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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: mining metals. Company profile →
Atlas Lithium Corporation (Nasdaq: ATLX, formerly Brazil Minerals, Inc.) is a Belo Horizonte-based mineral exploration and development company focused on hard-rock lithium in Brazil's "Lithium Valley" (Minas Gerais). Its lead asset, the Neves Project, cleared its final environmental/expansion permit in June 2026 and — per its Definitive Feasibility Study — targets roughly 150,000 tons/year of spodumene concentrate production; the processing plant has already been shipped to Brazil for assembly.
Atlas also holds the Salinas project (100%-owned, adjacent lithium pegmatite ground) and a separate Northeastern Brazil lithium exploration package. Beyond lithium, the company's own 10-K discloses exploration-stage mineral rights in nickel, copper, rare earths, graphite and titanium, and a ~28.06% equity stake in the separately listed Atlas Critical Minerals Corporation (formerly Jupiter Gold), which holds its own rare earths/copper/graphite/nickel/iron/gold/quartzite ground.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Atlas Lithium Corporation produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths (neodymium-class), titanium — exploration-stage mineral rights, not yet at production. Disclosed in Atlas Lithium's own FY2025 10-K as mineral rights the company holds beyond lithium; none are past the exploration stage, so today they represent optionality/diversification rather than realized output or revenue.
Nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths (neodymium-class), titanium — exploration-stage mineral rights, not yet at production. Disclosed in Atlas Lithium's own FY2025 10-K as mineral rights the company holds beyond lithium; none are past the exploration stage, so today they represent optionality/diversification rather than realized output or revenue.
Lithium — core product, mine-to-concentrate, not a purchased input. This is the company's entire near-term business case: Neves is fully permitted and moving to construction, so Atlas is a prospective producer/seller of spodumene concentrate, not a consumer exposed to lithium scarcity. Its supply-chain-risk relevance is on the production side — a single-country (Brazil), single-district (Minas Gerais Lit…
Nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths (neodymium-class), titanium — exploration-stage mineral rights, not yet at production. Disclosed in Atlas Lithium's own FY2025 10-K as mineral rights the company holds beyond lithium; none are past the exploration stage, so today they represent optionality/diversification rather than realized output or revenue.
Nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths (neodymium-class), titanium — exploration-stage mineral rights, not yet at production. Disclosed in Atlas Lithium's own FY2025 10-K as mineral rights the company holds beyond lithium; none are past the exploration stage, so today they represent optionality/diversification rather than realized output or revenue.
Nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths (neodymium-class), titanium — exploration-stage mineral rights, not yet at production. Disclosed in Atlas Lithium's own FY2025 10-K as mineral rights the company holds beyond lithium; none are past the exploration stage, so today they represent optionality/diversification rather than realized output or revenue.
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches graphiteneodymiumlithiumcopper · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 108d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗Nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths (neodymium-class), titanium — exploration-stage mineral rights, not yet at production. Disclosed in Atlas Lithium's own FY2025 10-K as mineral rights the company holds beyond lithium; none are past the exploration stage, so today they represent optionality/diversification rather than realized output or revenue.
Nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths (neodymium-class), titanium — exploration-stage mineral rights, not yet at production. Disclosed in Atlas Lithium's own FY2025 10-K as mineral rights the company holds beyond lithium; none are past the exploration stage, so today they represent optionality/diversification rather than realized output or revenue.
Lithium — core product, mine-to-concentrate, not a purchased input. This is the company's entire near-term business case: Neves is fully permitted and moving to construction, so Atlas is a prospective producer/seller of spodumene concentrate, not a consumer exposed to lithium scarcity. Its supply-chain-risk relevance is on the production side — a single-country (Brazil), single-district (Minas Gerais Lit…
+1 more touched material — see the composition section (3) above.
