium configuration.
Concrete licensing actions executed under the Strategy in its first year include:
licence for molybdenite and magnesium (Malmbjerg molybdenum project area).
Greenland Graphite A/S for graphite at Piiaaffik Amitsoq.
Greenland holds 25 of the 34 strategic raw materials on the EU CRMA list, including heavy rare earths (Tanbreez, post-uranium-ban Kvanefjeld remnants), large graphite, zinc and gold endowments, and molybdenum (Malmbjerg). The 2025-2029 Strategy is the operational instrument that gates how — and on whose terms — that endowment is brought into the Western/allied non-China critical-minerals supply architecture currently being assembled via the EU CRMA strategic-projects pipeline, the EU-US Critical Minerals Strategic Partnership (24 Apr 2026), and the US-led critical-minerals MOU/framework series (US-Australia, US-Japan, US-Saudi Arabia, US-Uzbekistan, US-Philippines, US-Morocco, US-Guinea, US-Peru, US-Norway).
It also sits inside an unusually charged geopolitical context: the 2024-2025 Trump administration Greenland-acquisition rhetoric, the March 2025 Greenland general election that returned a coalition led by Demokraatit, and Naalakkersuisut's posture of working with both the US and the EU rather than choosing between them.
designations sited in Greenland (Tanbreez heavy REE, Greenland Graphite A/S Amitsoq, Malmbjerg molybdenum).
export-import banks can route project finance into Greenlandic upstream assets without bilateral sovereignty friction.
EU/US/Nordic counterparties on strategic-mineral assets, even without an explicit FDI screening regime — consistent with the 2025 Naalakkersuisut posture toward Chinese-linked Greenland Minerals / Energy Transition Minerals on Kvanefjeld.
channel for gemstone and collector-mineral activity.
Strategy's cooperation framework, and whether designations will be bundled with Nordic ECA finance.
instrument for strategic mineral assets, or continues to manage this through licence-issuance discretion under the 2023 Mining Act.
licences progress through construction-finance, off-take and shipping bottlenecks given Greenland's logistics constraints.
US-Greenland minerals dialogue and any Trump-administration framing of Greenland inside the US critical-minerals MOU template.