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At the Japan–UK bilateral summit in London on June 14, 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae and Prime Minister Keir Starmer issued the "Japan–UK Leaders' Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation," committing to deepen collaboration on critical minerals supply-chain diversification (mining, refining, processing, recycling, stockpiling), a focused battery-materials and recycling dialogue, and semiconductor technology cooperation through the Japan–UK Frontier Technology Partnership. The two leaders expressed grave concerns over economic coercion and arbitrary export restrictions on critical minerals and other materials that could affect global supply chains. The declaration preceded and informed the G7 Évian critical-minerals alliance announced three days later on June 17, 2026.

On 15 April 2026 Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) published the interim summary "Manufacturing Base Strengthening Report" from the Study Group on Strengthening Manufacturing Base in Light of Geopolitical Risks. The report frames Japan's manufacturing base as the source of national power and proposes shifting economic-security support for "autonomy assurance" from "point" measures to "area"-wide measures — expanding the scope of Specified Critical Materials under the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA) beyond narrowly defined inputs to cover foundational petrochemicals (ethylene, propylene, methanol, synthetic rubber) and process-industry technologies (casting, forging), plus components for emerging technologies (humanoid-robot actuators and sensors, lasers for quantum computing). It is the cornerstone framework document operationalising METI's FY2026 strategic-budget package (~¥3.07 trillion overall envelope; ~¥1.23 trillion specifically for semiconductors and AI, including ¥150bn for Rapidus and ¥387.3bn for AI development) as Japan's coordinated response to deepening Chinese export-control pressure on dual-use items, gallium/germanium, graphite, antimony and heavy rare earths.

On 1 April 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae and President Emmanuel Macron held a Tokyo summit and signed a bilateral roadmap on cooperation in critical minerals — the first formal Japan-France instrument on supply-chain resilience for rare earths and other critical materials. The centrepiece is joint government support for Caremag, a heavy rare-earths refining project in southern France due to begin operations in late 2026, with backing from Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC), Iwatani Corporation, and the French government; the project targets approximately 20% of Japan's future demand for dysprosium and terbium (heavy rare-earth oxides used in EV motors, offshore-wind turbines, and electronic components). The two leaders also launched parallel high-level dialogues on dual-use AI, quantum technologies, space (including debris mitigation), cybersecurity, and a joint declaration on startups and innovation, expressing "serious concerns" over export controls on critical minerals and other materials affecting global supply chains — an explicit reference to China's tightening rare-earths export regime.

On 20 March 2026, METI/MOFA (Japan) and the US Departments of State and Energy jointly published the "Japan–United States Critical Minerals Project Cooperation Joint Fact Sheet," identifying five specific upstream critical-mineral projects spanning four continents (Australia, Tanzania, Brazil, UAE, Namibia) to receive structured joint financing through JOGMEC equity and offtake instruments and US DFC/Ex-Im Bank facilities. The document operationalises the October 2025 US-Japan Critical Minerals Framework and the same-day Action Plan, converting policy-framework language into named project commitments covering nickel, lithium, battery-anode graphite, and heavy rare earths. It was released the day following the Takaichi–Trump summit on 19 March 2026 and follows the Critical Minerals Investment Ministerial convened in Tokyo on 14 March 2026.

Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) and the Cabinet Office jointly published the Shipbuilding Revival Roadmap (造船業再生ロードマップ) on 26 December 2025, redefining shipbuilding as a "national strategic industry" within an All-Japan shipping-and-shipbuilding framework. The Roadmap targets doubling domestic shipbuilding capacity from ~9 million GT to 18 million GT by 2035 (re-capturing roughly 20% global market share) backed by a ¥1 trillion (~USD 6.4 bn) public-private investment commitment over three staged phases (2026-28 automation, 2029-31 facility expansion, 2032-34 dock-operation support), mandates consolidation of domestic shipbuilders into 1-3 groups by 2028, and is funded in its first three years by a ¥120 bn FY2025 supplementary budget enacted in December 2025.

Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry amended the Export Trade Control Order (輸出貿易管理令) on 14 November 2025 to extend the specific bulk-licence (特別包括許可 / tokubetsu hōkatsu kyoka) framework to accessories and parts of defence equipment exported for maintenance and repair purposes to countries holding a Defence Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement (DETTA / 防衛装備品・技術移転協定) with Japan. Prior to the amendment, each transfer of such parts required an individual export-licence application specifying parts and quantities per transaction, which impeded the rapid parts-flow essential to operational maintenance cycles. The amendment entered into force on 14 February 2026 and currently covers eleven DETTA-partner countries: the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Australia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

On 31 October 2025, Japan Investment Corporation (JIC) and its subsidiary JIC Capital, Ltd. (JICC) announced the establishment of two new private-equity limited partnerships — JIC PEF2 (JPY600 billion) and JIC PEFJ2 (JPY200 billion), collectively "JIC PE2" and totalling approximately JPY800 billion (~USD 5.36 billion) — launching 1 November 2025. The funds provide state-backed risk capital for large-scale industry restructuring, growth investment, and business-restructuring deals in capital-intensive sectors (mobility, semiconductors, chemicals, materials, healthcare) where JIC judges private PE capital in Japan to be insufficient. PEF2 is the main investment vehicle (10-year term, 5-year investment period); PEFJ2 co-invests alongside PEF2 in large-scale projects.