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
graphite — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
neodymium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches graphiteneodymiumcoppertitaniumnickel · flagged 26 Jun 2026, 101d pending
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax exemptions granted under individual mining Framework Agreements and introduces standard operating procedures — reduces discretionary government risk for large mining investors (Panda Hill niobium, graphite juniors, Buzwagi gold); parallel VAT amendments give equivalent statutory certainty for VAT exemptions; taken together, the bill moves Tanzania from discretionary tax administration toward a rule-of-law-based investor regime for all critical-mineral projects; budget targets Tanzania for top-4 niobium producer status (Panda Hill DA already signed March 24, 2026) and 50% geophysical survey coverage by 2030
source ↗Nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths (neodymium-class), titanium — exploration-stage mineral rights, not yet at production. Disclosed in Atlas Lithium's own FY2025 10-K as mineral rights the company holds beyond lithium; none are past the exploration stage, so today they represent optionality/diversification rather than realized output or revenue.
Nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths (neodymium-class), titanium — exploration-stage mineral rights, not yet at production. Disclosed in Atlas Lithium's own FY2025 10-K as mineral rights the company holds beyond lithium; none are past the exploration stage, so today they represent optionality/diversification rather than realized output or revenue.
Nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths (neodymium-class), titanium — exploration-stage mineral rights, not yet at production. Disclosed in Atlas Lithium's own FY2025 10-K as mineral rights the company holds beyond lithium; none are past the exploration stage, so today they represent optionality/diversification rather than realized output or revenue.
+2 more touched materials — see the composition section (3) above.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
graphite — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
neodymium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
MW · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches graphiteneodymiumcopper · flagged 13 Aug 2026, 53d pending
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi — uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, coal, limestone, gemstones, heavy mineral sands, vermiculite, phosphate, rutile, gold, diamonds, copper and others — with an exemption for minerals processed/refined/value-added domestically per Malawian mining law. Announced alongside a suspension of new mining-licence issuance and a review of mining laws (2026/27 State of the Nation Address), plus a planned sovereign wealth fund. Stated rationale: local beneficiation, targeting up to USD 500m/yr once the Kasiya rutile/graphite deposit (Lilongwe) and Kangankunde rare-earth project (Balaka, Mkango Resources — Africa's prospective first new REE mine since 2017, targeting late-2026 production) are fully developed. Violators face fines/penalties under Malawian law. MW is currently the THINNEST country in the register (1 prior action) despite this breadth of minerals covered. Export-ban/beneficiation-mandate, same instrument class as Zimbabwe's SI 213/2022 raw-mineral bans and Guinea's 2026 gold-export ban already in the register.
source ↗Nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths (neodymium-class), titanium — exploration-stage mineral rights, not yet at production. Disclosed in Atlas Lithium's own FY2025 10-K as mineral rights the company holds beyond lithium; none are past the exploration stage, so today they represent optionality/diversification rather than realized output or revenue.
Nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths (neodymium-class), titanium — exploration-stage mineral rights, not yet at production. Disclosed in Atlas Lithium's own FY2025 10-K as mineral rights the company holds beyond lithium; none are past the exploration stage, so today they represent optionality/diversification rather than realized output or revenue.
Nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths (neodymium-class), titanium — exploration-stage mineral rights, not yet at production. Disclosed in Atlas Lithium's own FY2025 10-K as mineral rights the company holds beyond lithium; none are past the exploration stage, so today they represent optionality/diversification rather than realized output or revenue.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Malawi stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Malawi processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
graphite — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
neodymium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
TZ · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · touches graphiteneodymiumlithiumtitaniumnickel · flagged 29 Jun 2026, 98d pending
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the official LIST of critical and strategic minerals — a distinct REGULATORY instrument (not the fiscal Finance Act). The strategy explicitly prioritises IN-COUNTRY BENEFICIATION for graphite, nickel, rare earths and lithium, and amends mineral-processing-licence conditions so that every processing licence now requires a domestic value-addition plan; it targets a 40-mineral beneficiation/local-processing scope plus technology-transfer partnership requirements. Once the list is gazetted, raw/unprocessed exports of the listed minerals (Tanzania = a structural graphite chokepoint via Faru/Lindi/Mahenge graphite, plus emerging niobium at Panda Hill and nickel at Kabanga) face value-addition-plan gating and likely export conditionality — re-pricing a major non-China graphite supply node and the Kabanga nickel/Panda Hill niobium projects.
