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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: industrial. Company profile →
Sojitz is a Japanese general trading company (sogo shosha). In critical minerals it works as an upstream intermediary and investor, not a manufacturer. It is the exclusive Japanese distributor for Brazil's CBMM and handles over 90% of the niobium products brought into Japan, mainly for steelmakers.
Through Japan Australia Rare Earth (JARE), which it co-founded with JOGMEC in 2011, it holds an exclusive distribution agreement for Lynas' light rare earth products in Japan. It also has an offtake agreement for Lynas' dysprosium and terbium, and began importing heavy rare earths from Australia in 2025.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
No production footprint is recorded in its dossier yet — its HQ country is 🇯🇵 Japan, a registration fact, not a production or sales claim. We say so rather than guess.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Dysprosium, terbium — *traded volume* of the heavy rare earths used in neodymium magnets. Sojitz's JARE joint venture with JOGMEC has a Lynas supply agreement (March 2023) for up to 65% of the dysprosium and terbium Lynas produces from Mt Weld feedstock, committed to the Japanese market; imports began in 2025.
Dysprosium, terbium — *traded volume* of the heavy rare earths used in neodymium magnets. Sojitz's JARE joint venture with JOGMEC has a Lynas supply agreement (March 2023) for up to 65% of the dysprosium and terbium Lynas produces from Mt Weld feedstock, committed to the Japanese market; imports began in 2025.
Neodymium (Lynas light rare earth products) — *bulk traded volume* for Japanese permanent-magnet makers. Sojitz's position is the non-Chinese alternative, so Chinese rare-earth export controls affect demand for its channel as well as its supply risk.
Niobium — *bulk traded volume*, sold as ferroniobium and other products to Japanese steelmakers (a microalloying additive in high-strength steel). Supply is single-source concentrated: CBMM is the dominant world niobium producer, and Brazil holds the large majority of both reserves and output.
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches neodymiumniobium · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 108d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗Neodymium (Lynas light rare earth products) — *bulk traded volume* for Japanese permanent-magnet makers. Sojitz's position is the non-Chinese alternative, so Chinese rare-earth export controls affect demand for its channel as well as its supply risk.
Niobium — *bulk traded volume*, sold as ferroniobium and other products to Japanese steelmakers (a microalloying additive in high-strength steel). Supply is single-source concentrated: CBMM is the dominant world niobium producer, and Brazil holds the large majority of both reserves and output.
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
neodymium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
niobium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
US · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches neodymium · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 112d pending
Framework agreed "in principle" between Trump and Xi following June 5, 2026 call and subsequent negotiations; Trump stated June 11, 2026 "Our deal with China is done, subject to final approval with President Xi and me" — China to supply "full magnets, and any necessary rare earths, up front" to US; if formally enacted, would suspend or ease China's April 2025 rare earth export licensing regime (filed 2025-04-04-china-mofcom-rare-earth-export-licensing) for US-bound shipments; China's Vice Commerce Minister Li Chenggang confirmed "in principle" framework consensus from the June 5 Trump-Xi call; tariff framework: US 55% / China 10%; China April 2025 rare earth controls (heavy/medium REEs, including Dy/Tb NdFeB magnets, SmCo magnets) remain formally active — no MOFCOM suspension announcement found as of June 15, 2026; the deal is political but not yet implemented as a formal regulation or bilateral MOU
source ↗Neodymium (Lynas light rare earth products) — *bulk traded volume* for Japanese permanent-magnet makers. Sojitz's position is the non-Chinese alternative, so Chinese rare-earth export controls affect demand for its channel as well as its supply risk.
