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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: utility energy. Company profile →
FCN (Fabrica de Combustibil Nuclear) is the nuclear-fuel-fabrication arm of Societatea Națională Nuclearelectrica (SNN), Romania's state-owned nuclear utility (operator of the Cernavodă CANDU plant). Its Pitești site fabricates CANDU fuel bundles; its Feldioara site — Fabrica de Prelucrare a Concentratelor de Uraniu (FPCU), operational since 2023 after SNN acquired the former CNU Feldioara processing assets — purifies and converts imported uranium octoxide (U3O8) concentrate into sintered uranium dioxide (UO2) powder, the feedstock Pitești presses into fuel pellets. Together the two sites give SNN an integrated domestic fuel cycle from concentrate to finished bundle.
In October 2025 FPCU made Romania's first-ever nuclear fuel export, shipping UO2 to Argentina.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where FCN - Fabrica de Combustibil Nuclear produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Uranium — bulk input. Uranium concentrate is not an input alongside other materials here; it *is* the company's entire feedstock and product line. FPCU Feldioara's design output is measured directly in UO2 tonnage, and Pitești's fuel-bundle output is likewise a direct function of uranium throughput — there is no substitute material or alternate product line.
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 4 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
KZ · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches uranium · flagged 29 Jun 2026, 98d pending
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No. 125-VI ZRK): (1) raises the mandatory local (domestic) content share in works and services from 50% to 70% during exploration and extraction of solid minerals INCLUDING URANIUM — a material new in-country-value obligation on the world's #1 uranium producer (Kazatomprom) and its JV partners (Cameco, Orano, CGN/CNNC, Uranium One); (2) digitises geological data and expands electronic auctions for granting subsoil-use rights; (3) grants strategic investors implementing large industrial/innovation projects (>14. 5M MCI) a priority right to explore and extract solid minerals. Re-prices the cost base and access regime for Kazakh uranium, copper, chromium and the country's emerging rare-earth deposits.
source ↗Uranium — bulk input. Uranium concentrate is not an input alongside other materials here; it *is* the company's entire feedstock and product line. FPCU Feldioara's design output is measured directly in UO2 tonnage, and Pitești's fuel-bundle output is likewise a direct function of uranium throughput — there is no substitute material or alternate product line.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches uranium · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
source ↗Uranium — bulk input. Uranium concentrate is not an input alongside other materials here; it *is* the company's entire feedstock and product line. FPCU Feldioara's design output is measured directly in UO2 tonnage, and Pitești's fuel-bundle output is likewise a direct function of uranium throughput — there is no substitute material or alternate product line.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
NA · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · touches uranium · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 113d pending
10% free-carried state equity in ALL new mining and energy projects (no-cost government stake via Epangelo Mining); consultations on 51% Namibian ownership in new mining ventures; maximum royalty rate rise from 5% to potentially 10% for strategic minerals; introduction of profit-based windfall-tax mechanism; tighter local-content and environmental obligations; affects Uranium One/NamCor (uranium), Osino Resources, B2Gold, and lithium juniors in Namibia
source ↗Uranium — bulk input. Uranium concentrate is not an input alongside other materials here; it *is* the company's entire feedstock and product line. FPCU Feldioara's design output is measured directly in UO2 tonnage, and Pitești's fuel-bundle output is likewise a direct function of uranium throughput — there is no substitute material or alternate product line.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
XA (multilateral / CEMAC: CM, CF, CG, GA, GQ, TD) · stage draft-published → moderate likelihood · touches uranium · flagged 20 Jun 2026, 107d pending
If adopted, creates a unified mining regulatory framework across Cameroon, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad — harmonising licensing regimes, fiscal terms, transparency obligations (EITI, KP, ICGLR), and environmental standards; would affect Eramet/Comilog manganese operations (Gabon), Sundance Resources iron ore (CAR), Chinese mining JVs (Congo-Brazzaville, CAR), and uranium projects across the region; if enacted, creates a regional investment-guarantee architecture that could facilitate cross-border mining finance and reduce individual-country treaty risk; structural precedent for pooled resource sovereignty in a region where individual states are renegotiating contracts (Gabon post-coup Décret 0276/2024 sovereign-equity mandate, CAR post-KP-readmission, Congo-Brazzaville mining-code review)
source ↗Uranium — bulk input. Uranium concentrate is not an input alongside other materials here; it *is* the company's entire feedstock and product line. FPCU Feldioara's design output is measured directly in UO2 tonnage, and Pitești's fuel-bundle output is likewise a direct function of uranium throughput — there is no substitute material or alternate product line.
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
4 of 22 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its sector (utility energy) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-05), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
+6 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.