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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: industrial. Company profile →
China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) is China's state-owned, vertically integrated nuclear conglomerate (SASAC-supervised, est. 1955, Beijing). It spans the full nuclear fuel cycle — uranium mining and milling (domestic Xinjiang/Inner Mongolia operations plus a majority stake in Rössing Uranium in Namibia), conversion and centrifuge enrichment, fuel fabrication (CF3 and AP1000 assemblies), reactor engineering, construction and operation (22 reactors operating domestically, several more under construction, plus exported units such as Pakistan's Karachi plant), spent-fuel management, and isotope/radiopharmaceutical production.
CNNC itself is the unlisted parent holding company; its listed arms include CNNC International (HKEX: 2302) and China National Nuclear Power (Shanghai-listed).
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
No production footprint is recorded in its dossier yet — its HQ country is 🇨🇳 China, a registration fact, not a production or sales claim. We say so rather than guess.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Uranium — bulk input. Uranium is not an incidental input for CNNC, it *is* the business: the group mines, converts, enriches, and fabricates uranium fuel at every stage of the cycle, then burns that fuel in the reactors it builds and operates. Supply risk here is largely upstream concentration and geopolitics (CNNC's own mines plus its Rössing stake in Namibi…
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 4 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
KZ · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches uranium · flagged 29 Jun 2026, 99d pending
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No. 125-VI ZRK): (1) raises the mandatory local (domestic) content share in works and services from 50% to 70% during exploration and extraction of solid minerals INCLUDING URANIUM — a material new in-country-value obligation on the world's #1 uranium producer (Kazatomprom) and its JV partners (Cameco, Orano, CGN/CNNC, Uranium One); (2) digitises geological data and expands electronic auctions for granting subsoil-use rights; (3) grants strategic investors implementing large industrial/innovation projects (>14. 5M MCI) a priority right to explore and extract solid minerals. Re-prices the cost base and access regime for Kazakh uranium, copper, chromium and the country's emerging rare-earth deposits.
source ↗Uranium — bulk input. Uranium is not an incidental input for CNNC, it *is* the business: the group mines, converts, enriches, and fabricates uranium fuel at every stage of the cycle, then burns that fuel in the reactors it builds and operates. Supply risk here is largely upstream concentration and geopolitics (CNNC's own mines plus its Rössing stake in Namibi…
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
uranium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches uranium · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 114d pending
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
source ↗Uranium — bulk input. Uranium is not an incidental input for CNNC, it *is* the business: the group mines, converts, enriches, and fabricates uranium fuel at every stage of the cycle, then burns that fuel in the reactors it builds and operates. Supply risk here is largely upstream concentration and geopolitics (CNNC's own mines plus its Rössing stake in Namibi…
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
uranium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
NA · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · touches uranium · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 114d pending
10% free-carried state equity in ALL new mining and energy projects (no-cost government stake via Epangelo Mining); consultations on 51% Namibian ownership in new mining ventures; maximum royalty rate rise from 5% to potentially 10% for strategic minerals; introduction of profit-based windfall-tax mechanism; tighter local-content and environmental obligations; affects Uranium One/NamCor (uranium), Osino Resources, B2Gold, and lithium juniors in Namibia
source ↗Uranium — bulk input. Uranium is not an incidental input for CNNC, it *is* the business: the group mines, converts, enriches, and fabricates uranium fuel at every stage of the cycle, then burns that fuel in the reactors it builds and operates. Supply risk here is largely upstream concentration and geopolitics (CNNC's own mines plus its Rössing stake in Namibi…
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
uranium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
XA (multilateral / CEMAC: CM, CF, CG, GA, GQ, TD) · stage draft-published → moderate likelihood · touches uranium · flagged 20 Jun 2026, 108d pending
If adopted, creates a unified mining regulatory framework across Cameroon, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad — harmonising licensing regimes, fiscal terms, transparency obligations (EITI, KP, ICGLR), and environmental standards; would affect Eramet/Comilog manganese operations (Gabon), Sundance Resources iron ore (CAR), Chinese mining JVs (Congo-Brazzaville, CAR), and uranium projects across the region; if enacted, creates a regional investment-guarantee architecture that could facilitate cross-border mining finance and reduce individual-country treaty risk; structural precedent for pooled resource sovereignty in a region where individual states are renegotiating contracts (Gabon post-coup Décret 0276/2024 sovereign-equity mandate, CAR post-KP-readmission, Congo-Brazzaville mining-code review)
source ↗Uranium — bulk input. Uranium is not an incidental input for CNNC, it *is* the business: the group mines, converts, enriches, and fabricates uranium fuel at every stage of the cycle, then burns that fuel in the reactors it builds and operates. Supply risk here is largely upstream concentration and geopolitics (CNNC's own mines plus its Rössing stake in Namibi…
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
4 of 22 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 1 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its sector (industrial) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of uranium. Restrictions by 🇷🇺 RU push buyers toward ex-RU producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the uranium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.