On 30 September 2025 Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) signed a facility agreement providing up to USD 1.8 billion (JBIC's portion) to Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), co-financed alongside Mizuho Bank (agent) and HSBC's Tokyo branch for a total facility of USD 3 billion. The loan is explicitly structured to support "stable imports of crude oil by Japanese companies" and is the seventh JBIC loan extended to ADNOC for this purpose. A companion MOU signed 4 November 2025 at ADIPEC 2025 broadens the JBIC-ADNOC partnership into downstream energy-transition sectors (hydrogen, ammonia, chemicals).

On 26 September 2025, Japan's Minister of Finance Katsunobu Kato announced the establishment of the Japan Strategic Investment Facility, a JBIC-administered financing vehicle operationalising the USD 550bn investment pledge from the July 2025 US-Japan tariff and investment agreement. The facility launched 1 October 2025 and runs through March 2029, supporting the overseas expansion of Japanese companies across nine economic-security sectors: semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, steel, shipbuilding, critical minerals, aviation, energy, automobiles, and AI/quantum technology. Funding draws on three sources — dollar-denominated JBIC bonds, yen-denominated Japanese government loans to JBIC, and a "supplemental" transfer from Japan's USD 1.324tn foreign-currency reserves — with private-sector loans and NEXI-backed loan guarantees supplementing JBIC's own financing.

Japan's first standalone AI statute (Law No. 53) was promulgated 4 June 2025 and became fully effective 1 September 2025, when chapters establishing the Artificial Intelligence Strategic Headquarters — chaired by the Prime Minister with all Cabinet ministers as members — entered into force. The Act adopts an innovation-first, non-punitive framework: it imposes no monetary penalties and relies on cooperative and reputational compliance mechanisms rather than mandatory requirements. An AI Basic Plan, adopted by Cabinet decision on 23 December 2025, translates the statutory mandate into cross-ministry R&D and deployment targets.

Japan's Act on the Promotion of Supply and Utilization of Low-Carbon Hydrogen and its Derivatives for a Smooth Transition to a Decarbonized, Growth-Oriented Economic Structure (the Hydrogen Society Promotion Act) was enacted by the Diet on 17 May 2024, promulgated 24 May 2024, and came into force on 23 October 2024. It is Japan's first legislation specifically targeting hydrogen. The Act establishes a 15-year price-gap Contract-for-Difference (CfD) subsidy backstopping the delivered cost of certified low-carbon hydrogen, ammonia, synthetic methane and synthetic fuels supplied to Japan, plus a "Hub Support" capex grant for shared port/pipeline/storage infrastructure. METI is the competent authority and JOGMEC the implementing agency. Total subsidy envelope is ~3 trillion yen (~USD 20bn) financed via GX Transition Bonds under the 2023 GX Promotion Act.

On 28 March 2024 the Cabinet Office Committee on National Space Policy adopted Japan's Space Technology Strategy, the country's first national space-industrial roadmap establishing priority technology areas (space transportation, satellites, space science and exploration, shared technologies) and the operating framework for the ¥1 trillion (≈USD 6.4 billion) ten-year Space Strategy Fund jointly managed by JAXA on behalf of METI, MEXT and the Cabinet Office. The Strategy sets headline targets of doubling Japan's space-industry market to ¥8 trillion by the early 2030s and reaching ≈30 launches per year. A METI/MEXT/CAO Basic Policy of 26 April 2024 operationalised the Fund's grant architecture, and JAXA opened the first calls in July 2024. The Strategy is the parent authority for subsequent JAXA Space Strategy Fund grant programmes and is Japan's structural counterpart to the EU Space Act (2025) and US National Space Policy.

The Act on Promotion of a Smooth Transition to a Decarbonized Growth-Oriented Economic Structure (Law No. 46 of 2023), passed by the Diet on 12 May 2023 and promulgated 19 May 2023, establishes Japan's Green Transformation (GX) financing and carbon pricing framework. The government will issue 20 trillion yen in GX Economy Transition Bonds (the world's first sovereign transition bonds) to catalyze 150 trillion yen of public-private decarbonization investment over ten years (2023-2032). Bonds are repaid through a two-pillar carbon pricing system: a GX Emissions Trading Scheme (GX-ETS) launching voluntarily in FY2023, becoming mandatory for emitters >100,000 tCO2/year from FY2026; and a GX-surcharge on fossil fuel importers phased in from FY2028.

The Act on the Promotion of Ensuring National Security through Integrated Implementation of Economic Measures (Law No. 43 of 2022), enacted 18 May 2022, establishes a four-pillar framework: (1) supply-chain resilience for "specified critical products," (2) security of critical infrastructure, (3) state-backed development of "specified critical technologies," and (4) non-disclosure of nationally sensitive patents. A December 2022 Cabinet Order designated 11 product categories as specified critical products, including semiconductors, storage batteries, permanent magnets, cloud programs, LNG, critical minerals, machine tools, and aircraft parts. Competent ministries must publish stable-supply plans, can fund private-sector surveys, and may provide subsidies to qualifying firms.