source ↗Nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths (neodymium-class), titanium — exploration-stage mineral rights, not yet at production. Disclosed in Atlas Lithium's own FY2025 10-K as mineral rights the company holds beyond lithium; none are past the exploration stage, so today they represent optionality/diversification rather than realized output or revenue.
Nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths (neodymium-class), titanium — exploration-stage mineral rights, not yet at production. Disclosed in Atlas Lithium's own FY2025 10-K as mineral rights the company holds beyond lithium; none are past the exploration stage, so today they represent optionality/diversification rather than realized output or revenue.
Lithium — core product, mine-to-concentrate, not a purchased input. This is the company's entire near-term business case: Neves is fully permitted and moving to construction, so Atlas is a prospective producer/seller of spodumene concentrate, not a consumer exposed to lithium scarcity. Its supply-chain-risk relevance is on the production side — a single-country (Brazil), single-district (Minas Gerais Lit…
+2 more touched materials — see the composition section (3) above.
This changes the form of what TZ exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your TZ-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a TZ processing partner, not a supplier switch.
graphite — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
neodymium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 11 Aug 2026, 55d pending
On 29 June 2026 DRC's Vice-Prime Minister for the National Economy (Daniel Mukoko Samba), Minister of Mines (Louis Watum Kabamba) and Minister of Foreign Trade (Julien Paluku Kahongya) jointly signed an arrêté interministériel regulating the commercialisation, export and nomenclature of marketable mining products, which for the first time BANS the export of unprocessed copper and cobalt concentrates outright — replacing the entire framework adopted 4 August 2023. Mining-rights holders, processing entities and buying counters (comptoirs) may seek a ministerial derogation to export less-elaborated products for up to one year, assessed against national mining policy and the technical/economic constraints of each mineral. A new tax regime for economically significant mining byproducts is introduced with a 3-month transition period. This is broader and more foundational than the existing filed/queued DRC cobalt-specific instruments — it is a national concentrate EXPORT BAN (not a quota or hydroxide-specific measure) covering BOTH copper and cobalt, issued under joint Economy/Mines/Trade authority rather than ARECOMS sectoral rulemaking. DRC = priority-tier chokepoint (cobalt, copper, tantalum). Severity 4 expected (national ban, dual-metal, replaces a 3-year-old framework).
source ↗Nickel, copper, graphite, rare earths (neodymium-class), titanium — exploration-stage mineral rights, not yet at production. Disclosed in Atlas Lithium's own FY2025 10-K as mineral rights the company holds beyond lithium; none are past the exploration stage, so today they represent optionality/diversification rather than realized output or revenue.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in DR Congo stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a DR Congo processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
copper — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still ex…
Framework agreed "in principle" between Trump and Xi following June 5, 2026 call and subsequent negotiations; Trump stated June 11, 2026 "Our deal with China is done, subject to final approval with P…
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No.
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators…
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Minister of Finance, acting under s.
Revises 30 CFR Part 580 to streamline 10 provisions governing prospecting, leasing, and operations for hard minerals (manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, seafloor massive sulfides) on the US Outer…
Madagascar's Council of Ministers approved resumption of mining-permit issuance on ~28-29 Jan 2026, ending a moratorium in place since 2010 (imposed during a political transition amid mining-title sp…
Japan's METI + MOF made an affirmative PRELIMINARY determination in an anti-dumping investigation (initiated 22 Jul 2025 on an application from Nippon Steel, Nippon Yakin Kogyo, NAS Stainless Steel S…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…
Draft law amending Morocco's 2015 Mining Code (led by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Minister Leila Benali), with public consultations reported open since ~Feb 2025.
