Loading…
Loading…
What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: semiconductor. Draft — claims not yet independently re-checked against their sources. Company profile →
Toshiba Electronic Devices & Storage Corporation is the wholly-owned Toshiba Corporation subsidiary that holds the group's semiconductor and hard-disk-drive businesses. Its own product listing covers two halves. The semiconductor half is discrete and analog rather than leading-edge logic: MOSFETs, IGBTs/IEGTs, bipolar transistors and diodes, microcontrollers, power-management and motor-driver ICs, linear ICs and logic devices, linear image sensors, and photocouplers/isolators — plus a wide-bandgap line of SiC MOSFETs and SiC Schottky barrier diodes.
The storage half builds hard disk drives for data-centre/enterprise, consumer and specialty applications. One boundary matters for anyone reading this file: it does not make NAND flash memory. Toshiba's memory business was separated as Toshiba Memory and is now Kioxia, an unrelated company. Nothing about NAND fabrication belongs in this dossier's exposure set.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
No production footprint is recorded in its dossier yet — its HQ country is 🇯🇵 Japan, a registration fact, not a production or sales claim. We say so rather than guess.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Silicon — *bulk input*, and the substrate the entire semiconductor half is built on. Every product family Toshiba lists on this side — MOSFETs, IGBTs, bipolar transistors, diodes, microcontrollers, power-management and motor-driver ICs, linear and logic devices, image sensors, photocouplers — is a silicon-wafer device, and the wide-bandgap line…
Helium — *bulk input in the sealed sense, and the differentiating exposure here*. Toshiba's MG-series enterprise drives are **helium-sealed**: the company's own storage product pages describe using "Toshiba precision laser welding technology to seal helium inside the disk mechanics", with the helium fill reducing aerodynamic drag to allow more…
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches silicon · flagged 28 Jun 2026, 100d pending
The same Finance Bill 2026/27 already tabled (Parliament-passed 23 June 2026, effective 1 July 2026) inserts a NEW export levy of "10% of the FOB value of the cargo OR TZS 200 per kilogram, whichever is higher" on exports of quartz minerals (HS 25. 06) and feldspar (HS 2529. 10. 00) via amendment to the Export Tax Act, Cap. 196 — a distinct beneficiation-forcing EXPORT-TAX instrument that pushes raw quartz/feldspar exporters toward in-country value-addition. 196), and neither existing entry mentions it; (2) material-relevant — quartz HS 25. 06 covers high-purity/silica quartz feeding the silicon→semiconductor/solar value chain, so a Tanzanian export tax re-prices a raw-silica supply node; the same "rocks to riches" beneficiation logic Tanzania applies elsewhere; (3) part of the wider African raw-mineral-export-tax wave (cf. Zimbabwe 10% lithium-concentrate levy, Namibia unprocessed-mineral ban, Guinea bauxite reference price).
source ↗Silicon — *bulk input*, and the substrate the entire semiconductor half is built on. Every product family Toshiba lists on this side — MOSFETs, IGBTs, bipolar transistors, diodes, microcontrollers, power-management and motor-driver ICs, linear and logic devices, image sensors, photocouplers — is a silicon-wafer device, and the wide-bandgap line…
This changes the form of what TZ exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your TZ-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a TZ processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid TZ entirely: silicon supply outside TZ is 🇨🇳 CN 86%, 🇧🇷 BR 3.9%, 🇳🇴 NO 2.8% (shares renormalised after removing TZ).
