3 critical materials scored · binding chokepoint: Silicon (🇨🇳 CN 80% of refining) · 34 restrictive government measures on record
Subject
EVK.DE · 🇩🇪 DE
Sector
chemicals
Materials scored
3
As of
2026-09-22
Risk Office verdict
Elevated · 65/100Company supply-risk index
The binding exposure is Silicon — 🇨🇳 CN controls 80% of global refining. On this company's production footprint that scores 71/100 (adversarial chokepoint; global 64). The register holds 34 restrictive government measures touching this company's materials — each traced to its primary source below.
Peer rank · SiliconEvonik Industries AG is the 522nd-most-exposed of the 832 named companies we track on 🇨🇳 CN's Silicon chokepoint; the most-exposed is aerodyn Engineering GmbH (77/100). Ranked on the same footprint-adjusted buyer score as above — a relative read of an existing metric, not a new one.
Competitor cohort · chemicals
Evonik Industries AG ranks 45th of 99 verified chemicals companies, tied with 6 others at 65.
89🇯🇵 Shin-Etsu Chemical Co., Ltd.Dysprosium
82🇩🇪 Merck KGaATungsten
81🇯🇵 Mitsubishi Chemical Group CorporationGraphite
81🇺🇸 Dow Inc.Tungsten
81🇯🇵 Tosoh CorporationManganese
80🇦🇹 Treibacher Industrie AGTungsten
79🇩🇪 CeramTecTungsten
79🇪🇸 Colorobbia España, S.A.Praseodymium
79🇺🇸 Solstice Advanced Materials, Inc.Manganese
77🇩🇪 AlzChem GroupSilicon
75🇫🇷 Air Liquide S.A.Tungsten
75🇺🇸 Ecolab Inc.Silicon
75🇩🇪 PCC SE (parent of PCC BakkiSilicon silicon-metal plant, Húsavík, Iceland — idled since mid-2025)Silicon
Same sector_primary, ranked on the company supply-risk index. Restricted to hand-verified dossiers — 13 further chemicals companies are tracked but auto-onboarded, and excluded here because their exposure list is a sector template rather than company research. A peer scoring lower is the useful read: it usually means a different production geography or a qualified second source.
Company supply-risk index 65/100 — the binding chokepoint dominates, with a modest add for exposure breadth across 3 scored materials. Buyer-relative (first-order): weighted by where the company produces (DE 32% · US 13% · ES 5% · AT 5% · CN 9% · TH 4% · ID 4% · FR 8% · BE 6% · SG 4% · IT 3% · FI 3% · BR 4%, estimated split — no cited source states these exact shares), applied across all materials — it does not yet trace each input to its specific sourcing step.
Evonik Industries AG
What they do
Evonik Industries AG (EVK.DE, Essen, Germany) is a specialty chemicals company with revenue of €14.1 bn (FY2025) organised across two operating segments: Advanced Technologies (silica, silanes, chlorosilanes, hydrogen peroxide, high-performance polymers, gas-separation membranes) and Custom Solutions (DL-methionine amino acids for animal feed under the MetAMINO brand, lipid nanoparticles for mRNA drug delivery, specialty surfactants, cosmetic ingredients). Germany's Marl Chemical Park is the largest single production hub; major international sites operate in Antwerp (methionine), Mobile AL (methionine), and Singapore (methionine + silica).
Critical-material exposure
Silicon metal → SIRIDION chlorosilanes & AEROSIL fumed silica (scored).
Evonik's SIRIDION brand produces high-purity chlorosilanes (SiCl4, HCDS) up to 99.9999% purity for semiconductor and glass-fibre applications via "directed synthesis from metallurgical silicon." AEROSIL fumed silica is manufactured by burning a silicon-bearing precursor in a hydrogen flame. Silicon metal is classified as a Critical Raw Material under the EU CRMA 2024. China controls ~70% of global silicon metal smelting capacity, creating a direct concentration risk for Evonik's Advanced Technologies segment.
Palladium (as platinum-palladium) → hydrogen peroxide AO process catalyst.
