Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2666 actions· ✨ 90 recent

In a final rule published at 89 FR 84766 (FR Doc 2024-23932), the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove BIS licence requirements on certain spacecraft and related items — including remote-sensing spacecraft and on-orbit servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (OSAM) items — for exports and reexports to Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The rule is effective immediately on publication (23 October 2024) and is part of a three-rule package modernising the US space-related export-control regime (companion IFR 2024-23958 broadens controls relief for ~40 additional destinations; companion proposed rule 2024-23975 floats a new License Exception Commercial Space Activities). The AU/CA/UK carve-out builds on the trilateral National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) framework.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 68544; FR Doc 2024-19130) added 123 entities under 131 entries to the Entity List with destinations Russia (63), China (42), Iran (11), Turkey (8), and one each in Canada, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Crimea Region of Ukraine, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish and other third-country firms (e.g., MAK Logistics, Megatek Ltd., Wellgo International, AllChips Limited, Chipgoo Electronics) named for supplying U.S.-origin electronics and dual-use items to Russian industry and military, plus designation of large numbers of Russian military manufacturers (e.g., JSC 75 Arsenal, FSE Aleksinsky Chemical Plant) as military end users. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy/presumption of denial; case-by-case for EAR99 food and medicine to certain Russian military end users. Effective on publication 2024-08-27.

Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (89 FR 14403, Doc 2024-03674) adding two entities under seven entries to the Entity List, effective February 27, 2024. Sandvine Incorporated, a Canadian deep packet inspection vendor, is listed across six destinations (Canada, India, Japan, Malaysia, Sweden, UAE) because it supplies DPI technology to the Government of Egypt where it is used for mass web-monitoring and censorship. Chengdu Beizhan Electronics Co., Ltd. is listed under China for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items on behalf of the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (UESTC), a PLA-affiliated institution already on the Entity List. All items subject to the EAR require a license with a presumption-of-denial review policy for both entities. The rule also revises entries for two existing Chinese entities and removes one UAE entry.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 10 entities under 13 destination entries to the Entity List, effective February 24, 2023. The additions span three groups: (1) five Chinese entities operating in the commercial satellite and dual-use space sector — most notably Spacety Co., Ltd. and China HEAD Aerospace Technology Co., both suspected of supplying satellite imagery and space technology in support of the Russian military in Ukraine; (2) two Canadian procurement intermediaries (CPUNTO Inc. and Electronic Network Inc.) facilitating illicit acquisition of US-origin controlled items; and (3) three Russian defense-industrial procurement companies supplying the Russian military. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a policy of denial, except EAR99 food and medicine which receive case-by-case review.

Canada amended the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations via SOR/2022-102, registered 18 May 2022, adding Schedule 6 (luxury goods) and Schedule 7 (goods usable in weapons production/manufacturing) to the list of items prohibited for export to, and in Schedule 6's case also import from, Russia. Both schedules took effect 60 days after registration (17 July 2022). Schedule 6 covers luxury alcohol, tobacco, textiles, footwear, clothing, jewellery, kitchenware, art, and some machinery; Schedule 7 covers raw materials (including tungsten and aluminium), pumps, vehicle parts, construction equipment, watercraft, and medical/dental/surgical equipment. The regulation also added 14 individuals to the Schedule 1 asset-freeze list.

Canada amended the Special Economic Measures (Belarus) Regulations via SOR/2022-075, registered and in force 5 April 2022, in response to Belarus's support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The amendment prohibits any person in Canada and any Canadian outside Canada from providing insurance, reinsurance or underwriting services for aviation and aerospace products owned, controlled, registered to, chartered by or operated by Belarus or a Belarusian person. A new section 3.6 separately establishes export prohibitions on goods and technologies listed on a Belarus Restricted Goods and Technologies List, incorporated by reference, aligning Canada's Belarus measures with its parallel Russia export-control regime. The same instrument added nine individuals (Belarusian oligarchs and defence officials) to the Schedule 1 asset-freeze list, outside this action's scope.

Canada amended the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations via SOR/2022-067, registered and in force 24 March 2022, establishing a new "Restricted Goods and Technologies List" and prohibiting any person in Canada, and any Canadian outside Canada, from exporting, selling, supplying or shipping any listed good or technology to Russia or to any person in Russia. The list is maintained and published separately by Global Affairs Canada and covers items with dual civilian/military applications across electronics, computers, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation and avionics, marine, aerospace and transportation equipment.

The Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding 34 entities under 43 entries to the Entity List, effective July 12, 2021. The largest cluster — 14 Chinese entities — comprises suppliers of surveillance infrastructure enabling the Chinese government's human-rights abuses in Xinjiang, including video analytics firms, network equipment makers, and geolocation platforms deployed in the Uyghur Region. Six Russian individuals and entities were added for participation in military procurement networks acquiring US-origin electronics and components in violation of the EAR. Additional listings cover Iran sanctions evaders (Canada, Lebanon), a UAE-based nuclear-proliferation facilitator, and one entity elevated from the Unverified List to the Entity List under China. All items subject to the EAR require a BIS licence to export, re-export, or transfer in-country to the listed parties, with a presumption-of-denial review policy.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 47 entities across 51 entries to the EAR Entity List effective 22 September 2020, covering entities in China, Hong Kong, Iran, Pakistan, Canada, Malaysia, Oman, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, and the UK. All 47 entities were determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests. For 39 of the 47 entities BIS imposed a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a presumption-of-denial review policy; the remaining eight face case-by-case review. The round targeted Iranian dual-use procurement networks, Chinese military-affiliated research institutes, and Pakistan-linked proliferators, reinforcing the layered export-control perimeter across multiple adversary programs simultaneously.