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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
On 13 March 2024 the State Council issued the Action Plan on Promoting Large-Scale Equipment Renewal and Consumer Goods Trade-In as Guo Fa [2024] No. 7, distributed by NDRC alongside ten implementing ministries. Branded the "Two New" (两新) initiative, it is the flagship Xi/Li-era domestic-demand industrial-policy instrument structured around four action lines (equipment renewal, consumer-goods trade-in, recycling and circular utilisation, standards uplift) with twenty specific tasks and 2027 quantitative targets including ≥25% increase in equipment investment vs 2023 across industry, agriculture, construction, transport, education and healthcare. Funded by CNY 150bn of ultra-long-term special treasury bonds in 2024, expanded to CNY 300bn earmarked in 2025, the programme drove >CNY 1.3 trillion of consumer-goods trade-in transactions (autos, appliances, home furnishings, e-bikes) in its first year and is the central pillar of Beijing's response to the property-sector slowdown.
On 26 July 2018 the Serbian government agreed to sell a 63% stake in RTB Bor — the state-owned copper mining complex in eastern Serbia — to Zijin Mining Group (HKG:2899) for approximately USD 350 million plus a committed investment of USD 1.26 billion over five years. The transaction closed on 24 September 2018 after Chinese MOFCOM and Serbian government approvals. RTB Bor operates the Bor open-pit copper mine and the Čukaru Peki underground mine. Under Zijin's management, combined annual copper output reached 296,000 tonnes in 2025, making Zijin the second-largest copper producer in Europe after KGHM (Poland). The complex also produces significant gold as a by-product. The acquisition was facilitated by the China-Serbia comprehensive strategic partnership and BRI connectivity framework. The Serbian government accepted Chinese investment at a discount to assessed asset value in exchange for committed capital expenditure in a region with limited Western private-sector appetite for brownfield copper. EU membership negotiations and EU state-aid rules complicated alternative European financing structures. Zijin financed the acquisition through a combination of corporate balance sheet and China Development Bank-syndicated loans. The Čukaru Peki mine, which was not included in the initial RTB Bor asset base, received a separate Zijin investment commitment exceeding USD 800 million.
On 26 November 2013 a Chinese consortium led by MMG Limited (HKG:1208, the listed mining arm of China MinMetals Corporation) agreed to acquire the Las Bambas copper project in Apurímac, Peru from Glencore PLC for USD 5.85 billion. The sale was completed on 7 April 2014. MMG holds 62.5% of the consortium; CITIC Metal holds 15%; Guoxin International holds 22.5%. All three are Chinese state-linked entities. Las Bambas is one of the world's largest copper deposits. Since commencing production in 2016 it has produced approximately 300,000-400,000 tonnes of copper concentrate per year, representing roughly 1-1.5% of global mined copper supply and approximately 10% of Peru's total copper exports. Peru is the world's second-largest copper producer (~10% global supply), so Las Bambas is a material share of the Andean copper complex. The acquisition was MOFCOM-directed: as a condition of approving the Glencore-Xstrata merger in 2013, China's Ministry of Commerce required Glencore to divest Las Bambas to a Chinese buyer within 12 months of merger completion. This is the definitive case of Chinese antitrust authority being used as an instrument of resource-acquisition policy — MOFCOM leveraged deal approval to transfer a world-class copper asset to Chinese state-linked ownership. Las Bambas has been the source of persistent community conflicts in Apurímac Province, with road blockades in 2022-2023 halting production for extended periods and bringing the Peru government into direct negotiation with MMG and local communities. China's policy-bank financing (CDB-backed) for the acquisition underpins the ongoing operation despite these disruptions.
In May 2011 Jinchuan Group, one of China's largest nickel and copper producers (Gansu Province, state-owned), agreed to acquire South African mining company Metorex Limited for ZAR 9.1 billion (approximately USD 1.36 billion), besting a competing bid from Vale. Metorex's principal asset was a 77% stake in Kinsenda Copper Company (DRC), operator of the Kinsenda underground copper mine in Katanga Province — at the time one of the world's highest-grade active underground copper mines, with ore grades of approximately 5.5% copper. The acquisition gave Jinchuan effective control of Kinsenda, adding high-grade DRC copper production to its existing Chinese and African operations. It was one of the first Chinese state-enterprise acquisitions of a JSE-listed mining company and established a template for Chinese SOE outbidding of Western and emerging-market competitors for African copper assets. The deal was financed by state-directed credit from China Development Bank and represents one of approximately 14 high-value mining transactions (each >$100M) in which Chinese policy-bank lending was deployed to secure copper and cobalt assets in the DRC-Zambia copper belt in the 2010-2015 period.