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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
President Trump signed Executive Order "Ending Certain Tariff Actions" on 20 February 2026 (Federal Register doc 2026-03832, published 25 February 2026), terminating the additional ad-valorem duties imposed under nine prior IEEPA-based executive orders. The order followed within hours of the US Supreme Court's 6-3 decision the same day in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. ___ (2026), holding that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorize the President to impose tariffs and vacating the Trump 2.0 IEEPA tariff regime. The EO directs CBP to cease collection "as soon as practicable"; CSMS guidance set the collection-end date at 12:00 a.m. eastern on 24 February 2026. The order explicitly preserves all underlying national-emergency declarations and all non-IEEPA trade actions — Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, Section 301 of the Trade Act, Section 122 of the Trade Act, and Section 201 — so the Section 232 cascade and the paired Section 122 10% temporary surcharge (effective 24 Feb 2026) remain in force. This is the first SCOTUS-driven repeal of a presidential tariff regime in the modern era and recalibrates the entire post-2024 US tariff architecture by removing IEEPA as a legal pillar.
President Trump signed a Presidential Proclamation on 20 February 2026 invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2132) to impose a temporary 10% ad-valorem import surcharge on articles imported into the United States, effective 12:01 a.m. EST on 24 February 2026. The proclamation was issued within hours of the US Supreme Court's 20 February 2026 ruling in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, which held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the president to set tariffs and vacated the IEEPA-based reciprocal-tariff regime previously in effect. The Section 122 surcharge is statutorily limited to 150 days (terminates 24 July 2026 absent Congressional extension) and the statute caps any such surcharge at 15% ad valorem. Goods qualifying as USMCA originating from Canada or Mexico are exempt; CAFTA-DR textile/apparel articles meeting specified rules of origin are exempt; and a substantial product-exception list excludes critical minerals, energy products, certain pharmaceuticals, electronics, vehicles, aerospace products, specified agricultural goods, and goods already subject to Section 232 duties (the Section 122 duty does not stack on Section 232).
On 9 February 2026 the UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) published a comprehensively revised enforcement and monetary-penalties guidance following its July–October 2025 public consultation. The update introduces a Settlement Scheme (20% penalty discount for subjects who agree not to contest OFSI's findings within 30 business days), an Early Account Scheme (up to 20% discount for legal persons providing a timely senior-attested factual account), a revised voluntary-disclosure framework (maximum discount cut from 50% to 30% and renamed to cover both prompt self-reporting and full cooperation), a four-level case-assessment seriousness matrix (severity × conduct), and fixed monetary penalties of £5,000 and £10,000 for information, reporting, and licensing offences. A planned legislative amendment (requiring primary legislation) will subsequently double the statutory civil monetary-penalty cap from £1m / 50%-of-breach to £2m / 100%-of-breach; in the interim the Policing and Crime Act 2017 caps remain in force. The revised guidance is the foundational enforcement architecture for all UK financial-sanctions programs (Russia, Iran, DPRK, Syria, Belarus, Myanmar, and 10+ additional regimes).
Innovate UK (part of UKRI) opened the Growth Catalyst - Investor Partnerships Round 2 competition on 10 December 2025, allocating a minimum of £100 million in grant funding to UK-registered SMEs at seed-to-Series-A stage. Grants (60-70% of project costs for feasibility and industrial-research projects; 35-45% for experimental development) must be matched by private investment from an Innovate UK-approved investor partner, ranging from an equal match to double the grant amount depending on project category. Applicants must align with one of the priority sectors named in the UK's Modern Industrial Strategy ("Invest 2035"): advanced manufacturing, clean energy, digital and technologies, defence, creative industries, life sciences, or the Battery Innovation Programme. The competition closes 3 February 2026.