neodymium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
MW · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches neodymiumniobium · flagged 13 Aug 2026, 53d pending
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi — uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, coal, limestone, gemstones, heavy mineral sands, vermiculite, phosphate, rutile, gold, diamonds, copper and others — with an exemption for minerals processed/refined/value-added domestically per Malawian mining law. Announced alongside a suspension of new mining-licence issuance and a review of mining laws (2026/27 State of the Nation Address), plus a planned sovereign wealth fund. Stated rationale: local beneficiation, targeting up to USD 500m/yr once the Kasiya rutile/graphite deposit (Lilongwe) and Kangankunde rare-earth project (Balaka, Mkango Resources — Africa's prospective first new REE mine since 2017, targeting late-2026 production) are fully developed. Violators face fines/penalties under Malawian law. MW is currently the THINNEST country in the register (1 prior action) despite this breadth of minerals covered. Export-ban/beneficiation-mandate, same instrument class as Zimbabwe's SI 213/2022 raw-mineral bans and Guinea's 2026 gold-export ban already in the register.
source ↗Neodymium (Lynas light rare earth products) — *bulk traded volume* for Japanese permanent-magnet makers. Sojitz's position is the non-Chinese alternative, so Chinese rare-earth export controls affect demand for its channel as well as its supply risk.
Niobium — *bulk traded volume*, sold as ferroniobium and other products to Japanese steelmakers (a microalloying additive in high-strength steel). Supply is single-source concentrated: CBMM is the dominant world niobium producer, and Brazil holds the large majority of both reserves and output.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Malawi stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Malawi processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
neodymium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
niobium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches neodymiumniobium · flagged 26 Jun 2026, 101d pending
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax exemptions granted under individual mining Framework Agreements and introduces standard operating procedures — reduces discretionary government risk for large mining investors (Panda Hill niobium, graphite juniors, Buzwagi gold); parallel VAT amendments give equivalent statutory certainty for VAT exemptions; taken together, the bill moves Tanzania from discretionary tax administration toward a rule-of-law-based investor regime for all critical-mineral projects; budget targets Tanzania for top-4 niobium producer status (Panda Hill DA already signed March 24, 2026) and 50% geophysical survey coverage by 2030
source ↗Neodymium (Lynas light rare earth products) — *bulk traded volume* for Japanese permanent-magnet makers. Sojitz's position is the non-Chinese alternative, so Chinese rare-earth export controls affect demand for its channel as well as its supply risk.
Niobium — *bulk traded volume*, sold as ferroniobium and other products to Japanese steelmakers (a microalloying additive in high-strength steel). Supply is single-source concentrated: CBMM is the dominant world niobium producer, and Brazil holds the large majority of both reserves and output.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
neodymium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
niobium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches neodymiumniobium · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
source ↗Neodymium (Lynas light rare earth products) — *bulk traded volume* for Japanese permanent-magnet makers. Sojitz's position is the non-Chinese alternative, so Chinese rare-earth export controls affect demand for its channel as well as its supply risk.
Niobium — *bulk traded volume*, sold as ferroniobium and other products to Japanese steelmakers (a microalloying additive in high-strength steel). Supply is single-source concentrated: CBMM is the dominant world niobium producer, and Brazil holds the large majority of both reserves and output.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
neodymium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
niobium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No.
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
Under the RESourceEU action plan (COM(2025) 945, adopted 3 Dec 2025 and already filed as 2025-12-03-eu-resourceeu-action-plan-com-2025-945), the European Commission committed to PROPOSE, by Q2 2026,…
Madagascar's Council of Ministers approved resumption of mining-permit issuance on ~28-29 Jan 2026, ending a moratorium in place since 2010 (imposed during a political transition amid mining-title sp…
Draft law amending Morocco's 2015 Mining Code (led by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Minister Leila Benali), with public consultations reported open since ~Feb 2025.
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
At Myanmar military-government head Min Aung Hlaing's early-June-2026 New Delhi visit (his first India visit since the 2021 coup), critical minerals and rare earths featured explicitly on the formal…
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
2 of 45 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 4 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its sector (industrial) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of dysprosium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the dysprosium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of terbium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the terbium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of neodymium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the neodymium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of niobium. Restrictions by 🇧🇷 BR push buyers toward ex-BR producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the niobium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.