USTR RFC: Design of a Plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Critical Minerals (USTR-2026-0034)

Mechanism

This RFC is a formal public-consultation step in the US executive trade-policy process, published by USTR under its standing authority to solicit views before entering trade negotiations. The docket lists five question clusters:

1. Critical-mineral identification and prioritisation — which minerals should the agreement cover, and why. 2. Supply-chain resilience tools — minimum/reference prices, border-adjustment measures, tariffs, quotas, regulatory standards, investment disciplines. 3. Like-minded partner criteria — what conditions a country must meet to qualify for price-floor or market-access benefits. 4. Downstream-industry effects — how the agreement should treat manufacturers reliant on critical-mineral inputs (rare-earth magnets → motors → EVs; lithium → battery cells → grid storage). 5. Non-market-practice disciplines — how to define and penalise state-directed pricing, excess capacity, and predatory export restrictions.

The mechanism being contemplated — a multilateral minimum-price / border-measure regime — is structurally distinct from any single-country trade remedy. It would effectively set an import price floor for qualifying critical minerals from participating ("like-minded") countries and impose countervailing border measures on minerals sourced outside the coalition, implicitly targeting China's sub-market-cost export pricing.

Context and prior actions

This notice follows directly from two antecedent actions on the register:

• The 4 Feb 2026 FORGE launch (2026-02-04-us-state-forge-critical-minerals-launch): the State Department stood up the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement with 54 participating countries as the diplomatic architecture for exactly this kind of like-minded coalition.
• The 14 Jan 2026 Section 232 Proclamation (2026-01-14-us-section-232-critical-minerals-proclamation): established the Presidential Critical Minerals Dependency Process (PCMDP) and directed USTR to pursue supply-chain negotiations — this RFC is USTR's first formal public step in executing that directive.

The US-Japan February 2026 bilateral action plan toward border-adjusted price floors (referenced in the FR preamble) foreshadows Japan as a likely early coalition member.

Downstream implications

• If a price-floor regime materialises, it would structurally re-price global rare-earth, lithium, cobalt, and nickel flows: Chinese export pricing advantages would be partially neutralised for coalition-member buyers.
• Companies with vertically integrated China-routed supply chains (magnets → motors → EV drivetrains) face higher input costs if China is outside the price floor and retaliates with volume restrictions.
• Miners and processors in coalition-eligible jurisdictions (Australia, Canada, DRC, Zambia via MOU partners) would see floor-priced access to US and partner markets — improving project economics for greenfield critical-mineral capex.
• The SIA submitted formal comments (March 2026) flagging semiconductor-grade materials (gallium, germanium, indium) as critical inputs that should be in scope.

Open questions

• Which minerals are ultimately in scope? The FR notice uses "critical minerals" broadly (OMB/USGS critical-minerals list has 50 entries); the agreement may narrow to a subset.
• Will the price-floor mechanism be implemented as an MFN tariff on sub-floor imports (WTO-compatible challenge risk) or as a non-tariff border measure (harder to challenge but requires coalition unanimity on reference prices)?
• Timeline to a formal negotiating mandate: comment period closed 19 March 2026; no formal announcement of next steps has been made as of 2026-06-28.
• China's anticipated countermeasure: expansion of rare-earth export quotas/licensing restrictions beyond the gallium/germanium/antimony controls already on the register.