US-Morocco Critical Minerals MoU (FORGE founding bilateral)

Mechanism

A non-binding intergovernmental MoU establishing a bilateral framework to:

• Cooperate on exploration, extraction, processing, refining, and

recycling of critical minerals and rare earths in Morocco.

• Channel US technical expertise and (separately, via FORGE

follow-on instruments — DFC, EXIM) project financing toward Moroccan downstream value-add capacity.

• Promote stable supply chains, fair-market practices, and

responsible-resource governance — the standard FORGE founding bilateral template language.

• Anchor Morocco's role as a non-China mineral-processing node in

the southern-Mediterranean / North-African geography, complementing existing OECD-side IMC activity that Morocco co-chaired in Istanbul (April 2026).

The MoU is one of eleven founding-member bilateral instruments signed at the inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial on 4 Feb 2026 alongside Argentina, Cook Islands, Ecuador, Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, UAE, UK, and Uzbekistan. Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita represented Morocco at the ministerial itself; the specific signatory of the Morocco MoU is not disclosed in the State Department press release.

Why severity 3

• Morocco controls **~70-75% of the world's known phosphate

reserves** (state-owned OCP Group is the dominant operator). Phosphate is the choke point for both global agricultural productivity (DAP/MAP fertilisers) and a parallel input into LFP-battery cathode chemistries via purified phosphoric acid. Western diversification of phosphate processing away from China (which is the dominant phosphoric-acid refiner) is a real strategic prize.

• Morocco is also a meaningful cobalt and copper producer (CTT/Bou

Azzer cobalt mine; Imiter, Akka silver-copper). Severity is held at 3 (vs. 4 for FORGE itself) because the MoU is non-binding and no DFC/EXIM Heads-of-Terms instrument has yet been published for Morocco, in contrast to the Uzbekistan track which had follow-on financing in 14 days.

• Severity could rise to 4 if a phosphate-processing or cobalt-

refining project receives concrete US-government financing under the FORGE umbrella, or if Morocco joins a price-floor / offtake-guarantee scheme.

Downstream implications

• Phosphate-axis competition with China. China is the largest

global phosphoric-acid refiner and largest LFP-cathode producer. A US-Morocco processing alliance would put a US-aligned alternate source of purified phosphoric acid into Western LFP supply chains — directly relevant to MP-Materials, IRA-compliant battery sourcing, and EV cost competitiveness.

• OCP Group as the de-facto counterparty. OCP is state-owned

but has US footprint (OCP North America, Florida) and JV/offtake history with US fertiliser distributors. The MoU likely flows through OCP rather than through a sovereign vehicle.

• Western Sahara legal-status risk. Significant Moroccan

phosphate is mined at Bou Craa in disputed Western Sahara territory. WSRW has already flagged this MoU; ESG-conscious Western buyers will need to navigate the source-of-origin question.

• OECD parallel track. Morocco co-chaired the OECD Forum on

Critical Minerals Supply Chains in Istanbul (April 2026), which formally elevates Morocco's status as a non-Chinese mineral governance interlocutor and complements the FORGE bilateral.

• EM resource-upstream capture pattern. Like the Philippines,

Indonesia (RKAB), and Zimbabwe trajectories, Morocco is positioning to climb the value chain via fiscal + framework policy. The 2022 Investment Charter (Law 03-22) is the domestic enabling instrument; the FORGE MoU is the external offtake / financing pathway.

Open questions

• Will a DFC + EXIM Heads of Terms follow (matching the

Uzbekistan / FORGE-signature pattern), and at what scale? OCP Group is large enough not to need DFC — the more interesting question is whether US offtake guarantees or strategic stockpile purchases (cf. EXIM Project Vault) reach Moroccan suppliers.

• Does the MoU explicitly cover phosphate, or only the

Energy-Act-2020 critical-minerals list? Phosphate is on the Department of Defense critical-minerals list but not the USGS critical-minerals list — coverage scope materially affects which US financing channels apply.

• Western Sahara — does the MoU specify territorial scope, or is

it deliberately ambiguous to accommodate the US 2020 recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara without provoking AU / Algerian counterclaims?

• How does this interact with Morocco's existing EU partnership

(Mineral Resource and Renewable Energy MoU, 2024) and with Chinese investment in Moroccan EV-battery supply chain (Gotion, BTR, CNGR Kenitra projects)?