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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
On 9 September 2026 the UK Export Control Joint Unit published Notice to Exporters 2026/19, revoking and replacing the Open General Licence (Global Combat Air Programme) and issuing a new Open General Export Licence for "de minimis" exports under the UK-France-Germany-Spain Agreement on Defence Export Controls (published 10 December 2025). The new OGEL implements the Agreement's de-minimis principle: where UK-origin content does not exceed 20% of the value of a final defence system integrated by France, Germany or Spain, re-export/re-transfer authorisation is granted without case-by-case licensing, subject to a national-security carve-out. Both licences remove individual application requirements for a defined category of collaborative defence-programme exports rather than introducing new restrictions.
The UK Department of Health and Social Care added Co-codamol (30mg/500mg, all formulations) to its list of medicines that cannot be parallel-exported from the UK or hoarded, effective 28 January 2026. DHSC had issued a medicine supply warning for co-codamol 30mg/500mg on 12 January 2026, projecting limited supply into at least early June 2026. The restriction is issued under regulation 43(2) of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012; breach constitutes a wholesale dealer licence violation enforceable by the MHRA with licence suspension.
The UK Department of Health and Social Care added Aspirin (all strengths and forms) and Ifosfamide (1g/2g powder for solution for injection vials, a chemotherapy agent) to its list of medicines that cannot be parallel-exported from the UK or hoarded, effective 17 January 2026. Pharmacy trade press reported the addition followed manufacturing delays and raw- ingredient shortages that had left UK pharmacies short of aspirin stock. The restriction is issued under regulation 43(2) of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012; breach constitutes a wholesale dealer licence violation enforceable by the MHRA with licence suspension.
The UK Export Control (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2025 (SI 2025/1197) entered into force on 16 December 2025, extending the UK's strategic export control regime to cover quantum computing hardware (ECCN-aligned 4A506), advanced and cryogenic semiconductor technologies (3A501, 3A504, 3B501), and associated software and technology categories. The regulations also transfer existing national controls on quantum and advanced semiconductor items from the Export Control Order 2008 into the UK's assimilated Dual-Use Regulation (retained EU 428/2009 as amended), harmonising the UK's dual-use schedule with Wassenaar Arrangement 2024 updates. The action is explicitly calibrated as "Wassenaar Minus One" — aligning UK controls with the US BIS (EAR / ECCN framework) and EU (Regulation 2021/821 as amended) without requiring multilateral consensus on each item. It is the first UK statutory instrument since Brexit to add substantial new technology-specific dual-use controls targeting advanced semiconductor and quantum capabilities.
The UK Department of Health and Social Care updated its list of medicines that cannot be parallel-exported from the UK or hoarded, adding Nelarabine (250mg/50ml solution for infusion vials, used in leukaemia/lymphoma treatment) and removing ten products including Atracurium, Cisatracurium and Erythromycin, effective 6 November 2025. The restriction is issued under regulation 43(2) of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 to protect domestic patient supply; breach constitutes a wholesale dealer licence violation enforceable by the MHRA with licence suspension. This is one of the DHSC's routine multi-times-per-year revisions to a standing list rather than a one-off policy action.
Qatar's Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) issued Circular No. (3) of 2025, barring car dealerships, showrooms and other commercial exporters from re-exporting new vehicles that have not completed at least one year of domestic registration. The measure targets re-export arbitrage by dealers that was reducing new-car availability and pushing up prices in the local market; authorised dealers and vehicles bought for personal use are exempt. MoCI subsequently adopted, in coordination with the General Authority of Customs (GAC), an executive mechanism clarifying that vehicles imported from a country other than the manufacturing country (and therefore outside Qatar's manufacturer-allocation quota) may still be re-exported.