The Department for Business and Trade, with DSIT, published "Vision 2035: Critical Minerals Strategy" on 22 November 2025 — the UK's first dedicated critical-minerals strategy under the Starmer government, superseding the withdrawn 2022 strategy. DBT commits up to GBP 50 million for new critical mineral projects on top of GBP 165 million in existing support, with the National Wealth Fund providing equity backing (Cornish Lithium GBP 24m in 2023 plus a further GBP 31m commitment in 2025; Cornish Metals GBP 28.6m in 2025; South Crofty Tin GBP 26.8m). Sets 2035 targets of 10% of UK industrial demand from domestic production (extraction + processing + refining), 20% from recycling, and a hard floor of 50,000 tonnes lithium carbonate equivalent produced domestically. Strategy is consciously midstream-and-recycling-tilted rather than upstream-extraction race; pillars are (i) optimise domestic production, (ii) resilient global supply networks via partnerships with US, EU, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia, India, Japan (plus Kazakhstan rhenium/vanadium and continued China engagement), (iii) circular economy / recycling, (iv) responsible supply chains.
The UK Department of Health and Social Care, delivered via Innovate UK, awarded more than GBP 54 million in government funding across eight R&D projects on 18 November 2025 through the Sustainable Medicines Manufacturing Innovation Programme, matched by more than GBP 20 million from industry (combined GBP 74m+). The programme is funded through the GBP 400 million VPAG Investment Programme, agreed under the 2024 Voluntary Scheme for Branded Medicines Pricing, Access and Growth (VPAG), and supports the manufacturing pillar of the UK's Modern Industrial Strategy Life Sciences Sector Plan. Funded projects include anaesthetic gas recovery/recycling (targeting ~GBP 5m annual NHS savings), converting spent nuclear fuel into radionuclide cancer therapies, CAR-T cell manufacturing scale-up (Royal Free Hospital), engineered bacteriophages for antibiotic resistance, and an AstraZeneca-led "Sustainable Future Factory" AI/robotics initiative.
On 8 September 2025, the UK Ministry of Defence published the Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 — "Making Defence an Engine for Growth" (CP 1388) — the first comprehensive cabinet-level UK defence industrial strategy in over a decade and the sector plan for Defence under the UK Modern Industrial Strategy umbrella (IS-8). The strategy was published alongside the Strategic Defence Review 2025 and operationalises the largest sustained defence- spending increase since the Cold War (rising to 2.6% of GDP by 2027 with ambition to 3% in the next Parliament). It defines six priority outcomes (growth, backing UK businesses, defence innovation, resilient industrial base, procurement transformation, enduring partnerships); establishes UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) within the MOD with a ringfenced £400m budget to accelerate dual-use technology; identifies priority defence capabilities (combat air, complex weapons, directed-energy weapons, next- generation land and maritime systems) plus dual-use sub-sectors (quantum, drones/autonomy, space, AI, cyber, engineering biology, advanced connectivity); and flags resilience priorities in steel, construction, energetic materials, batteries, semiconductors and rare earths.
The UK Department for Business and Trade, with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, published "The UK's Modern Industrial Strategy" (Command Paper CP 1451) on 23 June 2025, laid before Parliament via Written Statement HCWS725. It is the first cross-economy industrial strategy under the Starmer Labour government and replaces the 2017 Industrial Strategy (withdrawn in 2021). It sets a ten-year horizon focused on business investment, productivity and resilience, designates eight priority growth sectors ("IS-8"), and packages instruments including British Business Bank capacity expansion, the National Wealth Fund's GBP 27.8bn envelope, a permanent statutory Industrial Strategy Advisory Council, planning and skills reforms, and sector-specific Sector Plans published alongside.
The UK's state-owned National Wealth Fund (NWF) and UK Export Finance (UKEF), both wholly government-owned, jointly provided financial guarantees covering £272 million each (80% coverage of a £340 million loan facility) to unlock £680 million in commercial-bank financing for AESC's second battery gigafactory ("Plant 2") in Sunderland. The UK's Automotive Transformation Fund separately contributed £150 million in grants. Total investment mobilised exceeds £1 billion. The plant will add 15.8GWh of annual battery-cell capacity, supporting production of up to 100,000 electric vehicles per year and creating over 1,000 direct jobs in North East England.
