US-China Geneva Joint Statement — 90-day mutual reciprocal-tariff truce (US suspends 24pp of additional duty leaving a 10% reciprocal rate plus 20% IEEPA-fentanyl stack on PRC goods; China mirrors with 24pp suspension leaving 10% on US goods; non-tariff countermeasures since 2 April 2025 also suspended)

Mechanism

The Geneva truce operates through three coordinated instruments:

1. US side — Executive Order 14298 (12 May 2025) modifies the country-specific reciprocal-tariff rate on PRC-origin goods set under EO 14257 (the April 2025 regime; separately filed as 2025-04-02-us-trump-reciprocal-tariff-regime) and the subsequent escalation EOs 14259 (raising the rate to 84%) and 14266 (raising it to 125%). EO 14298 suspends the 24 percentage points of additional duty for 90 days but retains the underlying 10% reciprocal rate. Effective for goods entered for consumption on or after 12:01 a.m. EDT, 14 May 2025.

2. China side — State Council Tariff Commission Announcement No. 4 of 2025 mirrors the US action: 24pp of additional retaliatory duty suspended (from 125% to 10%) on US-origin goods. China additionally suspended the broader package of non-tariff countermeasures imposed since 2 April 2025 (rare-earth-related export-licensing tightening, MOFCOM "unreliable-entity" designations, and unannounced MOFCOM investigations).

3. Sunset architecture — the suspension is explicitly 90 days from 14 May 2025, terminating 12 August 2025. Absent further action, the 24pp escalation would have automatically re-engaged. The August 2025 Stockholm joint statement and a follow-on "Further Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates" EO extended the truce; that extension is filed as a separate amendment row.

The 10% rate logged in tariff_rate_pct is the reciprocal-tariff delta added by EO 14298. With the 20% IEEPA-fentanyl tariff under EO 14195 still in force (and Section 301 stacks unchanged), the effective additional-duty burden on most Chinese imports during the truce window was ~30% — well below the 145%-equivalent peak that would have prevailed had EO 14266's 125% rate stuck through May.

Downstream implications

• MacroLens China composite — material risk-on event in May

2025: removed near-term tail-risk of a sustained 125% reciprocal rate (effectively a trade embargo) on PRC imports. China-beta ETFs (FXI, MCHI, KWEB) saw immediate gap-up on 12 May 2025.

• US semiconductor and capital-goods names — relief on China-

revenue line-items proportional to the 24pp duty removed. Subsequent Busan arrangement (Oct 2025) delivered the deeper package (Section 301 maritime pause, BIS affiliates-rule suspension, soybean commitments) that this Geneva truce fore-shadowed.

• Sets the precedent for the rolling-extension architecture

(90-day suspensions renewed at Stockholm in Aug 2025 and Busan in Oct 2025) — markets price these on tariff-cliff dates rather than on a one-off resolution.

• Severity 5 set on scope — this is the first formal

bilateral de-escalation of the April 2025 reciprocal regime and the structural template for all subsequent US-China tariff freezes; the directional sign is risk-positive but the regime-change weight is what drives the rating.

Open questions

• Did the truce explicitly cover Section 301 maritime / shipbuilding

countermeasures (filed as 2025-04-17-us-section-301-china-maritime-logistics-shipbuilding), or was that pause held back for the Busan package?

• Scope of the PRC non-tariff countermeasure suspension — the

Joint Statement is non-specific; need to cross-reference MOFCOM announcements 2025 No. 18 / No. 19 / No. 20 for the named unreliable-entity removals.

• Treatment of de-minimis low-value-import duties under the

parallel "Amendment to Reciprocal Tariffs and Updated Duties As Applied to Low-Value Imports From the PRC" (FR 2025-06378, 14 Apr 2025) — does Geneva touch the 30% / specific-rate alternative on de-minimis parcels, or is that left at its higher level?