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
Chinese battery-materials major Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (603799.
Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all fo…
Cabinet-cleared bill to replace the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act, Act 703: raises mining royalties from current 3–5% range to 9–12% (price-linked sliding scale), introduces a new medium-scale mining…
Reduces maximum idle-concession period from 30 to 15 years (initial production deadline unchanged at 10 yr; penalty extension cut from 20 yr to just 5 yr); eliminates irrevocable legal status of mini…
Replaces 2016 Code Minier; embeds 'sovereignty doctrine' with stronger state participation, local-transformation mandate, and WAEMU-conformity requirements; President Faye targeted adoption before en…
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
On 28-Nov-2025 European Metals Holdings announced the Czech government approved a grant of up to EUR 360M under the Ministry of Industry and Trade's "Strategic Investments for a Climate-Neutral Econo…
In March 2026 the outgoing Boric administration reportedly fast-tracked and submitted to the Contraloría General de la República (Chile's comptroller) a batch of ~5 further Contratos Especiales de Op…
10% free-carried state equity in ALL new mining and energy projects (no-cost government stake via Epangelo Mining); consultations on 51% Namibian ownership in new mining ventures; maximum royalty rat…
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…
The 12 July 2025 Bougival Accord (13-page political agreement creating a "State of New Caledonia" within France, pending a 2026 referendum + French organic law) contains an economic-rebuilding pact t…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in advanced negotiations to acquire a 15-20% equity stake (deal value ~USD 1.
Full replacement of the Mining Act 1992 with sweeping new statute: state acquires up to 30% equity in any new mining project (Kumul Minerals free-carry); special mining leases (SML) issued for initia…
VP declared no new large-scale mining agreement will be concluded without a binding value-addition commitment; Mines Minister referenced Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ghana, and Malawi precedents for raw-miner…
At Myanmar military-government head Min Aung Hlaing's early-June-2026 New Delhi visit (his first India visit since the 2021 coup), critical minerals and rare earths featured explicitly on the formal…
Under the RESourceEU action plan (COM(2025) 945, adopted 3 Dec 2025 and already filed as 2025-12-03-eu-resourceeu-action-plan-com-2025-945), the European Commission committed to PROPOSE, by Q2 2026,…
Indonesia = ~50% global nickel mine supply and dominant producer of NPI/ferronickel/MHP; export duty on downstream nickel products (NPI, ferronickel, nickel matte, MHP) would add a material cost laye…
All DRC mining operators (Glencore, CMOC, Ivanhoe Mines, Eurasian Resources Group, and 50+ others) must transfer 5% of share capital to Congolese employees by July 31, 2026 or face permit suspension;…
State-owned QMSD (Qatar Mining Company subsidiary), paused since Sudan's 2023 civil war, confirmed at a 13 May 2026 Port Sudan meeting between Sudan's Minister of Minerals Nour al-Daim Taha and Qatar…
On 11 May 2026 Huayou Cobalt announced an all-cash agreement to acquire ASX/AIM-listed Atlantic Lithium for USD 210m, taking control of the Ewoyaa project (~1.
On 11 Feb 2025 the Attorney General of Canada filed a Notice of Application (Federal Court file T-472-25) seeking a court order under ICA s.
Saudi state mining-investment vehicle Manara Minerals (the PIF/Ma'aden JV) is negotiating to buy a 10–20% stake in the Reko Diq copper-gold project (Balochistan, Pakistan) for ~$500M–$1bn, acquiring…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in negotiation to buy a 10-20% stake (deal value ~USD 500m-1bn) in the Reko Diq copper-gold project in Balochistan, Pakistan — one…
5 of 101 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 6 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in ev batteries, permanent magnets, ev motors, wind turbines, defence… — read via the graph's critical minerals node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of graphite. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the graphite chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of neodymium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the neodymium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of lithium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the lithium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of copper. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the copper chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of titanium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the titanium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of nickel. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the nickel chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.