Morocco Investment Charter (Framework Law 03-22)

Mechanism

Framework Law 03-22 is a loi-cadre — a constitutional-rank framework statute setting strategic principles, leaving operational parameters to implementing decrees. The Investment Charter does five things:

1. Two-tier statutory support architecture. A "main" support mechanism (mécanisme principal) provides CAPEX subsidies up to 30% combining five stackable bonuses (sector-priority, regional/territorial, gender, sustainable, value-chain). A "specific" mechanism (mécanisme spécifique) targets strategic investment projects ≥ MAD 2bn (~USD 200m) meeting strategic-sector criteria (EV/batteries, semiconductors, green hydrogen, defence, pharma, water/energy/food/health priorities).

2. Bespoke State conventions for ≥ MAD 2bn projects. Strategic projects can negotiate fiscal, customs and exchange-control conventions directly with the State, separate from the main subsidy grid — the Argentina RIGI / Indonesia Danantara analog for Morocco.

3. Decentralised governance. Approval flows through the Comité National de l'Investissement chaired by the Head of Government, with regional investment centres (CRIs) handling project intake.

4. Goal: 2/3 private-sector investment by 2035. The Charter is explicitly designed to invert Morocco's historical public-investment dominance, targeting two-thirds of total fixed investment from private sources by 2035 — the same structural rebalancing being pursued by Saudi Vision 2030 and Indonesia's Danantara consolidation.

5. First overhaul of the 1995 regime. Replaces Loi-cadre 18-95 du 3 octobre 1995 (Charte des Investissements), in force for nearly 30 years and increasingly out of step with global industrial-policy norms.

The Charter is the legal backbone for Morocco's USD 10bn+ wave of announced 2023-2026 EV-battery / auto investments — Gotion High-Tech USD 6.5bn Kenitra battery gigafactory, COBCO Jorf Lasfar Li-ion materials plant, Tinci Materials electrolytes, plus Renault and Stellantis EV-assembly extensions. Morocco is positioning as Africa's auto-export hub serving EU (DCFTA), Africa (AfCFTA), Middle East and US (FTA) markets.

Downstream implications

• Battery-materials supply chain rerouting. Morocco offers

EU-aligned tariff regime + Chinese capital + low-cost labour + proximity to EU markets. Battery materials (cathode, electrolyte, precursor) and pack assembly increasingly route through Morocco, partially substituting for direct China-EU flows constrained by CBAM (2026-01-01-eu-cbam-definitive-phase) and EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation (2023-07-12-eu-foreign-subsidies-regulation).

• EV-OEM hedge against direct China imports to EU. Chinese OEMs

(BYD, Geely, etc.) considering Moroccan production as an alternative to direct-import strategies post-EU EV anti-subsidy measures.

• North-African industrial-policy convergence. Egypt's updated

Automotive Industry Strategy (2025-07-01) and Tunisia/Algeria electrification frameworks suggest a regional auto-electrification cluster forming in the Maghreb.

• EM horizontal investment-incentive regime cluster. Morocco

Charter joins Argentina RIGI (2024-07-08), Indonesia Danantara (2025-02-24), and Vietnam Decree 182 (2024-12-31) as the third-wave EM strategic-investment vehicles competing for global EV/battery/ semiconductor capex.

Open questions

• Exact effective date of Decree 2.23.1 in BO (publication date

vs. signature date) and whether subsequent amendments raise the MAD 2bn strategic threshold.

• Total CAPEX subsidies disbursed to date under the main mechanism

vs. the strategic mechanism — disclosure cadence is annual via the Comité National de l'Investissement reports.

• How the Charter interacts with Morocco's Industrial Acceleration

Plan (PAI) ecosystems and the upcoming VSME / SME support decree.

• Sustainability of the EU-Morocco DCFTA tariff-free routing if EU

CBAM (Phase 2) extends to battery cells and EVs — would erode Morocco's tariff-arbitrage value proposition.