The UK Department of Health and Social Care added five tuberculosis-treatment antimicrobials to its list of medicines that cannot be parallel-exported from the UK or hoarded, effective 17 July 2025: Rifampicin capsules/powder and solvent for infusion (all strengths), Pyrazinamide 500mg tablets, Rifampicin + Isoniazid 300mg/150mg tablets, Rifampicin + Isoniazid + Pyrazinamide 120mg/50mg/300mg tablets, and Voractiv tablets (all strengths). The restriction is issued under regulation 43(2) of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012; breach constitutes a wholesale dealer licence violation enforceable by the MHRA with licence suspension.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 18 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 5. Of the 18 additions, 5 are under China, 6 under Finland, 3 under Türkiye, 2 under Kazakhstan, 1 under Italy, and 1 under the United Kingdom — a geographic distribution dominated by Russia-adjacent diversion corridors. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends use of EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a UVL Statement before exporting any item subject to the EAR. The rule was published and effective the same day, 25 April 2025 (90 FR 17339).
In a final rule published at 89 FR 84766 (FR Doc 2024-23932), the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove BIS licence requirements on certain spacecraft and related items — including remote-sensing spacecraft and on-orbit servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (OSAM) items — for exports and reexports to Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The rule is effective immediately on publication (23 October 2024) and is part of a three-rule package modernising the US space-related export-control regime (companion IFR 2024-23958 broadens controls relief for ~40 additional destinations; companion proposed rule 2024-23975 floats a new License Exception Commercial Space Activities). The AU/CA/UK carve-out builds on the trilateral National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) framework.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 55033; FR Doc 2024-14635) added six entries to the Entity List under the destinations of the People's Republic of China (2), South Africa (1), the United Arab Emirates (2), and the United Kingdom (1). The two PRC-based entries (Global Training Solutions Limited; Smartech Future Limited) were added for ties to an existing Entity List party and for training elements of the PRC military. The two UAE-based entries (Mega Fast Cargo LLC; Mega Technique General Trading) were added for repeated dilatory or evasive conduct during BIS end-use checks, including the provision of false, misleading, or incomplete information. The South Africa and United Kingdom entries were added for shipping or attempting to ship US export-controlled items to Russia in violation of EAR controls. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy of presumption of denial. The rule is effective on publication, 2024-07-03.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding three Kaspersky entities to the Entity List under End-User Review Committee (ERC) determinations — AO Kaspersky Lab (Moscow), OOO Kaspersky Group (Moscow), and Kaspersky Labs Limited (London). All three are designated for cooperation with Russian military and intelligence authorities in support of Russian government cyber-intelligence objectives. Exports, reexports, and in-country transfers of all items subject to the EAR to the three entities now require a BIS licence reviewed under a policy of presumption of denial, with no licence exceptions available. The action is paired with a same-week Commerce ICTS final determination prohibiting Kaspersky cybersecurity and anti-virus software transactions in the United States.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (IFR) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove list-based license requirements — including National Security Column 1 (NS1), Regional Stability Column 1 (RS1) and Missile Technology Column 1 (MT1) reasons-for-control — for exports, reexports and in-country transfers to or within Australia and the United Kingdom. The IFR also expands the availability of license exceptions and reduces the scope of end-use and end-user-based license requirements for the two AUKUS partners, while leaving firearms-related items (Crime Control / CC) and a narrow set of other ECCNs untouched. The rule is the EAR-side companion to a parallel DDTC proposed rule creating an ITAR §126.7 exemption for defense articles and services traded among authorised AU/UK/US users, and is the foundational regulatory implementation of the AUKUS Pillar 2 advanced-capability cooperation track.
The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations 2023 (SI 2023/1364) amend the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 to prohibit UK persons from acquiring, importing, supplying or delivering listed Russian-origin metals and metal articles, delivering the Prime Minister's commitment to ban Russian copper, nickel and aluminium. Per law-firm summaries the list (a new Schedule 3BA) also covers lead, zinc, tin, tungsten, molybdenum, tantalum, magnesium, cobalt, antimony, manganese and further metals, and most provisions took effect on 15 December 2023 with a grace period for cargoes consigned before that date.