Evonik is a large global hydrogen peroxide producer using the anthraquinone autoxidation process, in which palladium-on-alumina catalyst performs the hydrogenation step. Palladium is non-substitutable at commercial scale and is classified as a CRM by the EU and US. Supply is concentrated in South Africa and Russia (~80% combined). Previously believed unscored; the platform's platinum-palladium combined slug already exists and resolves a bare "palladium" mention via its synonym table — corrected 2026-08-20.
Sulfur → MetAMINO DL-methionine.
MetAMINO synthesis proceeds from acrolein + methyl mercaptan + HCN; methyl mercaptan is the primary sulfur donor. Evonik runs proprietary methyl mercaptan capacity (Antwerp, Mobile, Singapore) to backstop supply, but upstream sulfur availability — a refinery byproduct whose volumes could fall in a net-zero transition — is an operational dependency at the >700,000 MT/yr methionine scale. Previously believed unscored; sulfur is directly in SCORED_MATERIALS — corrected 2026-08-20.
Sector-default exposures that do NOT apply. Phosphate, potash, vanadium,
manganese, antimony, and lithium are not material-level inputs in Evonik's current commercial portfolio. Cobalt and nickel appear only in early-stage battery-recycling R&D (ceramic lithium-selective membranes), not in current production.
Sources
Evonik Financial and Sustainability Report 2024: https://www.evonik.com/content/dam/evonik/documents/Evonik_Financial_and_Sustainability_Report_2024.pdf.coredownload.pdf
Evonik Raw Materials sustainability page: https://www.evonik.com/en/sustainability/Sustainability-in-the-value-chain/raw-materials.html
You = buyer-relative score (this company's disclosed footprint vs. the controller). Global = buyer-agnostic supply risk. Substitute = ease of swapping the material out (none = locked in). Input share = the material's disclosed magnitude in the company's input basket (HIGH/MED/LOW only where a public filing quantifies it; — = unrated). Descriptive effect-size, never scored.
Art. 5 = does the global top single-country share breach the EU's own CRMA Art. 5 diversification ceiling (no more than 65% of a strategic raw material from a single third country)? A conservative global-production PROXY for the EU-import denominator — descriptive only, sits beside the score, never merged into it (— = non-strategic material). Reg. (EU) 2024/1252 Art. 5 ↗
Supply-risk factor analysis
Per-material factor scoring on a 1–5 likelihood×impact scale, mapped to the Art. 24(2)(b) risk-factor framework. The headline score above is a portfolio RAG; this matrix is the assessment — it is where two companies with the same binding chokepoint diverge.
1 = very low … 5 = very high — a standard supply-risk likelihood×impact scale (the form a competent authority expects for the Art. 24(2)(b) factor analysis, not a CRMA-numbered scale). Public-source factors are pre-filled from the engine's primary sources (USGS concentration, IPTM government actions, EU import data); the three rightmost factor categories need company / Tier-1 supplier data and are flagged as input under Art. 24(3). Hover any cell for its evidence.
Material factors (scored 4–5) — evidence
Silicon
4Geopolitical: 19 restrictive actions, peak severity 4, 14 in last 24mo
4Concentration: refining HHI 6498 (extreme); top CN 80%
4Substitutability: limited substitutes in electronics/electrical steel
4Import reliance: Eurostat Comext 2025: 63% extra-EU imports, top partner NO 47% (partner HHI 2698)
Platinum-palladium
4Geopolitical: 12 restrictive actions, peak severity 5, 8 in last 24mo, less 1 liberalising action
5Price / market: price up, as of 2026-10-06
4Substitutability: Graedel et al. 2013 PNAS Fig. 5: Pt 66, Pd 39 /100; the harder element sets the pair
Sulfur
4Substitutability: byproduct of oil/gas desulfurization + smelting — cannot be produced on demand, so supply is price-inelastic; sulfuric acid has no substitute in phosphate fertilizer or copper SX-EW leaching (USGS: no substitute for the sulfur plant nutrient)
Change log
last 30 days
Every new filing and every amendment (rate change, scope change, repeal) touching this company's materials in the window above. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date.
The Art. 24(2)(c) vulnerability assessment, made explicit. For each leading exposure we model the move in this company's buyer-relative score under two distinct supply-disruption scenarios — the production footprint held fixed, only one lever moved at a time so each delta isolates one shock:
Both stress-test scenariosShowHide
Policy shock — the controlling country escalates to a full export-licensing / ban regime.
