Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2673 actions· ✨ 90 recent

Japan's Diet passed the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) 2026 Amendment on 29 May 2026; the law was promulgated on 5 June 2026. The amendment represents the most significant overhaul of Japan's inbound FDI screening regime since FEFTA was first applied to national-security transactions in 2019. Three structural additions: (1) indirect-acquisition screening — extends mandatory prior-notification to acquisitions of Japanese sensitive-sector companies effected through intermediate holding structures or offshore parent vehicles, closing the principal gap exploited by Chinese and GCC SWF investors via SPV chains; (2) call-in powers — grants the Minister of Finance authority to open a review up to ten years retroactively where an acquisition was not pre-notified or where circumstances have materially changed since clearance, directly analogous to CFIUS § 721(b)(1)(D) retroactive jurisdiction; (3) cross-ministerial "Japan CFIUS" consultation framework — formally institutionalises a standing inter-agency committee (Finance, METI, MoD, NPA, MIAC) modelled on the US CFIUS committee, replacing the prior ad-hoc inter-ministerial process. Cross-ministerial and indirect-acquisition provisions entered into force immediately on promulgation (5 June 2026); remaining Cabinet-Order-level implementing provisions to follow within one year.

On 15 April 2026 Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) published the interim summary "Manufacturing Base Strengthening Report" from the Study Group on Strengthening Manufacturing Base in Light of Geopolitical Risks. The report frames Japan's manufacturing base as the source of national power and proposes shifting economic-security support for "autonomy assurance" from "point" measures to "area"-wide measures — expanding the scope of Specified Critical Materials under the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA) beyond narrowly defined inputs to cover foundational petrochemicals (ethylene, propylene, methanol, synthetic rubber) and process-industry technologies (casting, forging), plus components for emerging technologies (humanoid-robot actuators and sensors, lasers for quantum computing). It is the cornerstone framework document operationalising METI's FY2026 strategic-budget package (~¥3.07 trillion overall envelope; ~¥1.23 trillion specifically for semiconductors and AI, including ¥150bn for Rapidus and ¥387.3bn for AI development) as Japan's coordinated response to deepening Chinese export-control pressure on dual-use items, gallium/germanium, graphite, antimony and heavy rare earths.

On 1 April 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae and President Emmanuel Macron held a Tokyo summit and signed a bilateral roadmap on cooperation in critical minerals — the first formal Japan-France instrument on supply-chain resilience for rare earths and other critical materials. The centrepiece is joint government support for Caremag, a heavy rare-earths refining project in southern France due to begin operations in late 2026, with backing from Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC), Iwatani Corporation, and the French government; the project targets approximately 20% of Japan's future demand for dysprosium and terbium (heavy rare-earth oxides used in EV motors, offshore-wind turbines, and electronic components). The two leaders also launched parallel high-level dialogues on dual-use AI, quantum technologies, space (including debris mitigation), cybersecurity, and a joint declaration on startups and innovation, expressing "serious concerns" over export controls on critical minerals and other materials affecting global supply chains — an explicit reference to China's tightening rare-earths export regime.

On 20 March 2026, METI/MOFA (Japan) and the US Departments of State and Energy jointly published the "Japan–United States Critical Minerals Project Cooperation Joint Fact Sheet," identifying five specific upstream critical-mineral projects spanning four continents (Australia, Tanzania, Brazil, UAE, Namibia) to receive structured joint financing through JOGMEC equity and offtake instruments and US DFC/Ex-Im Bank facilities. The document operationalises the October 2025 US-Japan Critical Minerals Framework and the same-day Action Plan, converting policy-framework language into named project commitments covering nickel, lithium, battery-anode graphite, and heavy rare earths. It was released the day following the Takaichi–Trump summit on 19 March 2026 and follows the Critical Minerals Investment Ministerial convened in Tokyo on 14 March 2026.

Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry amended the Export Trade Control Order (輸出貿易管理令) to add four technology categories to the prior-notification-of-transfer list under the Technology Management Scheme through Public-Private Dialogue (TMS-PPD): quantum-dot materials, TADF (thermally-activated delayed fluorescence) emissive materials, phase-difference film, and flexible endoscopes. Announced 11 November 2025, promulgated 19 November 2025, and effective 19 January 2026. This is the first list-control update produced by the TMS-PPD mechanism, which was established in December 2024 as an annual METI–industry review process for adding emerging-technology items to prior-notification controls outside the slower Wassenaar Arrangement / FEFTA catch-all channels.

