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exchange-visible warrants combined: ≈ 5.8 days of world use — vs. ≈13,000 thousand metric tons/yr (production-basis proxy, 2025, USGS MCS 2026)
Exchange-visible warehouse stock only — a floor on world inventory, never a total. State reserves, producer and consumer inventories, and all off-exchange holdings are disclosed by nobody. Westmetall — free daily mirror of the LME warehouse stock figure.
Operator-reported, per asset — not a national total and not a trade flow. Coverage is partial across operators and assets. Where sales are shown, the gap to production is metal that never crossed a border and appears in no customs statistic.
Zinc — businessanalytiq.com monthly provider index, a labelled proxy (not an exchange settlement). Each point is a month this platform actually recorded a reading; a gap in the line is a gap in what was fetched, never interpolated.
Zinc mining is moderately concentrated (China ~32% of the 13.0 Mt world total, then Peru, Australia, India — USGS MCS 2026), but the BINDING chokepoint is…
China is counted in this figure. Its annual declaration is UN Comtrade with China as reporter (primary, and the basis of the percentage above, which uses an annual denominator). The monthly bilateral series is a third-party republisher of GACC, not primary — top-partner agreement against China’s own declaration is 24/33 on imports and 15/33 on exports. UN Comtrade’s own China monthly series (not the republisher above) has been frozen at period 202412 since its release; a watcher flags the day it moves.
Denominator: UN Comtrade annual 2024, imports from World, 52 reporters (Taiwan absent from UN data entirely). Read the percentage above as “the importers on this panel are on file”, never as “we see the trade” — Taiwan is absent from UN data entirely, so it is never in this denominator and the true gap is larger than shown.
How much of China’s exports we see monthly: ≈394% of China’s non-EU exports — importer declarations from SG, HK, SA, JP, TH, BR in the monthly feed (202608), annualised against BACI 2024. EU destinations (AT, BE, DE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT) are seen separately through Eurostat Comext in EUR and are kept out of this ratio rather than converted. Not in our reporter set: Vietnam (34% of China's 2024 exports), Taiwan (6% of China's 2024 exports), Bangladesh (4% of China's 2024 exports), Russia (4% of China's 2024 exports), Cambodia (2% of China's 2024 exports), PY (2% of China's 2024 exports) — national customs portals, not Chinese hosts; each is a route that can be wired. Above 100% means 2026 monthly volumes exceed the 2024 annual base or an HS basket was widened; it is shown unclipped on purpose. 56% of this feed is declared by Hong Kong and/or Singapore, both re-export/bullion-storage hubs that do not consume what they import — a ratio well above 100% is expected here, not a double-count.
Source: CEPII BACI HS22 2024 (reconciled from UN Comtrade annual; CIF/FOB harmonised). Annual and one to two years behind — structure, not a current figure; never summed with the monthly rows above. Includes Taiwan (BACI 490), which no monthly artifact here carries.
Largest single dependence: Peru supplies 29% of EU imports, of which €55.3m lands in Finland.
Source: Eurostat Comext monthly bulk, CN8 × partner × declarant (6 CN8 codes: 26080000, 260800XX, 79011100, 790111XX, 79012000, 790120XX). Values in EUR, declarant-side — a different basis from the USD/HS6 figures elsewhere on this page. Not summable with them.
Production and reserves point at different countries — today’s supplier is not where the resource sits. That gap is optionality on one side and depletion risk on the other.
Reserves cover ~18 years of current mine output — the resource itself is the constraint, not only who controls it. Reserves 2025 ÷ mine production 2025, both USGS. A reserve is what is economic to extract at today’s price and technology, so this is a stress indicator, not a countdown to exhaustion.
Source: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (public domain). Production and reserves are world shares of the USGS-published world total. Stocks, price and net import reliance are United States salient series — never world figures. Reserves are a single-year snapshot; USGS does not restate history, so a reserves trend needs each year’s file archived separately.
