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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: metals refining. Company profile →
Liberty Galati SA is Romania's sole integrated flat-steel producer — a former ArcelorMittal (previously Sidex) plant on the Danube in Galati, acquired by Sanjeev Gupta's GFG Alliance / Liberty Steel Group in 2019. The site runs sinter, blast furnace, BOF/EAF steelmaking, continuous casting, hot and cold rolling, and continuous hot-dip galvanizing and organic-coating lines, supplying flat and coated steel to construction, automotive, shipbuilding, and energy customers. The plant has been in preventive settlement (concordat) since March 2025 (~EUR 1B debt), briefly restarted April 2025, then suspended again from September 2025.
Two sale auctions since (March and June 2026) both failed to attract a buyer, even after the asking price was cut from ~EUR 709M toward an ~EUR 407M liquidation-value floor. The Romanian state has since designated the plant strategically important, allocating 257.7M lei (April 2026) toward wage arrears for its ~4,500 employees and a gradual, tolling-based restart of the rolling mills; separately, a Czech court in Ostrava froze the company's key assets in May 2026 over an unpaid EUR 40M+ debt owed under a 2023 loan agreement to the insolvency estate of former sister plant Liberty Ostrava (itself sold out of insolvency to a Czech investor consortium in October 2025, per this corpus's `liberty-ostrava` dossier), a ruling under appeal. Current exposure reflects the plant's installed capability, not confirmed live output.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Liberty Galati SA produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Manganese — structural component. Manganese is a standard steelmaking alloying/deoxidizing addition (typically well under 2% by weight) present in essentially all of the plant's carbon-steel grades; no company-specific grade data beyond that general steelmaking chemistry was found.
Silicon — structural component. Used as a steelmaking deoxidizer and minor alloying element in the same basic-oxygen/electric-arc process.
Zinc — bulk input. The continuous hot-dip galvanizing line coats steel strip in a molten zinc bath (with an air-wipe to control coating mass) to produce corrosion-resistant galvanized sheet and coil, one of the plant's named product lines.
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
GA · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches manganese · flagged 26 Jun 2026, 103d pending
Gabon (CTRI transitional government, President Oligui Nguema) announced at Africa Forward Summit in Nairobi (May 2026) its intention to subscribe to Eramet SA's €500M capital increase, giving the Gabonese state direct equity in the French-listed parent of COMILOG (its primary manganese mining subsidiary in Moanda). Gabon already holds 29% of COMILOG; a stake in Eramet SA itself would give Gabon leverage over the global operations of the parent group (smelting, nickel, lithium, manganese across France, Norway, Senegal, and Indonesia) and a seat at the Eramet Board. Eramet AGM (May 27, 2026) approved the capital raise resolution. Capital raise planned for H2 2026. Distinct from: filed 2025-05-30-gabon-raw-manganese-export-ban-2029 (the export ban forcing value-addition); filed 2024-07-02-gabon-decret-0276-regimes-des-substances-souveraines (35% state free-carry in new mines) — this is an equity purchase in the parent company, not a free-carry in a Gabonese concession; new vector of state resource-control
source ↗Manganese — structural component. Manganese is a standard steelmaking alloying/deoxidizing addition (typically well under 2% by weight) present in essentially all of the plant's carbon-steel grades; no company-specific grade data beyond that general steelmaking chemistry was found.
This changes the form of what GA exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your GA-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a GA processing partner, not a supplier switch.
GA supplies 25% of world manganese mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid GA entirely: manganese supply outside GA is 🇿🇦 ZA 55%, 🇬🇭 GH 14%, 🇦🇺 AU 12% (shares renormalised after removing GA).
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches manganese · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 110d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗Manganese — structural component. Manganese is a standard steelmaking alloying/deoxidizing addition (typically well under 2% by weight) present in essentially all of the plant's carbon-steel grades; no company-specific grade data beyond that general steelmaking chemistry was found.