Concentration shock — the supply structure collapses to a single source (second-source loss / full monopoly).
Type
Scenario
Today
Stressed
Δ
Policy
Silicon — 🇨🇳 CN escalates silicon controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime
71
75
+4
Concentration
Silicon — 🇨🇳 CN becomes the single source for silicon — the second source is lost (full 80%+ monopoly)
71
84
+13
Policy
Platinum-palladium — 🇿🇦 ZA escalates platinum-palladium controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime
61
66
+5
Concentration
Platinum-palladium — 🇿🇦 ZA becomes the single source for platinum-palladium — the second source is lost (full 54%+ monopoly)
61
82
+21
Policy
Sulfur — 🇨🇳 CN escalates sulfur controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime
37
52
+15
Concentration
Sulfur — 🇨🇳 CN becomes the single source for sulfur — the second source is lost (full 23%+ monopoly)
37
71
+34
A zero delta means that lever is already modelled at maximum on that material — today's score already prices it in. This is why the two scenarios are shown together: where a material's policy lever is already maxed (zero policy delta), the concentration shock still carries a real delta, and vice-versa. Each stressed score isolates its one lever; all other factors are held at current values.
Art. 24(4) · mitigation trigger
Significant-vulnerability conclusion
No material crosses the significant-vulnerability threshold. The Art. 24(4) mitigation duty is not triggered on the factors we could score (1 of 15 inputs unrated across the materials bought). Absence of data is not evidence of low risk — an unrated factor enters the score as zero, not as an estimate, so this conclusion could change once those inputs are rated. The mitigations below are precautionary.
Stated threshold (so the conclusion is reproducible and auditable): buyer-relative band ≥ High AND substitutability hard/none AND ≥ 1 in-force restrictive measure on the material, assessed over the materials this company buys. The CRMA does not fix a numeric definition of “significant”; the company may adopt a stricter or looser threshold and should record it here.
Proposed — not yet law
Upcoming regulatory threats
Proposed, announced or draft regulation that is not yet in force but would touch this company's at-risk materials if it passes. Forward-looking early-warning — the likelihood shown is an honest band derived from the legislative stage, not a forecast or a fabricated probability. Kept separate from the enacted register above: nothing here is law yet.
The upcoming threatsShowHide
🇨🇳 China — MOFCOM/GACC suspension of ordinary industrial & smelter-byproduct sulfuric acid exports (in force from 1 May 2026)
passed-vote→high likelihood·flagged 73d ago · not yet law·matches Sulfur
If passed — Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still exportable under special approval; reporting attributes the measure to a joint Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) + General Administration of Customs (GACC) notice, expected to run through end-2026. Sulfuric acid is the indispensable leach/process input for copper hydrometallurgy (SX-EW), phosphate-fertilizer production, and battery-metal (nickel HPAL, lithium) processing, so a China export halt tightens a systemic upstream chokepoint hitting seaborne-acid buyers (Chile/Peru copper, Morocco/India phosphate, Indonesia nickel). This is a DISTINCT instrument from the already-filed 2025-12-12-china-ndrc-phosphate-fertilizer-export-suspension (finished-fertilizer export control) and 2026-03-31-russia-decree-350-sulphur-export-ban-extension (elemental sulphur, different country/product) — it controls the acid itself.
Caveat — ENACTED / in force per multiple independent secondary sources (S&P Global, SCMP, MINING. the parked H200 window-guidance item). Parked here per the standing verify-or-don't-file convention rather than filed. Re-check mofcom. gov. md as a distinct export-control action.