On 8 December 2023 the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a direct final rule (88 FR 85479; FR Doc 2023-26532) making two export-liberalisation amendments to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). First, BIS removes Chemical and Biological Weapons (CB) proliferation column controls from the Commerce Country Chart for exports of certain pathogens and toxins (ECCNs 1C351, 1C353, and 1C354) when destined to Australia Group (AG) member countries, on the basis that AG members operate equivalent domestic CBW-export controls. Second, the rule revises the Crime Control and Detection (CC) column entries for Austria, Finland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland, reflecting the updated US assessment of those countries' law-enforcement export-control standards. Both changes are effective on publication and reduce US export-licensing burdens for allied-country destinations without altering controls for non-allied markets.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 49 entities under 52 entries to the Entity List, effective October 11, 2023. The bulk of additions — 42 of 49 — are Chinese entities determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests, predominantly for supplying US-origin integrated circuits to Russian defense-sector consignees after March 1, 2023 in violation of export controls. Remaining entities span Estonia, Finland, Germany, India, Turkey, UAE, and the United Kingdom and were designated on similar Russia-diversion or end-use violation grounds. All listed parties face a license requirement for all EAR-subject items, reviewed under a presumption of denial.
BIS published a final rule adding 43 entities under 50 entries to the EAR Entity List and removing one entity (Fiber Optic Solutions, Latvia), effective June 12, 2023. The additions span ten countries — China (31 entities), UAE (5), Pakistan (4), South Africa (3), UK (2), and one each in Kenya, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand — targeting four principal threat clusters: China's military modernization and hypersonic-weapons supply chain, an international network of flight-training academies (TFASA and affiliates) providing Western pilot training to Chinese military personnel, Pakistan-linked procurement for unsafeguarded ballistic-missile programs, and UAE/South Africa-based dual-use diversion networks. All listed entities require a BIS licence, with most subject to a presumption of denial.
The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 36 entities under 41 entries to the Entity List, effective June 28, 2022. The entities — located across China, Lithuania, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, the UAE, the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam — were designated for acting contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. Key grounds include support for China's military modernization and AI-enabled surveillance programs, Pakistan-based proliferation concerns, and supply-chain facilitation for Russia amid the Ukraine invasion. The rule also revised eleven existing entries (Belarus, China, Russia, Slovakia) and corrected one entry (Pakistan).
The UK government announced on 15 March 2022 that it would ban the export of high-end luxury goods to Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine. The measure was implemented via new regulation 46B of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, inserted by the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 8) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/452), which was made on 13 April 2022 and came into force at 5pm on 14 April 2022. Regulation 46B prohibits the export, supply, or making available of luxury goods to, or for use in, Russia, covering goods with a sales price over £250 (excluding VAT) and vehicles over £42,000, spanning high-end fashion, works of art, jewellery, and vehicles, subject to licensing exceptions in Part 7.
The Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 91 entities (across 96 entries) to the Entity List under 15 CFR Part 744, in direct response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The listed entities span ten destinations — Belize, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Malta, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, and the United Kingdom — and include Russian military research institutes, shipbuilding facilities, aerospace and electronics manufacturers, and suspected front companies in third countries used to circumvent EAR controls. A license is required for all items subject to the EAR; the review policy is denial for 86 entities and case-by-case (for US Government-supported space programs) for five.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 47 entities across 51 entries to the EAR Entity List effective 22 September 2020, covering entities in China, Hong Kong, Iran, Pakistan, Canada, Malaysia, Oman, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, and the UK. All 47 entities were determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests. For 39 of the 47 entities BIS imposed a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a presumption-of-denial review policy; the remaining eight face case-by-case review. The round targeted Iranian dual-use procurement networks, Chinese military-affiliated research institutes, and Pakistan-linked proliferators, reinforcing the layered export-control perimeter across multiple adversary programs simultaneously.