Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2673 actions· ✨ 90 recent

On 27 December 2025, Codelco and SQM formally closed NovaAndino Litio SpA, the 50:50 joint venture (with a golden share for state-owned Codelco) mandated by the 2023 National Lithium Strategy to bring the Salar de Atacama under state operational control. The vehicle is formed by merging Codelco's subsidiary Minera Tarar SpA with SQM's SQM Salar SpA, governed by a six-director board (three Codelco, three SQM), and runs until 2060 under a CORFO contract amendment that extends operations beyond SQM's previous 2030 lease expiry. SQM manages operations 2025-2030, Codelco from 2031 onward; the Chilean state captures up to ~70% of operating margins through 2030 and ~85% from 2031. As part of the closing, SQM transferred all of its mining concessions in the Salar de Maricunga to Codelco. President Boric and the Cabinet Económico formally endorsed the venture on 29 December 2025, when the first board meeting was held in Santiago.

The European Commission approved a €4.1 billion Hungarian state aid scheme (SA.120705) under Section 6.1 of the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF), authorising grants and tax advantages for strategic investments that add cleantech-manufacturing capacity across Hungary through 31 December 2030. Eligible activities cover net-zero technologies listed in Annex II of the CISAF — batteries, solar PV, wind turbines, electrolysers, heat pumps, and CCUS equipment — plus their main specific components and the production or recovery of related critical raw materials. The scheme is open to companies across the whole territory of Hungary and is the CISAF-era successor to Hungary's EUR 2.36 billion TCTF net-zero scheme (approved 2023-08-30, aid deadline 31 December 2025), which channelled the bulk of Chinese and Korean battery/EV-supply-chain FDI into the Debrecen–Szeged–Göd–Nyíregyháza industrial cluster.

Indonesia's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources issued Permen ESDM No. 17 of 2025 on procedures for preparing, submitting and approving Work Plans and Budgets (RKAB) and reporting of mineral and coal mining activities. Signed by Minister Bahlil Lahadalia on 30 September 2025 and in force from 3 October 2025, the regulation reverses the 2023 three-year RKAB cycle back to an annual cycle, requires all IUP/IUPK holders to resubmit through the new MinerbaOne digital portal between 1 October and 15 November each year, annuls previously-issued 2026/2027 quotas, and introduces a 5-working-day auto-approval rule. Operationalised by a 2026 nickel-ore RKAB target band of 250–270 million wmt — roughly one third below the 2025 approved quota of ~379 million wmt — explicitly framed as a price-management and conservation instrument. First clear use of the RKAB framework as an explicit market-management lever rather than a domestic-licensing tool.

H.R.1, the "One Big Beautiful Bill Act" (Public Law 119-21), was signed into law by President Trump on 4 July 2025. The budget-reconciliation statute is the single largest reversal of the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) industrial-policy framework: it accelerates the termination of IRA-era clean- energy tax credits and overlays a new "Foreign Entity of Concern" (FEOC) / "Prohibited Foreign Entity" (PFE) regime on the credits that survive. The §25E used-EV credit, the §30D new clean-vehicle credit, the §45W commercial clean-vehicle credit, and the §30C alternative-fuel-refueling-property credit terminate for vehicles or property placed in service after 30 September 2025. The §25C energy-efficient home improvement credit and the §25D residential clean-energy credit terminate for property placed in service after 31 December 2025. The §45Y clean-electricity production credit and §48E clean-electricity investment credit are eliminated for wind and solar facilities placed in service after 31 December 2027, with a safe harbour for projects whose construction begins on or before 4 July 2026. From 1 January 2026, projects beginning construction must satisfy "material assistance" thresholds limiting the share of components, subcomponents and critical minerals sourced from prohibited foreign entities (PRC, Russia, Iran, DPRK and entities controlled by them). For §45Y/§48E facilities the threshold starts at 40% non-PFE content in 2026 and steps up by 5 percentage points per year through 2030; for §45X advanced manufacturing PTC the analogous schedule begins at 50% in 2026 and rises through the decade. CBO scored the package's energy-credit terminations as generating roughly USD 280bn of revenue (gross), of which USD 77.4bn from §25D termination, USD 21.2bn from §25C, USD 77.8bn from §30D, USD 104.5bn from §45W, and USD 2bn from §30C, partially offsetting the bill's other tax cuts. The bill simultaneously re-authorises and broadens the §48D advanced manufacturing investment tax credit for semiconductor fabs, raising the credit rate from 25% to 35% for property placed in service after 31 December 2025 (preserving the CHIPS Act-aligned semiconductor leg of the IRA-era stack). The OBBBA therefore reshapes the IRA from a broad-based clean-energy + EV + manufacturing pull-through into a narrower, China-decoupling industrial policy concentrated on semiconductors and (residually) §45X battery / critical- mineral processing.

Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 28 Tahun 2025 tentang Penyelenggaraan Perizinan Berusaha Berbasis Risiko ("PP 28/2025") is the cross-sector business-licensing parent statute signed by President Prabowo Subianto on 5 June 2025, replacing PP 5/2021. It expands the Online Single Submission (OSS) risk-based licensing system to six new sectors (creative economy, geospatial information, cooperatives, investment, electronic system & transaction operators, environment), integrates environmental permitting (AMDAL/UKL-UPL) into OSS, and strengthens layered administrative sanctions. Appendix 1F operationalises a de-facto moratorium: the OSS platform now blocks new business-permit applications for intermediate-nickel production lines — nickel matte, mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP), nickel pig iron (NPI), and ferronickel — pushing investment toward higher-value Class-1 / battery-grade nickel sulphate and precursor chemistry. After a four-month grace period, OSS enforcement notifications began October–November 2025, prompting FINI (Indonesian Nickel Smelting Association) exemption petitions on behalf of partially-built projects.

Government Regulation No. 19 of 2025 on Types and Rates of Non-Tax State Revenue (PNBP) applicable to the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, signed by President Prabowo Subianto on 11 Apr 2025 and effective 26 Apr 2025 (15 working days after promulgation), revokes PP 26/2022 and replaces fixed mining royalty rates with a progressive tiered system anchored to international benchmark prices (HMA for nickel, HBA for coal). Headline shifts: nickel ore from fixed 10% to 14–19% by HMA tier; ferronickel 2% → 4–6%; nickel matte 2% → 3.5–5.5%; NPI 5% → 5–7%; copper cathode 2% → 4–7%; tin 3% → 3–10%; gold 3.75–10% → 7–16%; coal up to 13.5% at HBA >USD 90 for >5,200 kcal/kg grades. The regulation is the cornerstone fiscal lever of the Prabowo nickel-downstreaming/hilirisasi 2.0 strategy alongside RKAB-quota tightening that cut national nickel quotas from 272m to 150m tonnes for 2025.

On 24 February 2025 President Prabowo Subianto launched Badan Pengelola Investasi Daya Anagata Nusantara (Danantara), Indonesia's new state investment-management agency, consolidating around USD 900bn–1tn of Indonesian state-owned-enterprise assets — including Pertamina, PLN, Bank Mandiri, BRI, BNI, Telkom, MIND ID, Antam and Inalum — into a single super-holding modelled on Singapore's Temasek. Danantara was created by the Third Amendment to the BUMN Law (Law No. 1 of 2025, enacted 24 February 2025) and Government Regulation No. 10 of 2025 on its organisation and governance, with board appointments formalised by Presidential Regulation No. 30 of 2025. The agency reports directly to the President, bypassing the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises, and is mandated to deploy SOE balance-sheet capacity into Prabowo's 8% growth target via co-investment in mineral downstreaming, refinery and EV-battery build-out, food security, and semiconductor / data-centre infrastructure.