If passed & escalated to a full control regime — modelled impact (high likelihood)
Sulfur🇨🇳 today 37→52+15
🇪🇺 EU CRMA Strategic Projects — Second Designation Round
in-consultation→moderate likelihood·flagged 113d ago · not yet law·matches Silicon, Platinum-palladium
If passed — Second wave of CRMA Art. 14 strategic projects (drawn from 160+ applications: 95 EU-domestic + 66 third-country including 40 from strategic-partnership countries) gains fast-track permitting (27-month EU cap, 15-month Member State cap), EIB/EBRD financing-hub priority, and off-taker certainty; 75 battery-value-chain projects + 21 REE-for-permanent-magnets in pool; widens the EU's 2030 extraction/processing benchmarks pipeline beyond the first 60 projects
Caveat — Second call for applications closed January 15, 2026 (September 2025 launch). Commission stated ~4-month assessment period → designation expected May–June 2026. As of 2026-06-15, no Commission press release or OJ publication confirmed. EUR-Lex CELEX 32026D0923 verified via web search to be an unrelated EU animal-disease implementing decision. Moved from filing. md 2026-06-15. Distinct from: 2025-03-25-eu-crma-strategic-projects-first-designation (60 projects, first round) and 2024-05-23-eu-crma-entry-into-force (base regulation). Severity 3 expected (same as first-round designation).
If passed & escalated to a full control regime — modelled impact (moderate likelihood)
Silicon🇨🇳 today 71→75+4
Platinum-palladium🇿🇦 today 61→66+5
🇪🇺 EU CRMA Art. 22 Commission Implementing Decision — Strategic Raw Material Stock Benchmarks
awaiting-signature→high likelihood·flagged 113d ago · not yet law·matches Silicon
If passed — Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
Caveat — The May 24, 2026 deadline set by Parliament and Council in Reg. (EU) 2024/1252 has now passed. No OJ publication confirmed as of June 15, 2026 — Commission may have adopted quietly or is overdue. This is the first CRMA Art. 22 benchmark cycle and is legally distinct from: (1) the CRMA base regulation (filed 2024-05-23); (2) the Strategic Projects first designation (filed 2025-03-25); (3) the RESourceEU Amendment — CRMA revision (filed 2026-03-04). If confirmed adopted, severity=2 (establishes the measurement baseline for EU strategic material supply risk assessment and directly feeds corporate Art. 24 reporting obligations). Distinct from all filed EU-CRMA actions. Not in filing. md or upcoming. md.
If passed & escalated to a full control regime — modelled impact (high likelihood)
Silicon🇨🇳 today 71→75+4
🇹🇿 Tanzania Finance Bill 2026/27 — NEW raw-mineral EXPORT LEVY on quartz (HS 25.06) and feldspar (HS 2529.10.00) under the Export Tax Act, Cap. 196
awaiting-signature→high likelihood·flagged 100d ago · not yet law·matches Silicon
If passed — The same Finance Bill 2026/27 already tabled (Parliament-passed 23 June 2026, effective 1 July 2026) inserts a NEW export levy of "10% of the FOB value of the cargo OR TZS 200 per kilogram, whichever is higher" on exports of quartz minerals (HS 25. 06) and feldspar (HS 2529. 10. 00) via amendment to the Export Tax Act, Cap. 196 — a distinct beneficiation-forcing EXPORT-TAX instrument that pushes raw quartz/feldspar exporters toward in-country value-addition. 196), and neither existing entry mentions it; (2) material-relevant — quartz HS 25. 06 covers high-purity/silica quartz feeding the silicon→semiconductor/solar value chain, so a Tanzanian export tax re-prices a raw-silica supply node; the same "rocks to riches" beneficiation logic Tanzania applies elsewhere; (3) part of the wider African raw-mineral-export-tax wave (cf. Zimbabwe 10% lithium-concentrate levy, Namibia unprocessed-mineral ban, Guinea bauxite reference price).
Caveat — On enactment, fold into that one TZ Finance Act 2026 action with action_type capturing both the fiscal-incentive and the export-levy (export-control/tariff) provisions; do NOT double-file. Distinct from filed 2025-06-30-tanzania-finance-act-11-of-2025 (prior year — no quartz/feldspar export levy). Severity 2 (sectoral raw-mineral export tax, niche HS lines).
If passed & escalated to a full control regime — modelled impact (high likelihood)
Silicon🇨🇳 today 71→75+4
🇿🇼 Zimbabwe — ban on new mining licences for single-mineral ("isolated") operations; VP Chiwenga, Zimbabwe-China Business Forum
announced→low likelihood·flagged 2d ago · not yet law·matches Platinum-palladium
If passed — VP Constantino Chiwenga announced at the Zimbabwe-China Business Forum (Hangzhou) that Zimbabwe will no longer issue new mining licences for operations that extract only one mineral from a deposit — future licensees must demonstrate capacity to identify, separate and process the full mineral suite present, or be barred from operating. Framed as beneficiation policy, layered on Zimbabwe's Feb-2026 raw-mineral/lithium-concentrate export ban (filed). Raises the entry bar specifically for Great Dyke chrome/PGM claims, which are frequently single-mineral operations — a licensing-stage chokepoint action, distinct instrument type from the export-ban actions already in the register.
