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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: medical devices. Company profile →
Medartis AG (operating subsidiary of Medartis Holding AG, SIX: MED) is a Basel-based medical device company focused exclusively on osteosynthesis — surgical fixation of bone fractures and deformities. Their product portfolio covers titanium plates, screws, nails, and instruments for upper and lower extremity trauma, foot-and-ankle surgery (via US subsidiary Nextremity), and craniomaxillofacial (CMF) surgery. All standard implants are CNC-machined from titanium rod stock or billet at the Basel plant; their 2025 acquisition of Belgium-based CADskills added titanium additive manufacturing (3D printing) capability for patient-specific implants.
Medartis reported CHF ~320 M in FY2025 sales, with 15.7% organic growth driven by extremity and international expansion.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Medartis AG produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Tungsten — CNC machining of titanium alloys at production scale requires tungsten-carbide cutting tools exclusively (no economically viable substitute for titanium turning/milling at this tolerance). Medartis's Basel plant processes several thousand implants daily; tool consumption makes tungsten a recurring upstream dependency.
Vanadium *(corrects a prior "niobium" claim, 2026-09-13)* — Re-verification found no source supporting niobium-bearing Ti-6Al-7Nb alloy at Medartis or its CADskills subsidiary. Medartis's own MRI-compatibility documentation names cp-Ti/Ti6Al4V for its implants, and CADskills' published material spec for its additively-manufactured implants is Tit…
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches tungsten · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
source ↗Tungsten — CNC machining of titanium alloys at production scale requires tungsten-carbide cutting tools exclusively (no economically viable substitute for titanium turning/milling at this tolerance). Medartis's Basel plant processes several thousand implants daily; tool consumption makes tungsten a recurring upstream dependency.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches tungsten · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 112d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗Tungsten — CNC machining of titanium alloys at production scale requires tungsten-carbide cutting tools exclusively (no economically viable substitute for titanium turning/milling at this tolerance). Medartis's Basel plant processes several thousand implants daily; tool consumption makes tungsten a recurring upstream dependency.
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
MN · stage draft-published → moderate likelihood · touches tungsten · flagged 27 Jun 2026, 100d pending
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising holding fees (to curb speculative licence-trading/flipping); (ii) introduces a STATUTORY definition of "critical minerals" (aligned to Mongolia's 11-mineral list: molybdenum, manganese, nickel, copper, fluorspar, graphite, REEs, cobalt, lithium, PGMs, tungsten) and a SEPARATE licensing regime for downstream beneficiation plants; (iii) mandates mine-closure plans + financial bonding once a mine reaches 75% of its life; aims to accelerate licence issuance and expand the resource base. Mongolia is a structural China/Russia-flanked chokepoint pursuing Western REE/copper partnerships (US FORGE, JP, KR), so a domestic critical-minerals statutory regime + downstream-processing licensing reprices the entry terms for any foreign developer of Mongolian copper/REE/fluorspar (Oyu Tolgoi-adjacent, Erdenes critical-minerals SOE pipeline).
source ↗Tungsten — CNC machining of titanium alloys at production scale requires tungsten-carbide cutting tools exclusively (no economically viable substitute for titanium turning/milling at this tolerance). Medartis's Basel plant processes several thousand implants daily; tool consumption makes tungsten a recurring upstream dependency.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
EU · stage consultation-closed (pre-proposal; CFE + OPC both closed 2026-07-29) → elevated likelihood · touches tungsten · flagged 30 Jul 2026, 67d pending
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence on CRM value chains**; (b) steer and de-risk finance into strategic projects with public and private partners; (c) support **strategic stockpiling**; and (d) run **joint purchasing** by pooling company orders and matchmaking demand with supply (a "raw materials platform" pooling orders and creating joint stocks, with an EU-coordinated stockpiling pilot to become operational in the following year). A **call for evidence + public consultation opened 19 May 2026**, and the Commission announced a **legislative proposal for Q2 2026**. Supply-relief on the material axis (EU-side aggregation, stockpiles and de-risking finance directly loosen chokepoint exposure for EU industrial buyers), but it also creates a new EU purchasing/allocation gatekeeper whose membership and priority rules will be contested. If it carries reporting or data-submission duties on participating companies, it becomes a second corporate-facing CRM information obligation alongside CRMA Art. 24.
source ↗Tungsten — CNC machining of titanium alloys at production scale requires tungsten-carbide cutting tools exclusively (no economically viable substitute for titanium turning/milling at this tolerance). Medartis's Basel plant processes several thousand implants daily; tool consumption makes tungsten a recurring upstream dependency.
This is support, not a threat — it funds, fast-tracks or relaxes rather than restricts. If you have operations, projects or purchases inside its scope, check your eligibility against the measure's own text above.
UG · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · touches tungsten · flagged 13 Jun 2026, 114d pending
Mandates 15% free-carried interest for Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC) in all new mining licences; introduces mandatory mineral buying centres; tightens local-content and value-addition obligations — changes joint-venture economics for all new Ugandan mining operations, raising effective cost-of-entry for foreign miners
source ↗Tungsten — CNC machining of titanium alloys at production scale requires tungsten-carbide cutting tools exclusively (no economically viable substitute for titanium turning/milling at this tolerance). Medartis's Basel plant processes several thousand implants daily; tool consumption makes tungsten a recurring upstream dependency.
This changes the form of what UG exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your UG-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a UG processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid UG entirely: tungsten supply outside UG is 🇨🇳 CN 83%, 🇻🇳 VN 3.7%, 🇰🇿 KZ 3.0% (shares renormalised after removing UG).
1 of 16 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in healthcare. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-05), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+1 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
No deployment evidence in our corpus for the names below. Treat them as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.