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches silicon · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗Silicon — *bulk input*, and the substrate the entire semiconductor half is built on. Every product family Toshiba lists on this side — MOSFETs, IGBTs, bipolar transistors, diodes, microcontrollers, power-management and motor-driver ICs, linear and logic devices, image sensors, photocouplers — is a silicon-wafer device, and the wide-bandgap line…
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
US · stage passed-committee → elevated likelihood · matches its sector (semiconductor) · flagged 24 Jun 2026, 104d pending
Requires US allies — primarily the Netherlands (ASML) and Japan (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu) — to align their national export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment with US BIS restrictions targeting China; strips DoC discretionary licensing authority for chipmaking tools; DUV immersion lithography machines (ASML TWINSCAN NXT series) would face mandatory licensing denial for China-bound sales/servicing; includes anti-circumvention provisions to block third-country re-export through Malaysia, Singapore, or UAE; if enacted, would overturn the bilateral US-Netherlands arrangement on DUV servicing and pressure Japan to expand its April 2023 / January 2024 semiconductor-equipment controls beyond current scope; diplomatic friction: NL Trade Minister Sjoerdsma was in Washington the same week opposing this bill while simultaneously signing Pax Silica
source ↗Matched at sector level (semiconductor) — none of this company's tracked materials is named. Read the measure to judge product-line impact.
No named material → no substitution bench to map; the measure text above is the read.
TZ · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · touches helium · flagged 29 Jun 2026, 99d pending
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the official LIST of critical and strategic minerals — a distinct REGULATORY instrument (not the fiscal Finance Act). The strategy explicitly prioritises IN-COUNTRY BENEFICIATION for graphite, nickel, rare earths and lithium, and amends mineral-processing-licence conditions so that every processing licence now requires a domestic value-addition plan; it targets a 40-mineral beneficiation/local-processing scope plus technology-transfer partnership requirements. Once the list is gazetted, raw/unprocessed exports of the listed minerals (Tanzania = a structural graphite chokepoint via Faru/Lindi/Mahenge graphite, plus emerging niobium at Panda Hill and nickel at Kabanga) face value-addition-plan gating and likely export conditionality — re-pricing a major non-China graphite supply node and the Kabanga nickel/Panda Hill niobium projects.
source ↗Helium — *bulk input in the sealed sense, and the differentiating exposure here*. Toshiba's MG-series enterprise drives are **helium-sealed**: the company's own storage product pages describe using "Toshiba precision laser welding technology to seal helium inside the disk mechanics", with the helium fill reducing aerodynamic drag to allow more…
This changes the form of what TZ exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your TZ-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a TZ processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid TZ entirely: helium supply outside TZ is 🇺🇸 US 43%, 🇶🇦 QA 33%, 🇩🇿 DZ 8.1% (shares renormalised after removing TZ).
TW · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · matches its sector (semiconductor) · flagged 20 Jun 2026, 108d pending
Taiwan ITA (International Trade Administration, MOEA) launched a 60-day public consultation on planned revisions to the SHTC (Sensitive High-Tech Commodity) controlled-goods export list to add AI chips and advanced semiconductor categories specifically targeting exports to China; if enacted, would extend Taiwan's existing sub-14nm chip / advanced packaging export controls (SHTC list 2025-11-18) to include AI-application chips sold for China use — the measure is designed to align Taiwan's export controls with US BIS advanced-chip restrictions and close the gap on AI server / Nvidia chip diversion from Taiwan to China; Bloomberg June 9, 2026 cites Taiwan authorities "considering much stricter export controls on AI chip sales to China to further align with US measures"; ITA confirmed a 60-day review period for planned revisions; if enacted, would add legal tools to address diversion of AI servers and Nvidia chips through Taiwan to China; affects global AI hardware supply chains and Taiwan-domiciled chip distributors, system integrators, and ODM/OEM assemblers
source ↗Matched at sector level (semiconductor) — none of this company's tracked materials is named. Read the measure to judge product-line impact.
No named material → no substitution bench to map; the measure text above is the read.
Second wave of CRMA Art.
Reuters (exclusive, multiple sources) reported 31 Dec 2025 that Chinese authorities have been requiring domestic chipmakers to source at least 50% of equipment spend from Chinese toolmakers when appl…
If enacted, first Taiwan restriction covering all Chinese customers (not just blacklisted entities); would require Taiwanese OEMs (Foxconn, Pegatron, ASUS, Quanta, Wiwynn), server makers, and compone…
2 of 20 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in semiconductors. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-06), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
No listed, tradable substitute passes the screen — 3 tracked ex-bloc producers remain a research starting point.
Full substitution matrix →lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.