Caveat — Likelihood kept LOW per the discovery brief's calibration caution (a forum announcement with no SI number is exactly the channel that has previously stalled — e. g. the chrome-concentrate extension signalled since Feb-2026, entry below, remains unenacted 8 months on). Dedup: checked "chiwenga", "single mineral", "single-mineral", "zimbabwe chrome licence" across filing. md, upcoming. md, and action-index — zero hits; distinct from filed Zimbabwe lithium/chrome export-ban actions (different instrument: licensing bar on NEW operations, not export control on existing ones).
If passed & escalated to a full control regime — modelled impact (low likelihood)
Platinum-palladium🇿🇦 today 61→66+5
Likelihood band is derived deterministically from the legislative stage (announced → low; draft-published / in-consultation → moderate; passed-committee → elevated; passed-vote / awaiting-signature → high) — a reproducible, source-traceable proxy, not a probability estimate. Where shown, the modelled impact-if-passed re-uses the same buyer-relative stress engine as the enacted scenarios above: it holds this company's production footprint fixed and escalates the proposed measure to a full export-licensing / control regime — the conservative upper bound for a measure that may pass only as a partial cap. The delta is the move from today's score to that stressed score; companies with no modelled production footprint show no delta.
What to watch next
Forward-looking read on the binding chokepoint, from the recent trajectory of policy on these materials. Directional, not a forecast.
The watch listShowHide
Silicon is the line to war-game: 🇨🇳 CN already controls 80% of refining, and the policy lever is active. A single new licensing or export-control action on this material moves the binding score materially.
Platinum-palladium carries 12 restrictive measures on record (🇿🇦 ZA 54% of mining) — a secondary escalation candidate.
Sulfur carries 3 restrictive measures on record (🇨🇳 CN 23% of mining) — a secondary escalation candidate.
Art. 24(4) · diversification & substitution
Priority mitigations
The mitigating efforts Art. 24(4) names — diversifying the supply chain and substituting the material — plus the standard levers against a concentrated, policy-exposed input. Prioritise around the binding input chokepoint (Silicon).
The mitigation optionsShowHide
Map your real exposure to Silicon. Trace it from the component back to the smelter/refiner and country of origin — most buyers discover the dependence is one tier deeper than their direct supplier.
Qualify a non-CN source. Identify and validate at least one supplier outside CN for the binding input before it is needed, even at a cost premium — optionality is the hedge.
Lead-time to re-source is ~9 months (6-12mo). The largest tracked non-CN producer of Silicon is 🇩🇪 DE (~7% of refining); scaling it into a replacement is roughly a 6-12mo ramp. A share-of-stage substitution heuristic derived from current production share, not a firm supplier quote.
Design for substitution where feasible. Silicon has at least partial substitutes; specify them into next-generation products to cut the dependence structurally.
Hold strategic inventory / contract forward. For materials with no substitute and active export controls, a buffer stock or long-dated offtake converts a shock into a managed cost.
Run a live policy tripwire. Monitor MOFCOM, EU CRMA and the exporting jurisdictions for new measures on your materials, with a pre-agreed escalation if a licensing regime tightens — this register is that monitor.
Annex A · regulatory basis
CRMA Art. 24 compliance crosswalk
Under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (Reg. (EU) 2024/1252), a Member State identifies the large companies (Art. 2(29): >500 employees and >€150M net worldwide turnover) using strategic raw materials to manufacture a listed strategic technology (batteries, renewables, hydrogen, traction motors, heat pumps, aircraft, data-storage equipment, robotics, drones, satellites, advanced chips). Those companies must, at least every three years and to the extent the information is available to them (Art. 24(2)), assess their strategic-raw-material supply chain. Where suppliers do not provide the data on request, the assessment may rely on the Commission's monitoring dashboard (Art. 20(4)) or other publicly available information (Art. 24(3)) — which is the evidence base this report assembles. Board reporting (Art. 24(5)) is voluntary unless the Member State mandates it (Art. 24(6)).