On 8 May 2025, President Trump and UK Prime Minister Starmer announced the General Terms of the US-UK Economic Prosperity Deal (EPD), the first bilateral framework arrangement of the second Trump administration and the template instrument for subsequent US bilateral framework deals (US-Japan, US-Indonesia, US-Argentina, US-Korea, US-EU). The framework was implemented on 23 June 2025 via Executive Order 14309 (Federal Register doc 2025-11473). Key US concessions: a 100,000-vehicle annual TRQ for UK autos at a 10% combined rate (7.5% + 2.5% MFN, vs. 27.5% Section 232 default); aerospace tariff reduction back to MFN rates; authority delegated to Commerce/USTR to establish UK-only TRQs for steel and aluminum (in lieu of the 50% Section 232 global rate). Key UK concessions: 13,000 mt duty-free beef quota (with 20% tariff removal on the existing 1,000 mt WTO quota); 1.4 billion litre duty-free ethanol quota; commitment to negotiate non-tariff barrier reductions and supply-chain security alignment. The 10% IEEPA "reciprocal" baseline tariff on most other UK goods is preserved by the EPD.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (IFR) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove list-based license requirements — including National Security Column 1 (NS1), Regional Stability Column 1 (RS1) and Missile Technology Column 1 (MT1) reasons-for-control — for exports, reexports and in-country transfers to or within Australia and the United Kingdom. The IFR also expands the availability of license exceptions and reduces the scope of end-use and end-user-based license requirements for the two AUKUS partners, while leaving firearms-related items (Crime Control / CC) and a narrow set of other ECCNs untouched. The rule is the EAR-side companion to a parallel DDTC proposed rule creating an ITAR §126.7 exemption for defense articles and services traded among authorised AU/UK/US users, and is the foundational regulatory implementation of the AUKUS Pillar 2 advanced-capability cooperation track.
The UK government published its National Semiconductor Strategy on 19 May 2023, under Secretary of State Michelle Donelan at the newly established Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT). The strategy commits GBP 1 billion in long-run support to the UK semiconductor sector, explicitly focusing on the UK's identified strengths: chip design (Arm, Imagination Technologies, Dialog), compound and wide-bandgap semiconductors (III-V, SiC, GaN -- centred on the Cardiff/Newport cluster and IQE plc), and upstream academic R&D. Unlike the US CHIPS Act or EU Chips Act, the strategy explicitly declined to fund advanced silicon wafer fabrication at scale, acknowledging the prohibitive capital cost and the UK's lack of existing fab infrastructure at leading nodes. A UK Semiconductor Advisory Panel was established to guide delivery and assess emerging requirements. The strategy is enabled by the UK Subsidy Control Act 2022 (in force January 2023), which freed UK public authorities to grant large technology subsidies without prior EU Commission approval.
The Subsidy Control Act 2022 (Royal Assent 28 April 2022; in force 4 January 2023) replaced EU state-aid rules as the UK's domestic subsidy-control framework, fulfilling an obligation under the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). It establishes a principles-based self-assessment regime administered by a new Subsidy Advice Unit (SAU) at the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), allowing UK public authorities to grant subsidies without prior Commission approval while remaining compliant with WTO subsidy disciplines and TCA obligations.
The UK government announced on 15 March 2022 that it would ban the export of high-end luxury goods to Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine. The measure was implemented via new regulation 46B of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, inserted by the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 8) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/452), which was made on 13 April 2022 and came into force at 5pm on 14 April 2022. Regulation 46B prohibits the export, supply, or making available of luxury goods to, or for use in, Russia, covering goods with a sales price over £250 (excluding VAT) and vehicles over £42,000, spanning high-end fashion, works of art, jewellery, and vehicles, subject to licensing exceptions in Part 7.