Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2667 actions· ✨ 89 recent

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 87261; FR Doc 2024-25411) added 40 entities under 42 entries plus four addresses to the Entity List under the destinations China (11), India (5), Malaysia (2), Russia (13), Singapore (1), and Turkey (14), and modified 52 existing entries across China, Estonia, Finland, India, Turkey, the UAE and the UK. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish, Indian, Malaysian and Singaporean entities listed for transshipping controlled US-origin items to Russian defense end users; the 13 Russia entries cover chemical and biological warfare R&D and defense procurement networks. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with a policy/presumption of denial; four China addresses get the narrower "CCL + EAR99 supp. 7" scope. Effective on publication 2024-11-01.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 8 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 2. Of the 8 additions, 3 are under China, 2 under Germany, 1 under Pakistan, and 2 under Türkiye. Of the 2 removals, 1 is under Saudi Arabia and 1 under China. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before exporting any item subject to the EAR. The rule was published and effective the same day, 16 October 2024 (89 FR 83428, FR Doc 2024-23638).

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 68544; FR Doc 2024-19130) added 123 entities under 131 entries to the Entity List with destinations Russia (63), China (42), Iran (11), Turkey (8), and one each in Canada, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Crimea Region of Ukraine, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish and other third-country firms (e.g., MAK Logistics, Megatek Ltd., Wellgo International, AllChips Limited, Chipgoo Electronics) named for supplying U.S.-origin electronics and dual-use items to Russian industry and military, plus designation of large numbers of Russian military manufacturers (e.g., JSC 75 Arsenal, FSE Aleksinsky Chemical Plant) as military end users. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy/presumption of denial; case-by-case for EAR99 food and medicine to certain Russian military end users. Effective on publication 2024-08-27.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 8. Additions are under five destinations: China (8), Türkiye (2), Cyprus (1), Kyrgyzstan (1), and the United Arab Emirates (1). Removals span China (6), UAE (1) and Russia (1). The single Russian entry (EFO Ltd.) was removed from the UVL because BIS simultaneously moved it to the Entity List, allowing BIS to delete Russia entirely as a UVL destination. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before exporting items subject to the EAR. Published and effective the same day, 3 July 2024 (89 FR 55036, FR Doc 2024-14642).

On 2 May 2024 Türkiye's Ministry of Trade announced that all export, import and transit transactions with Israel, covering all product groups, were halted, as the second phase after the 9 April 2024 restriction on 54 product groups. Customs declarations naming Israel as country of shipment, destination or origin are no longer registered. The ministry stated the halt stays in force until Israel declares a ceasefire in Gaza and allows uninterrupted humanitarian aid access.

On 9 April 2024, Türkiye's Ministry of Trade restricted exports of 1,019 tariff lines across 54 product groups to Israel — including cement, marble, sulphur, aluminium wire, ceramics, varnishes and mineral fertilisers — in response to Israel's conduct of the Gaza war and its refusal of a Turkish request to participate in aid airdrops. The government stated the restriction would remain in force until Israel declared an immediate ceasefire and allowed unimpeded humanitarian aid into Gaza. The measure was superseded three weeks later, on 2 May 2024, when the Ministry halted all exports, imports and transit trade with Israel across every product category.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 14385; FR Doc 2024-03969; Docket 240215-0050; RIN 0694-AJ54) added 93 entities under 95 entries to the Entity List, effective 23 February 2024, with destinations Russia (63), Turkey (16), China (8), UAE (4), Kyrgyzstan (2), India (1), and South Korea (1). The dominant rationale is enforcement of Russia-diversion controls: 46 Russian defense manufacturers are designated as military end users acquiring US-origin items for Russia's armed forces, five Chinese entities (including Dennex Enterprises Limited and Shenzhen Speed Industrial Materials Co.) are cited for facilitating diversion of controlled microelectronics to Russia, and 16 Turkish firms are cited as procurement hubs obtaining US-origin items of importance to Russia's war effort. Four UAE entities are designated for transshipment networks serving both Russia and Iran. All entities are subject to a presumption of denial for EAR-controlled items; Russian military end users are additionally subject to the Russia/Belarus FDP rule (15 CFR 734.9(g)).