Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2675 actions· ✨ 91 recent

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 42 entities under 44 entries to the Entity List, effective December 7, 2023. The majority — 28 entities in Russia — are sanctioned for procuring or contracting on behalf of Russia's defense sector, including avionics, military-grade drones, and military electronics. Fourteen additional entities across Armenia, Belarus, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, China, and the UAE were added for operating diversion and transshipment networks that supply U.S.-origin items to Russian military end-users. All listed entities face a license requirement for all EAR-controlled items with a presumption of denial.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 49 entities under 52 entries to the Entity List, effective October 11, 2023. The bulk of additions — 42 of 49 — are Chinese entities determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests, predominantly for supplying US-origin integrated circuits to Russian defense-sector consignees after March 1, 2023 in violation of export controls. Remaining entities span Estonia, Finland, Germany, India, Turkey, UAE, and the United Kingdom and were designated on similar Russia-diversion or end-use violation grounds. All listed parties face a license requirement for all EAR-subject items, reviewed under a presumption of denial.

BIS added 28 entities to the EAR Entity List across seven countries, targeting four distinct threat clusters: a Russia GRU/UAV diversion network spanning China, Finland, Germany, and Russia; an Iran Shahed-series UAV procurement chain operating through Chinese front companies (designated under the Russia/Belarus Military End User FDP Rule); Pakistan-linked suppliers procuring for unsafeguarded nuclear activities; and two Oman-based entities supporting Yemen's Houthi forces. Russia's dominant titanium producer VSMPO-AVISMA was also added as a military end user. One Chinese entity (Zhejiang Perfect New Material) was simultaneously removed from the Military End User List.

On 9 August 2023 the German Federal Cabinet adopted the government draft Wirtschaftsplan 2024 of the Climate and Transformation Fund (Klima- und Transformationsfonds, KTF) and the accompanying 2024–2027 financial plan. The plan envisaged ca. EUR 211.8 bn of programme spending across 2024–2027 (EUR 57.6 bn in 2024 alone), funded by national and European emissions-trading revenues plus federal grants, with major lines for semiconductor production (~EUR 4.0 bn in 2024), hydrogen industry build-out (~EUR 3.8 bn), building renovation (~EUR 18.9 bn), EEG renewables support (~EUR 12.6 bn) and electric mobility. The KTF is the principal German federal vehicle for co-financing the EU Chips Act state-aid envelope, IPCEI Hydrogen, decarbonisation contracts (Klimaschutzverträge) and other net-zero-aligned industrial-policy subsidies.

The German Federal Cabinet adopted the Fortschreibung (update) of the 2020 Nationale Wasserstoffstrategie on 26 July 2023, led by BMWK (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action). The update doubles Germany's domestic electrolyser-capacity target from 5 GW to at least 10 GW by 2030, sets a hydrogen-demand target of 95–130 TWh/year by 2030 (rising to 360–500 TWh by 2045), and lays out a four-pillar framework covering supply (domestic + import diversification), infrastructure (H2-Kernnetz core network), demand (industrial decarbonisation + heavy-mobility), and the action framework (€18 bn KTF allocation, IPCEI Hy2Tech/Hy2Use, H2Global double-auction import mechanism, Klimaschutzverträge/carbon contracts for difference). It is the parent authority for subsequent instruments including the H2-Beschleunigungsgesetz and the Oct 2024 Bundesnetzagentur approval of the Wasserstoff-Kernnetz.