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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: mining metals. Company profile →
The mainland-China trading arm of Richardson RFPD, a specialist distributor of RF, wireless and power semiconductors that is owned by Arrow Electronics (US) (GLEIF lists Arrow Electronics, Inc. as ultimate parent of Richardson RFPD, Inc. and Richardson RFPD Hong Kong Limited; the China entity itself has no LEI on file).
Sungrow's 2011 IPO prospectus names it as distributing Semikron power semiconductors under Arrow. It was Sungrow's rank-1 power-semiconductor supplier in FY2009 and its rank-1 supplier overall in H1-2011 (9.26 % of total purchases); the filing notes it traded earlier as 理察森电子贸易(中国)有限公司 before a rename. It is a reseller. It does not fabricate devices.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
No production footprint is recorded in its dossier yet — its HQ country is 🇨🇳 China, a registration fact, not a production or sales claim. We say so rather than guess.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Gallium — group-level line card. Richardson RFPD signed a global distribution deal for Innoscience's gallium-nitride-on-silicon (GaN-on-Si) power devices.
Silicon — IGBT modules (Semikron, per the Sungrow prospectus) and the GaN-on-Si substrate are silicon devices. This is a *structural* use (the die/substrate), but again resold rather than consumed.
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 4 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches galliumsilicon · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 114d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗Gallium — group-level line card. Richardson RFPD signed a global distribution deal for Innoscience's gallium-nitride-on-silicon (GaN-on-Si) power devices.
Silicon — IGBT modules (Semikron, per the Sungrow prospectus) and the GaN-on-Si substrate are silicon devices. This is a *structural* use (the die/substrate), but again resold rather than consumed.
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches silicon · flagged 28 Jun 2026, 101d pending
The same Finance Bill 2026/27 already tabled (Parliament-passed 23 June 2026, effective 1 July 2026) inserts a NEW export levy of "10% of the FOB value of the cargo OR TZS 200 per kilogram, whichever is higher" on exports of quartz minerals (HS 25. 06) and feldspar (HS 2529. 10. 00) via amendment to the Export Tax Act, Cap. 196 — a distinct beneficiation-forcing EXPORT-TAX instrument that pushes raw quartz/feldspar exporters toward in-country value-addition. 196), and neither existing entry mentions it; (2) material-relevant — quartz HS 25. 06 covers high-purity/silica quartz feeding the silicon→semiconductor/solar value chain, so a Tanzanian export tax re-prices a raw-silica supply node; the same "rocks to riches" beneficiation logic Tanzania applies elsewhere; (3) part of the wider African raw-mineral-export-tax wave (cf. Zimbabwe 10% lithium-concentrate levy, Namibia unprocessed-mineral ban, Guinea bauxite reference price).
source ↗Silicon — IGBT modules (Semikron, per the Sungrow prospectus) and the GaN-on-Si substrate are silicon devices. This is a *structural* use (the die/substrate), but again resold rather than consumed.
This changes the form of what TZ exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your TZ-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a TZ processing partner, not a supplier switch.
silicon — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
EU · stage consultation-closed (pre-proposal; CFE + OPC both closed 2026-07-29) → elevated likelihood · touches gallium · flagged 30 Jul 2026, 69d pending
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence on CRM value chains**; (b) steer and de-risk finance into strategic projects with public and private partners; (c) support **strategic stockpiling**; and (d) run **joint purchasing** by pooling company orders and matchmaking demand with supply (a "raw materials platform" pooling orders and creating joint stocks, with an EU-coordinated stockpiling pilot to become operational in the following year). A **call for evidence + public consultation opened 19 May 2026**, and the Commission announced a **legislative proposal for Q2 2026**. Supply-relief on the material axis (EU-side aggregation, stockpiles and de-risking finance directly loosen chokepoint exposure for EU industrial buyers), but it also creates a new EU purchasing/allocation gatekeeper whose membership and priority rules will be contested. If it carries reporting or data-submission duties on participating companies, it becomes a second corporate-facing CRM information obligation alongside CRMA Art. 24.
source ↗Gallium — group-level line card. Richardson RFPD signed a global distribution deal for Innoscience's gallium-nitride-on-silicon (GaN-on-Si) power devices.
This is support, not a threat — it funds, fast-tracks or relaxes rather than restricts. If you have operations, projects or purchases inside its scope, check your eligibility against the measure's own text above.
gallium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
EU · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · touches silicon · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 114d pending
Second wave of CRMA Art. 14 strategic projects (drawn from 160+ applications: 95 EU-domestic + 66 third-country including 40 from strategic-partnership countries) gains fast-track permitting (27-month EU cap, 15-month Member State cap), EIB/EBRD financing-hub priority, and off-taker certainty; 75 battery-value-chain projects + 21 REE-for-permanent-magnets in pool; widens the EU's 2030 extraction/processing benchmarks pipeline beyond the first 60 projects
source ↗Silicon — IGBT modules (Semikron, per the Sungrow prospectus) and the GaN-on-Si substrate are silicon devices. This is a *structural* use (the die/substrate), but again resold rather than consumed.
This is support, not a threat — it funds, fast-tracks or relaxes rather than restricts. If you have operations, projects or purchases inside its scope, check your eligibility against the measure's own text above.
silicon — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
1 of 24 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 2 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in ev batteries, permanent magnets, ev motors, wind turbines, defence… — read via the graph's critical minerals node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of gallium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the gallium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of silicon. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the silicon chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.