Japan's Cabinet adopted a Cabinet Order on 11 November 2025 (promulgated 14 November 2025, effective 14 February 2026) amending Appended Table 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (輸出貿易管理令) to add three new list-control item categories: (i) peptide synthesizers and related components (Item group mapping to Australia Group 2023–2024 plenary dual-use biotechnology controls, aligning Japan with the US BIS implementation promulgated December 2024), (ii) powders of refractory metals or their alloys below specified particle-size and purity thresholds — tungsten, molybdenum, niobium, tantalum, and rhenium powders used as additive- manufacturing feedstocks (Item 5(20), implementing a Wassenaar Arrangement plenary outcome on metal-powder dual-use), and (iii) modules, assemblies, or devices incorporating field-programmable logic devices (FPGAs) above specified gate-count and process-node thresholds (Item 7(10-2), extending Japan's semiconductor-component AI-compute perimeter). This is the first discrete Appended Table 1 list-control amendment filed under the post-October-2025 FEFTA catch-all- controls overhaul architecture.

On 31 October 2025, Japan Investment Corporation (JIC) and its subsidiary JIC Capital, Ltd. (JICC) announced the establishment of two new private-equity limited partnerships — JIC PEF2 (JPY600 billion) and JIC PEFJ2 (JPY200 billion), collectively "JIC PE2" and totalling approximately JPY800 billion (~USD 5.36 billion) — launching 1 November 2025. The funds provide state-backed risk capital for large-scale industry restructuring, growth investment, and business-restructuring deals in capital-intensive sectors (mobility, semiconductors, chemicals, materials, healthcare) where JIC judges private PE capital in Japan to be insufficient. PEF2 is the main investment vehicle (10-year term, 5-year investment period); PEFJ2 co-invests alongside PEF2 in large-scale projects.

METI committed up to 732 billion yen (~US$4.86 billion) in direct subsidies for Japan Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing K.K. (JASM) to build a second wafer fab adjacent to the first JASM facility in Kikuyo, Kumamoto Prefecture. Confirmed by METI Minister Ken Saito at the Fab 1 opening ceremony on 24 February 2024, two weeks after TSMC, Sony Semiconductor Solutions, Denso, and Toyota jointly announced the Fab 2 expansion (6 February 2024). Fab 2 will produce 6/7nm and 40nm logic for automotive, industrial, consumer, and HPC end-markets, with combined Fab 1 + Fab 2 capacity exceeding 100,000 12-inch wafers per month. Construction targets year-end 2024; operations target year-end 2027. Combined with the 476 billion yen Fab 1 grant, total JASM subsidies reach ~1.208 trillion yen, the largest single direct manufacturing subsidy in Japanese history. METI conditions require >=10 years of post-startup production and >=50% Japanese-domestic procurement of silicon wafers, materials, and components.

Japan's Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA, Act No. 228 of 1 December 1949; 外国為替及び外国貿易法) is the foundational umbrella statute governing the entire modern Japanese economic-statecraft toolkit. Originally a restrictive positive-list regime for foreign-exchange transactions, FEFTA was fundamentally liberalised by the 1980 revision (positive-list to negative-list shift) and again overhauled in 1998 to establish the modern regulatory architecture. Three principal enforcement arms operate under FEFTA: (i) security export controls administered by METI via the Export Trade Control Order and the Foreign Exchange Order (covering the Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, MTCR, NSG, and CWC controlled-items lists plus Japan-specific catch-all controls); (ii) inward FDI screening administered jointly by the Ministry of Finance and sector ministries (prior notification and pre-notification regime, substantially expanded 2019–2020 with Core Business Sectors covering semiconductors, critical minerals, advanced materials, cloud computing, and aerospace added 2021); and (iii) autonomous economic sanctions (asset- freeze and payment-restriction designations against Russia, Iran, DPRK, Myanmar, Belarus, and others via Cabinet Orders made under FEFTA authority). Structurally peer-foundational to the US Trade Expansion Act 1962, US Trade Act 1974, UK SAMLA 2018, CN Export Control Law 2020, and CN Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law 2021 as the G7+CN foundational economic- statecraft statute cluster.