The full crosswalkShowHide
CRMA provision
Obligation
Where addressed
Art. 24(1)
Member State identifies the company as in-scope (uses an SRM to make a listed strategic technology).
Scope & applicability
Art. 24(2)(a)
Map where the strategic raw materials are extracted, processed and recycled.
Exposure register + Supply-risk factor analysis
Art. 24(2)(b)
Analyse the factors that might affect supply.
Supply-risk factor analysis (factor matrix) + The laws that threaten it
Art. 24(2)(c)
Assess vulnerabilities to supply disruptions.
Stress test + significant-vulnerability conclusion
Art. 24(3)
Where supplier data is unavailable, rely on Commission (Art. 20(4)) / public sources.
This report's basis — see Methodology & sources
Art. 24(4)
Where significant vulnerabilities are found, assess diversifying or substituting.
Report results, sources, significant risks and mitigations to the board.
This document — board-ready, PDF-exportable
This report pre-fills the Art. 24(3) public-source half of the assessment. The company-specific inputs — employee/turnover thresholds, bill-of-materials volumes, the tiered supplier map, and formal board adoption — remain the company's to complete; they are flagged as “company input” where they appear.
Why this dependence is structural, not transitional. The EU's own external auditor — the European Court of Auditors, Special Report “Critical raw materials for the energy transition — Not a rock-solid policy” (Feb 2026) — judges the bloc's 2030 extraction, processing and recycling targets to be out of reach (recycling runs 1–5% for 7 of 26 materials, and diversification shows no measurable effect). A separate industry-analyst assessment (Adamas Intelligence & Tradium, EU CRMA report, Apr 2024 — an interested-party commercial view, not an independent verdict) reaches a compatible conclusion that the 2030 rare-earth targets will be missed without an expedited push. The chokepoint this report maps is therefore a durable constraint the Act has not yet closed, not a gap that resolves on its own.
Annex B · Art. 24(1) · Art. 2(29)
Scope & applicability
Article 24 applies only when both size thresholds are met and a Member State has identified the company as making a listed strategic technology with strategic raw materials.
Scope detailsShowHide
Threshold test
This assessment
Average employees (last FY) > 500
company input
Net worldwide turnover (last FY) > €150M
company input
Uses a strategic raw material as an input
Yes — 3 scored SRMs on the input side (binding: Silicon)
Manufactures a listed strategic technology
chemicals (confirm against Annex)
Formally identified by a Member State authority
company input
Evidence & sources
Production-concentration figures: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 + the production dataset behind each material page. Policy measures trace to the primary government sources below.
Each material's global supply-risk index blends five weighted factors: concentration of refining/processing (35%), active trade-control & policy pressure (25%), import reliance (15%), substitutability (15%), and price stress (10%). The buyer-relative score then scales the relational factors (concentration / policy / import) by this company's production-footprint alignment against each material's controlling country — bloc-neutral factors (substitutability, price) are left intact.
Caveats. The footprint is the company's assembly / manufacturing geography applied uniformly across all materials — a first-order proxy, not per-material input tracing. Scores are an analytical judgement on public data with a transparent weighting, not a market forecast or investment advice. Production shares reflect 2024-2025 figures and the policy position as of 2026-09-22; the register is continuously maintained and should be re-pulled against each new policy action.
Tip: the change log above defaults to the last 30 days. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date (e.g. ?since=2026-04-01).
Refresh SLA
New government measures — polled hourly; a filed action can appear on this report within the hour it's picked up.
Dossier verification (this company's exposure list, sourced against its own disclosures) — the auto-onboarded backlog drains on a 30-minute cycle; a specific company's upgrade timing depends on queue position, not a fixed date.
Live-quoted materials (currently: neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium, indium, tellurium — see the price row on each material's page) — refreshed daily.
Other material prices — hand-maintained; flagged STALE on the minerals index past 45 days without a fresh source, rather than left silently out of date.
This is a description of the actual automated pipeline (verifiable against this repo's own cron schedule), not a contractual commitment.