Loading…
Loading…
Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
Japan's Diet passed the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) 2026 Amendment on 29 May 2026; the law was promulgated on 5 June 2026. The amendment represents the most significant overhaul of Japan's inbound FDI screening regime since FEFTA was first applied to national-security transactions in 2019. Three structural additions: (1) indirect-acquisition screening — extends mandatory prior-notification to acquisitions of Japanese sensitive-sector companies effected through intermediate holding structures or offshore parent vehicles, closing the principal gap exploited by Chinese and GCC SWF investors via SPV chains; (2) call-in powers — grants the Minister of Finance authority to open a review up to ten years retroactively where an acquisition was not pre-notified or where circumstances have materially changed since clearance, directly analogous to CFIUS § 721(b)(1)(D) retroactive jurisdiction; (3) cross-ministerial "Japan CFIUS" consultation framework — formally institutionalises a standing inter-agency committee (Finance, METI, MoD, NPA, MIAC) modelled on the US CFIUS committee, replacing the prior ad-hoc inter-ministerial process. Cross-ministerial and indirect-acquisition provisions entered into force immediately on promulgation (5 June 2026); remaining Cabinet-Order-level implementing provisions to follow within one year.
On 10 November 2025 the European Commission conditionally approved, under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2022/2560), the c. €14.7bn acquisition of German polymer and polyurethane producer Covestro AG by Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). The Phase II investigation identified foreign-subsidy distortions including an unlimited UAE State guarantee covering ADNOC and a committed capital increase by ADNOC's state-backed parent into Covestro. To clear the transaction, ADNOC committed to remove the State guarantee, Covestro committed to maintain existing R&D cooperation agreements with EU competitors, and Covestro committed to license its present and future sustainability-related patents (c. 200 patents) to qualifying EU market participants on pre-established transparent terms for ten years. This is the second-ever FSR Phase II conditional clearance (after the September 2024 e&/PPF Telecom decision) and the first FSR remedy package to deploy sustainability-IP licensing as a structural commitment.
On 24 September 2024 the European Commission issued its first-ever final decision under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2022/2560), conditionally approving (Case FS.100011) the acquisition of PPF Telecom Group B.V. by Emirates Telecommunications Group Company PJSC (e&, majority-owned by the Emirates Investment Authority, Abu Dhabi). The Commission found that e& received prohibited foreign subsidies — principally an unlimited state guarantee via the EIA and preferential financing instruments — that risked post-transaction competitive distortion within the EU's five-country PPF footprint (Czechia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia, Slovakia; 10+ million subscribers). Conditions imposed require e& to remove the unlimited state guarantee, prohibit financing PPF's EU operations from EIA or e& group treasury, and mandate notification of future EU acquisitions above the FSR thresholds. The non-confidential version of the decision was published 4 April 2025.