US-Peru Critical Minerals MoU (FORGE founding bilateral)

Mechanism

A non-binding intergovernmental MoU establishing a bilateral framework to:

• Cooperate on exploration, extraction, processing, refining, and

recycling of critical minerals — with copper the centre of gravity given Peru's reserve base and operating scale, plus silver, zinc, tin, lead, molybdenum and gold across the broader Andean polymetallic complex.

• Channel US technical expertise and (separately, via FORGE

follow-on instruments — DFC, EXIM Project Vault) project financing toward Peruvian downstream value-add capacity, which remains underdeveloped despite Peru's upstream weight.

• Promote stable supply chains, fair-market practices, and

responsible-resource governance — the standard FORGE founding bilateral template language.

• Anchor Peru's role as the principal Latin American copper /

polymetallic node in a non-China-aligned supply chain — a particularly sensitive positioning given Chinese state ownership of three of Peru's largest copper assets (Las Bambas / MMG, Toromocho / Chinalco, Marcona / Shougang) and the recent inauguration of the Chancay megaport (Cosco).

The MoU is one of eleven founding-member bilateral instruments signed at the inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial on 4 Feb 2026 alongside Argentina, Cook Islands, Ecuador, Guinea, Morocco, Paraguay, Philippines, UAE, UK, and Uzbekistan. The Ministerial convened representatives of 54 countries and the European Commission.

Why severity 3

• Peru is the **world's #2 copper producer (~12% of global mined

supply, ~2.6 Mt/yr)**, a top-two silver producer (alternating with Mexico depending on year), the world's #2 zinc producer after China, and a leading source of tin (Minsur's San Rafael), molybdenum (copper byproduct), lead, and gold. For copper specifically — the unavoidable electrification metal — Peru is the single most important non-OECD diversification target after Chile and DRC.

• Severity is held at 3 (vs. 4 for FORGE itself) because the MoU

is non-binding and no DFC or EXIM Heads-of-Terms instrument has yet been published for Peru, in contrast to the Uzbekistan track which had follow-on financing in 14 days. Peru's mining-investment climate has also been impaired by multi-year community-conflict episodes (Las Bambas blockades, Tía María, Conga) which raises execution risk on any new US-aligned greenfield project.

• Severity could rise to 4 if a US-financed copper-smelting,

refining, or polymetallic-processing project lands in Peru under the FORGE umbrella, or if Peru is brought into a strategic-stockpile / offtake-guarantee instrument (e.g., EXIM Project Vault) for copper or silver.

Downstream implications

• China-overlap is unusually direct. Three of Peru's five

largest copper mines are Chinese-state-controlled: Las Bambas (MMG / CITIC / Guoxin), Toromocho (Chinalco), and Río Blanco (Zijin). Cosco's $3.6bn Chancay megaport (inaugurated Nov 2024) was explicitly framed by Beijing as a Pacific gateway for Andean mineral exports. A US-Peru framework directly contests Chinese physical control of Peruvian copper outflow — but cannot reverse existing concession structures, so the contest plays out at the margin (new projects, financing for non-Chinese operators, Chancay vs. Callao port routing).

• Copper-axis competition. US smelting capacity is structurally

short (only one operating primary copper smelter at Hayden / ASARCO post-2025). A bauxite-style "secure the resource, refine abroad" pathway is more realistic than US-onshoring of refining. Peru's existing smelters (Ilo / Southern Copper, La Oroya / Doe Run successor) are candidates for upgrade financing under the FORGE umbrella but have severe environmental legacy issues.

• Silver and the photovoltaic supply chain. Peru and Mexico

alternate as the world's largest silver producers; silver is a growing critical-minerals concern given PV-cell demand trajectories. The MoU brings Peruvian silver into the US-aligned column at the moment the Silver Institute and DOE are flagging structural deficit risk.

• Political-cycle risk. Peru has cycled through six presidents

in five years (Vizcarra, Sagasti, Castillo, Boluarte, ...); a 2026 general election is scheduled for April 2026 with unusually high candidate fragmentation. Continuity of the US-aligned posture across the next administration is not guaranteed — particularly if a left-coalition wins and revives resource-nationalism / royalty-revision proposals.

• Latin American FORGE cohort. Peru, Argentina (lithium /

copper), Ecuador (copper / gold), and Paraguay (titanium / rare earths exploration) form the Latin-America bloc of the FORGE founding eleven. Notably absent: Chile (copper / lithium #1), Brazil (rare earths / niobium), Mexico (silver), Bolivia (lithium) — each absent for different but politically legible reasons (Chile's left government and lithium-strategy preference for plurilateral frameworks; Brazil's Lula administration's BRICS-aligned posture; Mexico's USMCA-channel preference; Bolivia's MAS-era resource nationalism). The Peru inclusion is therefore the principal Latin-American copper win for FORGE.

Open questions

• Will a DFC + EXIM Heads of Terms follow (matching the

Uzbekistan / FORGE-signature pattern), and at what scale?

• Does the MoU cover copper-smelting / refining capacity inside

Peru, or only mining and offtake? The Ilo and La Oroya smelter complexes are the obvious candidates.

• How does Washington address the China-controlled copper

concessions (Las Bambas, Toromocho, Río Blanco) and the Chancay-port routing question? Are there any non-public side-arrangements on offtake-redirection or new-project preference for non-Chinese operators?

• How does the framework survive Peru's April 2026 general

election, which polling suggests will produce a fragmented congress and potentially a left-coalition presidency?

• Is silver explicitly within scope, given the divergence between

the USGS critical-minerals list (which historically excludes silver) and DOE / Silver Institute deficit warnings?

• Does the MoU intersect with the older Biden-era US-Peru

critical-minerals MoU (2024), and is the new framework a succession instrument or a parallel track under FORGE?