Economy at stake: a cut-off by CA would take $346M off US GDP (USGS puts that scenario at 11% probability; weighted, $51M). Zinc, smelted, USGS Open-File Report 2025-1047 input-output model over 402 US industries, 2023 dollars. US economy only and a model estimate, not an observation. Source.
| Stage | Companies | Most exposed |
|---|---|---|
| Mining, refining, trading | 89 | Treibacher Industrie AG, Korea Zinc Co., Ltd., Aurubis AG |
| Functional goods (magnets, chemicals, cells, components) | 3 | Torrecid Group, Clariant AG, Italmatch Chemicals S.p.A. |
| Industries that depend on them | 26 | Videoton Holding Zrt., Thales Australia Limited, Nokian Tyres plc (Nokian Renkaat Oyj) |
Counted from our company dossiers and recomputed on every load. Stage is inferred from each company’s role and sector, and this counts companies, not output.
$1.7bn of output at risk worldwide, 2.46× the $693M first-round loss. US $1.1bn, EU $264M. Other suppliers: AU $8.2bn · PE $8.0bn · US $5.3bn.
| Where it bites hardest | At risk | of its output | Named here |
|---|---|---|---|
| CH · Non-ferrous metals | $11M | 0.34% | none in our corpus yet |
| US · Non-ferrous metals | $190M | 0.12% | Novelis Inc., Kaiser Aluminum Corporation |
| BE · Non-ferrous metals | $18M | 0.11% | Galloo NV |
| FR · Non-ferrous metals | $12M | 0.11% | none in our corpus yet |
| FR · Iron & steel | $15M | 0.05% | none in our corpus yet |
| US · Fabricated metal products | $147M | 0.03% | none in our corpus yet |
| US · Electrical equipment | $41M | 0.03% | none in our corpus yet |
| US · Iron & steel | $43M | 0.02% | Novelis Inc., Kaiser Aluminum Corporation |
Output at risk if CA’s $693M of exports stop, propagated through every country and industry: OECD ICIO 2025 edition (released Aug 2025, revised Jan 2026), 2022 structure, BACI 2024 flows, supply-side (Ghosh) input-output model. No substitution and no inventories, so this is an upper-bound exposure, not a forecast loss; USGS’s price-based estimate above answers a different question. Amplification by year: 2016 2.54× · 2017 2.66× · 2018 2.55× · 2019 2.52× · 2020 2.52× · 2021 2.61× · 2022 2.46×. Named companies: dossiers headquartered there, in a matching sector, already exposed to this material.
Read against the card above: the EU buys 87% of its zinc from outside the Union and produces it in 4 member states.
Also produced: Unwrought zinc alloys (metal) · Zinc ores and concentrates (ore) · Zinc oxide; zinc peroxide (refined)
Source: Eurostat PRODCOM DS-059358, sold production by member state, EUR. Production, not trade — a different basis from the import figures above and never summed with them. Producers exclude states that only trade the code, and exclude non-EU27 reporters (PRODCOM also carries Iceland, Norway and candidate countries).
Source: China Data Portal (chinadata.live), an independent third-party republisher of GACC customs data — not primary GACC, methodology not disclosed by the operator. Cross-validated once against our own BACI 2024 extraction; treat as directionally reliable, not audited. Never summed with the flows or totals below.
Policy pressure on Zinc (LME) is cooling — 7 restrictive actions on record, peak severity 4, 1 in the last 12 months (vs 2 the year before). Most-active issuer: 🇪🇬 EG (1).
Signals are read directly from the policy register's recorded cadence, pending effective dates, and responds_to cycles for Zinc (LME). They describe the trajectory already on the record — not a forecast.
Tickers and corporate names parsed from the company_refs field of every action whose target_materials includes zinc — the specific operators a policymaker identified by name. Click a company to see the filings.
Worked causal-chain narratives whose recorded actions overlap this material's policy register — the evidence behind the exposure thesis.