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Last amendment: > on 2026-06-25.
Base rate computed from analyst-asserted responds_to: edges in the reverse direction (target-country → issuer-country) for prior issuer-actions on the same target. Modal type + lag percentiles only — not a model output. Treat as a historical anchor for sizing counter-response scenarios, not a forecast in itself.
FCC 25-49 closes a 24-year gap in the Commission's submarine cable licensing framework. The 2001 rules predated the hyperscaler-financed transpacific/transatlantic cable boom and modern foreign- adversary supply-chain risks. The order makes three structural changes:
1. IRU prohibition on SLTE control. No entity subject to foreign adversary jurisdiction may hold an IRU that grants operational or technical control over Submarine Line Terminal Equipment at a US cable landing station. SLTE is the chokepoint that controls signal routing and capacity allocation — adversary control creates both intelligence and disruption risk.
2. Annual reporting. All cable landing licensees must file an annual report disclosing: (a) licensee identity and ownership chain; (b) cable system topology and routing; (c) any relationships with foreign adversary service providers; (d) current cybersecurity and physical security plans; (e) compliance with the FCC Covered List (gear from Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision, Dahua).
3. Foreign adversary definition alignment. The order formally adopts Commerce's 15 CFR § 791.2 definition, designating China (including Hong Kong and Macau), Cuba, Iran, DPRK, the Russian Federation, and the Maduro regime in Venezuela. This aligns FCC cable licensing with BIS, OFAC, and FCC Equipment Authorization Service restrictions already in force under that definition.
The order was adopted 7 August 2025 (FCC 25-49), released 13 August 2025, published in the Federal Register on 27 October 2025, and took effect 26 November 2025.
The rules affect all submarine cable systems with a US landing point. The most commercially significant are:
(META), and Amazon (AMZN) hyperscaler consortia, including Bifrost, Topaz, Echo, Havfrue, and numerous older Tier-1 systems landing at the same stations.
multi-party consortia.
The FCC order is a converging US vector of the same Western cable-security policy wave that produced EU Recommendation 2024/779 (February 2024) and the EU Cable Security Action Plan JOIN(2025) 9 (February 2025). Both EU instruments pushed member states toward coordinated risk-assessment and route-diversity requirements; the FCC order targets the same adversary set but focuses on US landing-point control rather than routing-path diversity. The combined EU + US regulatory tightening in 2024-2025 represents the most significant hardening of submarine cable governance since international frameworks were established in the 1990s.
additional proposals — including potential restrictions on foreign-adversary-connected cable repair vessels. Watch for a second R&O in 2026.
full scope of the new § 1.767 framework is not yet final.
transition timeline for existing agreements is not fully specified in public summaries.