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Brazil supplies 4.0% of world manganese mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid Brazil entirely: manganese supply outside BR is 🇿🇦 ZA 42%, 🇬🇦 GA 28%, 🇬🇭 GH 11% (shares renormalised after removing BR).
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches silicon · flagged 28 Jun 2026, 101d pending
The same Finance Bill 2026/27 already tabled (Parliament-passed 23 June 2026, effective 1 July 2026) inserts a NEW export levy of "10% of the FOB value of the cargo OR TZS 200 per kilogram, whichever is higher" on exports of quartz minerals (HS 25. 06) and feldspar (HS 2529. 10. 00) via amendment to the Export Tax Act, Cap. 196 — a distinct beneficiation-forcing EXPORT-TAX instrument that pushes raw quartz/feldspar exporters toward in-country value-addition. 196), and neither existing entry mentions it; (2) material-relevant — quartz HS 25. 06 covers high-purity/silica quartz feeding the silicon→semiconductor/solar value chain, so a Tanzanian export tax re-prices a raw-silica supply node; the same "rocks to riches" beneficiation logic Tanzania applies elsewhere; (3) part of the wider African raw-mineral-export-tax wave (cf. Zimbabwe 10% lithium-concentrate levy, Namibia unprocessed-mineral ban, Guinea bauxite reference price).
source ↗Silicon — structural component. Used as a steelmaking deoxidizer and minor alloying element in the same basic-oxygen/electric-arc process.
This changes the form of what TZ exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your TZ-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a TZ processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid TZ entirely: silicon supply outside TZ is 🇨🇳 CN 86%, 🇧🇷 BR 3.9%, 🇳🇴 NO 2.8% (shares renormalised after removing TZ).
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches manganesesilicon · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 114d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗Manganese — structural component. Manganese is a standard steelmaking alloying/deoxidizing addition (typically well under 2% by weight) present in essentially all of the plant's carbon-steel grades; no company-specific grade data beyond that general steelmaking chemistry was found.
Silicon — structural component. Used as a steelmaking deoxidizer and minor alloying element in the same basic-oxygen/electric-arc process.
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
NG · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches zinc · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 115d pending
Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all foreign-invested mining JVs; builds on existing eMC+ digital cadastre and mandatory value-addition plans introduced Nov 2024; could force processing-plant investment or suspension of raw mineral shipments from Africa's most populous economy; RMRDC = Raw Materials Research and Development Council (the sponsoring agency)
source ↗Zinc — bulk input. The continuous hot-dip galvanizing line coats steel strip in a molten zinc bath (with an air-wipe to control coating mass) to produce corrosion-resistant galvanized sheet and coil, one of the plant's named product lines.
This changes the form of what Nigeria exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Nigeria-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Nigeria processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid Nigeria entirely: zinc supply outside NG is 🇨🇳 CN 39%, 🇵🇪 PE 14%, 🇦🇺 AU 10% (shares renormalised after removing NG).
Revises 30 CFR Part 580 to streamline 10 provisions governing prospecting, leasing, and operations for hard minerals (manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, seafloor massive sulfides) on the US Outer…
Cabinet-cleared bill to replace the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act, Act 703: raises mining royalties from current 3–5% range to 9–12% (price-linked sliding scale), introduces a new medium-scale mining…
Reduces maximum idle-concession period from 30 to 15 years (initial production deadline unchanged at 10 yr; penalty extension cut from 20 yr to just 5 yr); eliminates irrevocable legal status of mini…
Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
10% free-carried state equity in ALL new mining and energy projects (no-cost government stake via Epangelo Mining); consultations on 51% Namibian ownership in new mining ventures; maximum royalty rat…
Gabon = ~25% world manganese reserves, world's 2nd largest manganese ore exporter (~8 Mt/year via COMILOG/Eramet); ban on raw ore exports forces domestic processing investment (silicomanganese, EMD,…
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
If adopted, creates a unified mining regulatory framework across Cameroon, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad — harmonising licensing regimes, fiscal terms, transparency oblig…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
2 of 31 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in critical minerals — read via the graph's critical minerals processing node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-07), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
+11 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+24 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.